Sustaining the costly offensive

“Missiles have the range and precision to strike targets deep inside adversary territory without exposing the launch platform to danger. Their speed also often leaves little or no warning time, making interception difficult, if not impossible,” a former defence scientist associated with the country’s missile programmes told Blueprint on the condition of anonymity. 

Pointing to the performance of the BrahMos — a supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from land, air, and sea — during Operation Sindoor in May last year, the former scientist added: “The role of missiles is only going to grow, both globally and in the subcontinent. We must be able to build all kinds of them in substantial numbers, but without breaking the bank.”

Operation Sindoor began with Indian retaliatory strikes on the intervening night of May 6 and 7, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in response to the April 22 Pahalgam attack. The conflict widened despite India repeatedly offering off ramps, with Pakistan attempting to strike civilian and military infrastructure across the entire stretch of the Line of Control and the international border. In response, India broadened its strikes to include Pakistani military infrastructure, hitting 11 airbases between May 8 and 10. 

By the time the conflict was paused on the evening of May 10, the subcontinent had witnessed at least three military firsts: India’s use of air-launched cruise missiles, including the BrahMos; Pakistan’s use of conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles; and the employment of drone warfare by both sides.

Ballistic missiles have traditionally been classified through the prism of their nuclear role. The categories broadly run from close-range systems with ranges of 50–300 kilometres (km), to short-range at 300–1,000 km, medium-range at 1,000–3,000 km, intermediate-range at 3,000–5,500 km, and intercontinental systems beyond 5,500 km. Cruise missiles, which until recently had seen broader conventional use than their ballistic counterparts, are generally grouped differently: short-range variants extend up to 300 km, medium-range between 300 and 1,000 km, and long-range beyond 1,000 km. Recent conflicts suggest that the ranges most relevant to conventional missile warfare increasingly lie in the roughly 500–3,000 km bracket. Meanwhile, rocket artillery often caps out at 300–350 km.

Perhaps the clearest sign yet that policymakers are factoring the growing centrality of long-range conventional missiles into military planning came from Defence Secretary Rajesh kumar Singh. Speaking at a security summit in the national capital in April, Singh said an emerging case existed for establishing a conventional missile force in light of the conflict in West Asia and recent steps taken by the Pakistan military. Such weapons, he noted, had traditionally been viewed as primarily strategic in nature, but that paradigm had shifted, requiring India’s armed forces to adapt accordingly.

In May, at an industry summit, Singh again pointed to the changing character of warfare and the growing use of ballistic missiles — once largely confined to the nuclear realm — as instruments of conventional conflict. The time had come, Singh argued, to consider transferring technology for various types of ballistic missiles to the private sector. “…you will see steps taken by the government to ensure sufficient private-sector involvement in that space as well,” he added.

The services have also indicated the need for the ability to strike targets farther away, with military sources suggesting that the army wants to increase the reach of the ‘Shaktibaan’ artillery regiments raised last year from the current 100–400 km range to 700–1,000 km. At the far end of that planned expansion, ballistic and cruise missiles are likely to be the only realistic options.

The context is difficult to miss. Last August, Pakistan announced the creation of an “Army Rocket Force” to oversee missile combat capabilities in a conventional war. China, which has possessed a missile force for decades, recommissioned it as the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) in December 2015 and elevated it into the country’s fourth military service alongside the army, navy, and air force.

The Chinese missile force has “changed strikingly in character” over the past 40 years, shifting from primarily a nuclear deterrent force into a combined nuclear and conventional missile arm, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an American think tank.

A 2017 assessment by the United States (US) Navy stated that the PLARF then controlled the “largest and most diverse missile force in the world”. At least one credible US open-source estimate has placed the PLARF’s inventory at more than 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles.

India, for its part, has kept pace with global advances in missile technology. It possesses a mature and diverse arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles, along with the battle-tested BrahMos cruise missile, which is now beginning to see export success, with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam likely to follow the Philippines as customers. 

The country has also registered successes in hypersonic technology and prototype testing. The gap, for now, appears to be manufacturing scale. At present, defence public sector undertaking (DPSU) Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) remains the country’s principal integrator of long-range missiles, with the various components — from propellant to warhead — manufactured across a distributed industrial network.

In the cruise missile space, BrahMos Aerospace — the Indo-Russian defence corporation — occupies a unique position. The first defence joint venture established by the Indian government with a foreign state, it manufactures the supersonic weapon that shares its name and is increasing production capacity. The first batch of missiles from its new facility in Lucknow under the Uttar Pradesh Defence Industrial Corridor programme rolled out in October 2025.

Rajinder Singh Bhatia, chairman of Kalyani Strategic Systems Ltd, a defence subsidiary of Bharat Forge, told Blueprint that India already possesses the foundations required to substantially expand missile production, with the private sector having worked closely with DPSUs across several related programmes and now deeply embedded in component manufacturing. “The country does possess substantial capacity, but that needs to be augmented given global trends. We, both as a country and as an industry, can gear up for this by setting clear goals and a defined roadmap,” he added.

The exact production capacity of strategic missile systems remains a closely guarded secret. However, another private defence industry insider and senior member of the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers, speaking to Blueprint on condition of anonymity, said it was widely understood that the necessary technological maturity had already been attained. The constraints, he argued, revolved around the availability and cost of energetics — including explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics — as well as sensors and electronics. Achieving scale in these areas would be the first major milestone. On the positive side, he added, the precision-manufacturing facilities and industrial capabilities required already exist in the country and can be expanded.“We will need to increase the availability of the sensors that guide these weapons to their targets, the propellants that power them there, and the explosives they carry to achieve the desired military effect. Efficient management of the supply chain and component ecosystem will ultimately determine the scale-up,” said the industry insider.

The former scientist quoted before laid out two further requirements that would have to be met. The first was the in-country refinement and processing of the raw materials that go into these missiles, along with assurances that both public- and private-sector producers would make sufficient output available for such programmes. The second was the marriage of the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) technical expertise and human resources with the production capacity of private industry, including startups.

He argued that any effort to build missiles at scale should ideally be pursued through a consortium framework. “Today, there are private firms that can provide the propulsion needed for ballistic or subsonic cruise missiles. Most of the cost lies in the avionics, and we already have at least a handful of players capable of supplying reliable quality. DRDO has the design, research, and development expertise. What is needed now is to bell the cat and bring all the moving parts together in one place,” he said.

The former scientist also pointed out that while the urgent need for numbers meant large private-sector firms would have to play a central role, the value of engaging startups should not be overlooked. “More agile disruptors could very well bring in the innovation needed to reduce per-unit costs,” he said, arguing that making the most of dual-use technologies was essential, as they would attract greater funding.

The rationale behind his argument is reflected in the draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026 released by the MoD in February. The document acknowledges that future battlefields will be dominated by dual-use technologies — systems of civilian origin that can be adapted for military purposes. “The rigid walls between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ specifications have crumbled,” it notes. In response, the draft seeks to institutionalise “civil-military fusion” — an integrated ecosystem in which civilian and military sectors share capabilities and innovation.

The industry insider quoted before argued that order visibility would ultimately be the deciding factor, as building a robust supply chain for raw materials, components, and sub-components would flow from that. “Exports could materialise later on, but they will mostly be government-to-government deals, given the sensitivity surrounding the proliferation of longer-range missiles of all kinds. While we should compete for a larger share of the global market, domestic order volumes will ultimately determine whether scale can be achieved,” the industry source added.

The former scientist, however, disagreed, arguing that achieving a meaningful surge in production within the desired timeframe would require industry investment to run ahead of orders.

Investments do appear to be forthcoming. Welcoming any move to broaden industry participation in the defence sector, Ram Agarwal, chief executive officer of Goodluck India Ltd, said group company Goodluck Astra India Ltd would soon begin producing composite propellant — solid rocket fuel — at its upcoming facility in Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh. “We will do our part in securing the nation and are already putting up the investment. Going forward, we will also manufacture other components that will be critical for missiles and munitions,” Agarwal added. A manufacturer of specialised engineered steel products, Goodluck India already produces artillery shells at another facility in Uttar Pradesh.

In mid-May, Agneyastra Energetics Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kalyani Strategic Systems Ltd, broke ground for a 1,000-acre manufacturing facility in Andhra Pradesh for advanced energetics, along with ammunition systems. The facility is planned to come up with an investment of Rs 1,500 crore over the next two to four years. A company release said that Agneyastra Energetics had been established to address the country’s “continued reliance on imported energetics materials”.

Action from the MoD is already visible. “Yes, affordable mass is needed in conventionally armed missiles. We have asked the DRDO to license missile technologies to the private sector,” a ministry source said on condition of anonymity, adding that it was the source’s understanding that for weapons such as short-range air-defence missiles and anti-ship missiles, the DRDO had already enlisted private partners. The source added that the DRDO would likely be doing the same for other non-strategic missiles as well, including the Astra beyond visual range air-to-air missile and the Pralay surface-to-surface quasi-ballistic missile, among others, in the coming days. 

The DRDO conducted a salvo launch of two Pralay missiles in December 2025 (Photo: PTI)

A term common in Western military planning and increasingly shaping weapon development programmes in the US, “affordable mass” describes the ability to field large numbers of systems that are inexpensive enough to sustain prolonged, high-intensity conflict, yet capable enough to remain effective on the modern battlefield.

Cost-effective, however, does not mean less capable or less precise. “Precision and mass once stood at opposite ends, and bringing the two together came at enormous cost,” a senior officer from one of the three armed services said at an event hosted in the national capital in May by a think tank focused on air power. But that equation, the officer argued, had now shifted fundamentally: “Mass precision — quality and quantity — is the defining factor of modern combat.”

While the officer was referring to the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems, the observation applies just as readily to long-range missiles. Michael Bohnert, an engineer with the Engineering and Applied Sciences Department at the American think tank RAND, told Blueprint that while Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had underscored the power of affordable tactical mass through unmanned air and ground systems, the recent wars involving Iran and its proxies highlighted the value of affordable ballistic missile mass. “However, a mix of exquisite and affordable systems is likely more cost effective overall,” he said, adding that there remains significant debate over which capabilities offer the best value — cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, long-range one-way attack drones, air-deployed munitions, and others.

The importance of “mass” is difficult to miss. Between the start of the war in West Asia on February 28 and April 6, Iran launched an estimated 2,108 ballistic missiles and 58 cruise missiles — apart from an even larger number of drones — against targets across the region, according to the think tank, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America.

Contrast that with the “less than 50 weapons” that the Indian armed forces said were sufficient to bring Pakistan “to the talking (negotiating) table” during Operation Sindoor— an admittedly brief conflict, however intense, whose duration was curtailed in significant measure by what the services have described as effective Indian “conflict termination”.

Meanwhile, the importance of containing the cost of offensive operations was underscored by a report that, by March 27, the US military had fired more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles in just four weeks of war with Iran. The pace at which the missiles were being expended reportedly alarmed at least some Pentagon officials, raising questions about future availability. Those anxieties were likely compounded by the economics of replacement. According to one credible American academic estimate, while each Tomahawk missile was once valued at roughly $2 million, replacing them today could cost between $3 million and $3.5 million apiece. At the upper end of that estimate, replenishing the missiles fired during the conflict alone would cost approximately $2.975 billion.

At home, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is estimated to have employed approximately 25 Franco-British SCALP missiles, five Israeli Crystal Maze missiles, and 19 BrahMos missiles during Operation Sindoor, according to an analysis by the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank. With estimated unit costs of roughly $1 million for the SCALP, $2 million for the Crystal Maze, and $4.75 million for the BrahMos, the expenditure would amount to approximately $25 million, $10 million, and $90.25 million respectively, taking the total estimated missile expenditure during the operation to roughly $125.25 million, the analysis added. Scaled to the number of missiles reportedly employed by the US, India’s outlay on such weapons alone would have reached approximately $2.172 billion — roughly a quarter of the estimated $8.7 billion value of the deal with France for 36 Rafale combat aircraft.

It remains to be seen whether the concept of affordable mass will also be extended to cruise missiles, as is the case with the US Air Force, which plans to spend more than $12 billion over five years to acquire nearly 28,000 affordable cruise missiles.

For now, however, in the ballistic missile sphere — where systems are generally easier to produce at lower cost than cruise missiles while remaining just as accurate — India may already possess the basic building blocks in the form of the Pralay.

Developed by the DRDO, the Pralay surface-to-surface missile has a declared range of 150–500 km. Powered by solid propellant and launched from a canisterised road-mobile system, two factors that allow for rapid deployment, the missile is designed to carry a range of conventional warheads. It flies a quasi-ballistic trajectory — a lower and flatter flight path than the steep arc followed by a traditional ballistic missile — making interception by adversary missile defences more difficult. Integrated avionics and an onboard navigation system also give it precision-strike capability.

The more consequential detail, however, may be that the Pralay is learnt to utilise subsystems derived from existing missiles, a factor likely to reduce unit costs. First tested in December 2021, the system now appears to be maturing, with two missiles launched in quick succession from the same launcher roughly four years later.

Operation Sindoor brought “kinetic, non-contact” warfare to the subcontinent: a form of conflict driven primarily using missiles, drones, and long-range precision weapons to destroy targets from a distance, limiting direct close-quarters engagement between opposing forces. While the character of warfare continues to evolve, and a confrontation with the northern neighbour may unfold under different dynamics, the ability to inflict damage from standoff distances is now firmly established in the region and is likely to remain a feature of future hostilities.

That, in turn, calls for a concerted effort to better prepare India for such warfare, requiring not only stakeholders to come together and the technical challenges of achieving production scale to be solved, but also affordability to be driven by the rapid incorporation of commercial off-the-shelf technologies, faster testing by the services, and quicker acquisition by the government.