Nationalism and Hindutva: A new era in Indian politics gets explored

In 2019, Hindutva yielded rich results for the BJP. But why did the nationalism plank produce suboptimal results in 2024?

India on the Move: When Jai Shri Ram Met Bharat Mata ki Jai

Author: Marya Shakil & Narendra Nath Mishra

Publisher: Penguin

Pages: 174

Price: Rs 699

 

Marya Shakil and Narendra Nath Mishra are extremely busy journalists. Ms Shakil was the only journalist to whom Prime Minister Modi granted an interview from his campaign vehicle. So it is mystifying how they got the time to develop an idea and write a book while covering recent events on the ground. For a reporter, covering an election is not just about hitting dusty roads, spending nights in small hamlets, tolerating attacks by mosquitoes and sundry other wee beasties. It is not just about talking to myriad people, some of whom have to be coaxed to talk to you. It is that niggling feeling that you might have missed something, the uncertainty and the doubt, the sense that what people are saying could be interpreted differently leading to a different outcome altogether….

 

But Ms Shakil and Mr Mishra have stuck their necks out, have taken a bet and on the basis of their ground reporting have reached a conclusion about Indian politics. It could be wrong, it might be right. It’s too soon to tell. But it is an interesting hypothesis. The central premise of the book is that the political mobilisation of Hindus as Hindus has been overtaken by mobilisation on the basis of nationalism. The turning point was the events in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 2016, when a protest was held against the “judicial killing” of Afzal Guru, the 2001 Parliament attack convict, and Kashmiri separatist Maqbool Bhat, in “solidarity with the struggle of the Kashmiri people for their right to self-determination. JNU has for long been envied and resented; it has been considered a Left radical enclave (although it has contributed vast numbers to pillars of establishment such as the civil services). It is a campus known for fostering independent thinking. Deeming this quality insufficient for rounded education, former Vice-Chancellor Jagadesh Kumar batted to have a tank installed on the campus so that it would inspire ideas of nationalism in students. In ideological terms, it was in JNU that the idea that India is a collective of many nationalities and religions was challenged by the assertion that India was one nation and anyone who said otherwise must be a traitor.

 

The authors describe Kanhaiya Kumar’s meeting, the hysterical chanting of “azaadi” by the students who attended and, amid some electoral defeats, the BJP’s conclusion that it needed something more than Hindutva. JNU events offered the opportunity on a platter. “The nationalism plank that the BJP now wore on its sleeve would go on to become an even greater unifying force than Hindutva and would emerge as the BJP’s strongest weapons in the times to come,” they write.

 

Nationalism did not supplant Hindutva; it supplemented it. The Balakot strikes and the branding as anti-nationals of those who asked questions about the outcome of the attack, was one component. Large rallies such as farmer protests and the rallying together of wrestlers were other examples of “those who wanted to show India in bad light”. The book details other strands of the nationalism narrative: The Bollywood response and the “boycott” movement, the deployment of “influencers” on alternative media, vaccine diplomacy during Covid, the corralling of the Indian diaspora, and even the new Parliament building with heavy reliance on symbols such as the Sengol to showcase India’s unity as a nation.

 

In 2019, Hindutva had yielded rich results for the BJP. In fact, the book argues, many opposition political parties had to consciously co-opt Hindutva in their campaigns. But Hindutva also gave rise to instant leaders who had their own creative interpretations of it. The BJP “disciplined” elements such as Nupur Sharma, though the book notes that in any other society, hate speech laws would have been invoked. The disciplining was a recognition of the pragmatic conclusion that it would be counterproductive for India to anger the Islamic world.

 

But why did the nationalism appeal lead to a sub-optimal electoral result for the BJP in 2024? The book is a bit vague on this aspect.  Its conclusion is that while Hindutva and nationalism are all very well, people want governments to govern efficiently and address issues of livelihood, employment and social justice, and they take no time at all to see through the window dressing. On the other hand, the book notes that as themes in electoral strategy, Hindutva and nationalism are here to stay. Indian society is seeing many counter currents. For example, while Bollywood films that reinforce the nationalism theme such as Tiger Zinda Hai and Border have been box office successes, so have movies like Veer Zara and the  Gadar  series that are India-Pakistan love stories. Gadar 1 and 2 have surpassed all box office benchmarks, testifying to India’s continuing interest in Pakistan stories, nationalist fervour notwithstanding.

 

BJP took the brave decision of contesting 2024 in Punjab and Tamil Nadu on its own. In these two states nationalism is understood differently. The party contested more seats so its vote share also went up. But rising voter interest in the BJP is forcing local parties to devise new electoral strategies. BJP workers are also pressing the senior party leadership to think about growth in these states. It needs to be nationalism-plus. This book has something to say. Whether you agree with its conclusions or not, if you want to understand India, you have to listen.