A security breach

The attack on Parliament building raises many questions

The security breach in the new Parliament building on December 13, the 22nd anniversary of the attack on the old building by Pakistan-backed terror groups in 2001, raises critical questions about the security mechanisms and processes in a building that was supposed to surpass in terms of security technology the 96-year-old one it replaced. A repetition of the 2001 attack, it was said, would never be possible in the new complex. But comparisons with the 2001 attack do not enhance the reputation of the Delhi Police, paramilitary forces, and the Parliament Security Services, the agencies responsible for parliamentary security. In 2001, Parliament was attacked in a planned operation by operatives of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad carrying sophisticated weaponry. Yet the car they drove toward Parliament did not even get near the main building and none of the 100-odd MPs inside was required to physically engage with the attackers as some of them were forced to do on Thursday. In 2001, the attackers’ car, bearing a forged home ministry sticker, was turned back by alert security guards suspecting foul play. It was then that the terrorists opened fire and the resultant exchange of bullets caused the deaths of eight security persons and a gardener.

True, most of the culprits in the 2023 attack could not have attracted similar suspicion, being ordinary unarmed Indian citizens. It was sheer luck that the operation was conceived, planned, and resourced in a laughably and serendipitously amateurish manner, so there were no deaths or other casualties. The concealed canisters smuggled in the shoes of two attackers in the visitors’ gallery contained coloured smoke of the kind seen at sports stadiums rather than lethal gases. But questions must surely be asked as to how two other conspirators also managed to get close enough to the exterior of the building to shout slogans and detonate more canisters of coloured smoke. Also open to inquiry should be the design of the interiors that positioned the visitors’ gallery accessibly close to the MPs to enable a reasonably fit individual to jump down.

Beyond the bungling inside Parliament, the incident should prompt a rethink of security procedures. The laxity with which MPs are permitted to authorise visitor passes must be addressed. For those entering the visitors’ gallery, the security process would not have passed muster in the world’s (and some of India’s) major airports. In most large airports, shoes (in which the canisters were concealed) are scanned separately. Enhanced technology could address these issues but the bigger point is the broader security planning around Parliament. This involves much more than restricting traffic and pedestrians or upping surveillance on citizens. The attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, demonstrated unanticipated threats to institutions of public governance. A complicated and tumultuous democracy such as India faces multiple external and internal threats at any given time. Those responsible for parliamentary security need to apply their collective mind to scenario-planning to anticipate and respond to multiple-threat situations. This exercise demands the harder work of intelligent thought rather than the easy solutions of fixing responsibility and bolstering security hardware and processes.