A worrying shift: New security strategy in US reflects changing worldview

The United States (US) government periodically issues a document summarising its approach to national security. The latest National Security Strategy was released last week, outlining how the administration under President Donald Trump sees the world. It contained several surprises and some major shifts in emphasis for the US. Given the importance of that country to global and regional stability, it is no wonder that such shifts have caused both elation and dismay in many quarters. The first major underlying alteration of US efforts is a clear prioritisation of the Western Hemisphere. The new strategy proposes a “Trump corollary” for the Monroe doctrine of the early 19th century, named after President James Monroe, who warned any European powers from further interference or colonisation in the New World. In other words, Washington was declaring that the Americas were its sphere of influence and that no outside power would be welcome.

 

This is an expression of the underlying politics of the strategy document. As is commonly the case in Mr Trump’s second term, this politics is populist, xenophobic, and “America First”. Control of the Western Hemisphere is necessary to achieve ends that are important in domestic politics. The various other shifts around the world are also, to a greater or lesser degree, a consequence of the triumph of Mr Trump’s ideological worldview. For example, while the National Security Strategy generally preaches non-interference, it makes an obvious exception in the case of Europe. These long-standing US allies have been a particular bugbear for Mr Trump, who despises the liberal outlook, which is mainstream in their polities and underlines the policies of the European Union. The strategy document, most unusually, urges the continent to rediscover its civilisational heritage — and not so subtly suggests that it is a core US interest that migration to those countries be stopped as well.

 

Where does this worldview leave India and the broader Indo-Pacific? The document continues to say the right things about such initiatives as the Quad and AUKUS; and it seems to urge the US to invest in its military sufficiently to maintain superiority over China in any contest over the South China Sea and the First Island Chain. But it also expects local partners to contribute a great deal more to this effort. Some of this is already in motion: Japan has already begun to increase its warlike preparedness, provoking an angry response from Beijing. India, however, is likely to resist any expectation that support from the West in its efforts to deter China in the Himalayas requires it to be more proactive in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. So far New Delhi’s American interlocutors have tiptoed around the question of India’s actions in the case of such a crisis. But the tone of this strategy document indicates that this sort of polite caution is a thing of the past.  Questions will also be asked, as a consequence of the 2025 National Security Strategy, of the depth of Washington’s commitment to deterring Beijing. After all, much of this document looks like a retreat to the Western Hemisphere, and a contraction of the definition of US core interests. If American policymakers become convinced that prosperity in North America can best be defended through allowing Asia to become a Chinese sphere of influence, the worldview in this National Security Strategy would suggest that this is acceptable, even desirable. For India, this is a worrying shift.