Saudi Arabia-Pakistan dynamics: India must consider collateral impact

The mutual defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan essentially formalises a well-known, longstanding military cooperation between the two nations. The nuclear dimension of the pact, as articulated by the Pakistani defence minister, who said his country’s nuclear programme would be “made available to Saudi Arabia” under the new pact, has also been an integral element in this collaboration.  In his 2012 book, Eating Grass, Pakistani military insider Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan reveals that Saudi Arabia provided “generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear programme to continue, especially when the country was under sanctions”. This tacit understanding of nuclear cooperation became clearer after US military intelligence revealed Riyadh’s acquisition of intercontinental ballistic-missile technology from China following Saudi misgivings at the Biden administration’s attempts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. It is the timing of this public announcement that is significant, however. Concluded soon after Israel’s bombing of US ally Qatar, the Saudi-Pakistan agreement implies a new dynamic in West Asian politics vis-a-vis the US.

 

Israel’s bombing of Qatar has signalled that the Trump White House has given Binyamin Netanyahu a carte blanche in the region. Not surprisingly, this development has raised an acute sense of vulnerability about the security guarantees between Washington and the Gulf monarchies. Deep defence ties make it difficult for Saudi Arabia to extricate itself from relations with the US — not least because Riyadh buys the bulk of its conventional weaponry from the US. Israel’s bombing has heightened Saudi threat perceptions, which were already elevated by the presence of Iran-backed Houthis on its southern border. By formalising an informal defence pact, Riyadh has sent an unambiguous signal that it is seeking more robust deterrence against potential nuclear threats in its neighbourhood. The fact that the Gulf nations hailed Islamabad’s nuclear weapons test as the “Islamic Bomb” in 1998 offered early indications of the perception of Pakistan’s role in West Asian military security.

 

Though the pact is not directed at India, the possibility of collateral impact cannot be ruled out. There is unlikely to be a material change in cordial relations between India and Saudi Arabia. India is Saudi Arabia’s second-largest trade partner and Saudi Arabia is India’s fifth-largest. Beyond the geoeconomics of crude oil, where Russia has taken prime position, the Saudi wealth fund has significant investment in India and the two countries conducted joint land and naval military exercises for the first time last year. It is noteworthy that it is Pakistan rather than Saudi Arabia that has highlighted the reciprocal arrangement under which an attack on either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia would be considered an attack on both nations and both would respond. However, one implication of the formalisation of the Saudi-Pak agreement is that other West Asian nations will also be seeking new partnerships in response to altered threat perceptions. As such, given India’s friendly relations with Israel, India is unlikely to figure high in the strategic calculus of West Asian nations. Another implication of the agreement is that Islamabad could well feel encouraged to escalate political provocations. Though the deal may not be new to the Indian foreign policy establishment, it has undoubtedly introduced a new dynamic into India’s “Look West” policy, which calls for a new and nuanced response.