Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is widely regarded for his ability to convincingly articulate even those points of view to which he does not really subscribe. This is a useful attribute to have in domestic politics. But in international relations it runs the risk of being seen as confusion or bungling. Thus, when he was asked what India's position on Nepal was""a multi-party democracy with a constitutional monarchy, or one without it""he said: "So far our position has been that constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy are the two pillars of the Nepali polity. There is no change in that position." He could hardly have said that India does not want the monarchy to survive; still, Confucius might have responded, "He who rides two bicycles, runs the risk of falling down". | |
| The Prime Minister's answer was fine in the perspective of how the Nepalese system functioned from 1990 to 2004. But is today's ground reality in tune with that history, or is Nepal's history about to turn another page? On the day that the king offered to hand over some of his powers to the seven-party coalition, India came out firmly on the king's side and even claimed ownership of the proposal (a credible claim since Karan Singh had parleyed with the king a day earlier). But pretty soon it became clear that the king's offer had not gone far enough, and that the mood on the street was getting hostile to any future role for the king. India then backtracked furiously and declared that it was up to the Nepalese people to decide what system of governance they wanted. Fair enough, but wasn't there a fundamental misreading of the situation on the ground the previous day? Or is it that there is a royalist group in India's foreign policy establishment? |
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| As a large neighbour, India cannot be in control of events in Nepal, nor can it be indifferent to them-especially when the Maoists have gained ground in Nepal, and India has its own Maoist problem. The sensible course then is to stay engaged with all parties, while expressing some basic, non-controversial sentiments. Jumping into one camp or the other, when the eventual outcome cannot be predicted, is fraught with risk. It should be safe therefore for India to argue that it would like to see democracy restored in Nepal, and what form that will take is left to the Nepalese people. Trying to save the monarchy, especially one that has not been friendly to India, should not be part of South Block's brief. |
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| Nor does it help to have the CPI(M)'s Sitaram Yechury say that "Maoists in Nepal have very strong political influence and their inclusion in the consolidation of the democratic process will have an impact on Maoists in India... Excluding the Maoists will be a great disservice to the movement in Nepal." He justified this by saying that integrating the Maoists in Nepal would have a ''salutary effect'' on Maoists in India! |
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| As for the evolving situation on the ground, the choices seem to be a strictly constitutional monarchy with no powers, and no monarchy at all. King Gyanendra has invited this unhappy denouement on himself; he can remain a symbolic king if he reaches out more than he has done so far. If not, he will become history and India need shed no tears for him. New Delhi will continue to have influence in Kathmandu, given its longstanding relationships with Nepal's mainstream politicians. So the urgent issue to deal with is the relationship between Nepal's Maoists and India's, across an open border. |
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