Securing national interest

Signing defence pacts with the US is not a sell-out

The standard debate that dominates the public discourse as US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter arrived in India on his third visit since assuming office is whether India's "pivot" towards the world's lone superpower is prudent foreign policy. The terms of the discussion are anachronistic and impractical. Given today's geo-political realities, it makes more sense to consider how optimally India's security and strategic interests are served if it were to sign the three agreements that the US establishment considers the foundation of a closer defence relationship. The fact that the Indian defence establishment has shown qualified enthusiasm for the "foundational" pacts and that the US has demonstrated a willingness to meet some of these reservations suggests that the misgivings of "capitulation" to US interests are misplaced.

Of the three - the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the Communication and Information Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) - only the first is likely to be signed. Rechristened the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), it provides access for the signatories to each other's military bases. In 2006, the Left parties had objected to this agreement on the ground that the country would become a base for US military operations to which India had objections. This was an issue that the Pentagon has addressed and the renamed agreement reportedly ensures that discretion remains with the Ministry of Defence. CISMOA involves a firewall for accessing advanced radio and satellite communication equipment that goes into the C-130J Super Hercules special operations transporters, and P8-I Poseidon maritime multi-mission aircraft. The US' reservations about supplying communication equipment without the CISMOA arise out of its fears that technology may leak to, say, Russia, India's major defence partner since the 1970s. India, however, chose to buy these aircraft fitted with commercially available radios of a lower order and is unlikely to sign the CISMOA right now. The BECA remains the point of contention with India unwilling to provide access to digital imagery of the country in view of Washington's close ties with the Pakistan military.

There are strategic gains, too, in Indo-US defence ties. Though it is true that the US sees India as one bulwark against China's rising power, reciprocity here can only be mutually beneficial in the light of China's overt tilt towards Pakistan and aggressive infrastructure expansion into India's neighbourhood. Nor can it be spurned at a time when Russia is becoming an increasingly capricious partner in terms of spare parts supports, contractual niggles and delivery schedules. In any case, India has long demonstrated its ability to balance geo-political imperatives with its strategic interests. The 2005 civil nuclear deal, for which the US persuaded nuclear suppliers to make exceptions for India, is one indicator of this. Nor has the country narrowed its supplier base, as exemplified by its contracts for Rafales and submarines from France. Detractors of closer Indo-US relations should worry not about defence but in such recent agreements as climate change, where it is difficult to avoid criticisms of toeing the US line. In the larger rubric of foreign relations, however, sticking to dated alignments is both impractical and harmful for India.