The apex court rejected the pleas of Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi, Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, BJP leader Subramanian Swamy and others to decriminalise the colonial-era penal provisions and they will now have to face criminal defamation cases lodged against them.
Upholding the constitutional validity of sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, dealing with criminal defamation and punishment for it which entails upto two years imprisonment or fine or both, the court held that the right to freedom of speech and expression is "absolutely sacrosanct" but "is not absolute."
The judgement, delivered on a batch of 27 pleas, including those filed by Rahul, Kejriwal and Swamy, said that they can now knock the doors of various High Courts to challenge the issuance of summons by magisterial courts within eight weeks during which the interim protection and stay of criminal proceedings against them would remain in force.
However, it clarified that since the offence of criminal defamation has its own gravity, the magistrates have to be extremely careful in issuing summons.
"As we declare the provisions to be constitutional, we observe that it will be open to the petitioners to challenge the issue of summons before the High Court either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 CrPC, as advised and seek appropriate relief and for the said purpose, we grant eight weeks time to the petitioners," the bench said.
While Swamy is facing three criminal defamation cases in Tamil Nadu filed by the J Jayalalithaa government for allegedly making certain comments against her, Rahul has a case in Bhiwandi in Maharashtra for allegedly blaming RSS for the assasination of Mahatma Gandhi.
After the pronouncement of the 268-page verdict in a
packed court, senior advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for the Congress Vice President, sought extension of the eight week stay on criminal proceedings till July 19 when the case will come up for hearing in the trial court.
While dealing with the contentions, the bench held that the right to freedom of speech and expression is "abolutely sacrosanct" but "is not absolute" and "is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions" and "it is difficult to come to a conclusion that the existence of criminal defamation is absolutely obnoxious to freedom of speech and expression."
Holding that the legislature in its wisdom has not thought it appropriate to abolish criminality of defamation in the obtaining social climate, the bench brushed aside the contention that "the existence of defamation as a criminal offence has a chilling effect on the right to freedom of speech and expression."
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The bench, while putting a stamp of approval on the 1860 penal law, held that "notwithstanding, the expansive and sweeping and ambit of freedom of speech, as all rights, right to freedom of speech and expression is not absolute. It is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions".
It held that reputation is an "inextricable aspect of right to life" under Article 21 of the Constitution and the State in order to sustain and protect the said reputation of an individual, has kept the provision under Section 499 IPC "alive" as a part of law.
The bench said that though right to freedom of speech and expression is a "highly valued and cherished right", the Constitution conceives of "reasonable restriction" and added that protection of reputation is a fundamental and human right.
"Right to free speech cannot mean that a citizen can defame the other. Protection of reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a human right. Cumulatively, it serves the social interest. Thus, we are unable to accept that provisions relating to criminal defamation are not saved by doctrine of proportionality because it determines a limit which is not impermissible within the criterion of reasonable restriction," the bench said.
It said the concept of fraternity under the Constitution expects every citizen to respect the dignity of the other and mutual respect is the fulcrum of fraternity assuring dignity.
"It does not mean that there cannot be dissent or difference or discordance or a different voice. It does not convey that all should join the chorus or sing the same song. Indubitably not. One has a right to freedom of speech and expression.
