Nuclear arms as national power

The statement typically seeks to square the blame on China while making an audacious claim that the US is “working harder than ever to prevent nuclear proliferation.” The assertion about its efforts to “prevent” nuclear proliferation might be based on the proclaimed raison d'être of the military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, of eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme. According to a dossier released by Reed D. Rubinstein, legal adviser at the State Department, on April 21, Operation Epic Fury was meant to “(d)estroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy (Iran’s) navy and other security infrastructure,” and, finally, ensure that Iran “will never have nuclear weapons.”

  Even in his eight-minute video of February 28, US President Donald Trump had cited Iran’s nuclear ambitions as the key catalyst for Operation Epic Fury. This is despite claiming on multiple occasions over the past many months that the 12-day joint military mission with Israel of June 2025, christened Operation Midnight Hammer, had completely eliminated Iran’s nuclear programme. Declaring the Operation as “historically successful,” the US Secretary of War Pete Hegeseth had remarked that the “most complex and secretive military operation in history,” was a “resounding success, resulting in a ceasefire agreement, and the end of the 12-day war.” Because of decisive military action, Trump “created the conditions to end the war, decimating — choose your word — obliterating, destroying, Iran’s nuclear capabilities.”

  Having claimed complete “destruction” of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, there was no sound logic to raising the nuclear bogey again to justify Operational Epic Fury. However, that is what President Trump did in his February 28 video. Trump concocted a story on Iran’s nuclear weapons, notwithstanding his repeated claims, even in this video, that Operation Midnight Hammer “obliterated the regime’s nuclear programme at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.” Trump then claimed that the US sought to repeatedly make a deal to ensure that Iran did not resume “their malicious pursuit.”

  Such incoherent rants embody how the US under the Trump administration has used the “nuclear bogey” to pursue political wars even while claiming to “work(ing) harder to prevent nuclear proliferation.” This is not new in the pantheon of America’s “global efforts to curb nuclear proliferation” — a standard championing theme. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was fought in the name of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), allegedly amassed by the Saddam Hussein regime. Like that campaign ended up with regime change in Iraq, the underlying political objective behind Operation Epic Fury, aided by Operation Roaring Lion (Israel), was also about regime change in Iran.

  While the WMD claims of 2003 remained unsubstantiated, the George W Bush regime had institutionalised what was termed as “counterproliferation,” which, unlike nonproliferation, involved the use of military tools to tackle “proliferation threats”. The campaigns of that era, including against North Korea, Libya and even Iran, were all guided by the logic of “countering proliferation,” by going beyond traditional diplomatic mechanisms. While Libya also witnessed “regime change”, and Iran’s nuclear programme began to be intensely scrutinised, North Korea evaded the impending challenge by swiftly testing, developing and deploying its nuclear weapons.

  While ‘counterproliferation’ might be still at play against Iran, whose nuclear programme is touted as the reason for the military action, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18 by President Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, was seen as a literal giveaway on the nuclear front with no concrete proposals on removal of uranium from Iranian soil, or any other stringent conditions beyond that agreed in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015.

What then explains the US concern of a Chinese submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test and rationalises its own claim of “hard work” to prevent nuclear proliferation, not to ignore the fact that the archaic American nuclear arsenal is itself undergoing rapid transformation and advancement. At a time when the US is racing against time to develop and deploy the Sentinel ICBM to replace the ageing Minuteman, it could only be described as the typical “geopolitical hypocrisy” for the US to blame nations like China for the ongoing nuclear arms race.     

At the 80th anniversary of the World War parade last year, China had showcased what was unveiled as among the world’s most advanced nuclear armoury, similar to the one Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed in his 2018 presentation. The parade revealed the quantum of Chinese advancements, especially when comparing with the array of systems on display just a few years earlier, at the 2019 parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

If it was the Dong Feng (DF) 41 ICBM that awed the world in 2019, it was the DF-61 in 2025. If it was the YJ-18 anti-ship missile in 2019, it was the turn of the YJ-21 hypersonic version in 2025, designed to be launched on the H-6K medium-to-long range bomber aircraft. At the 2019 parade, China had unveiled the DF-17, a hypersonic glide vehicle with an estimated range between 1,800 to 2,500 kilometres. Besides rolling out the DF-17 during the parade in 2025, the (PLA) Rocket Force had also undertaken a test flight of the system this June. Alongside the DF-17 and YJ-21, the 2025 parade also revealed the adoption of “hypersonic configuration designs” in the new version of the DF-26 medium-to-long range missile system, implying the integration of a hypersonic glide vehicle like the DF-17. Some reports also indicate that the intermediate-range DF-27 is also likely to integrate hypersonic elements in the near future. 

Beyond this rapidly advancing delivery capability, including pervasive integration of hypersonic technologies, the more alarming aspect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is the feverish expansion of the Chinese warhead numbers. From 320 total nuclear warheads in 2020, the Chinese arsenal incrementally grew to 350 in 2021/2022, 410 in 2023, 500 in 2024, 620 in 2025 (including 24 deployed and 576 stored), and remains at the same number in 2026 but deployed numbers increasing to 34, according to the yearbook of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (Sipri), which is the subject of this analysis. According to this assessment, the Chinese warhead inventory grew on average to 50-70 in the initial years of the decade and slowed down in the last two years while shifting from storage to deployment.

  While even other peer surveys like Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimate the current Chinese warhead numbers at around 620, the US Department of Defense/War estimates China’s arsenal to surpass the 1,000 mark by 2030 (four years from now), though the average rate of numerical expansion over the past five years, as shown above, does not back this projection. Nonetheless, the US Defense/War Department, in its 2025 report to the US Congress, projects that China might field a stockpile of about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. This might be part of a concerted narrative that portrays a feverish growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.

  Expansion of nuclear arsenals has been a uniform phenomenon in the last many years for most states with nuclear weapons (SNWs), other than the erstwhile superpowers whose arsenals are subject to arms control and reduction treaties, and of the United Kingdom whose numbers remain at a static 225 after a marginal increase from 215 in 2019, with over 120 warheads in deterrence deployment.

  As for most other nuclear-armed states, including China, the numbers have been on an upward trajectory. France, for instance, has an inventory of 370 warheads, including 280 deployed ones, in 2026, according to the Sipri yearbook. This marks a sudden augmentation from 2020 to 2025 when France had maintained its total numbers at 290 warheads. The rapid expansion in 2025-2026 is attributed to the French government’s decision to expand its nuclear arsenal and extend nuclear deterrence coverage for Europe, following President Trump’s threats of withdrawing or reducing the American security coverage for its European allies.

  Following France, it is the South Asian dyad involving India and Pakistan that sees proactive growth in nuclear capabilities, both in deliveries and warheads. The Sipri yearbook estimates India’s warheads at 190 (with 12 deployed ones), and Pakistan at 170 in 2025-2026. This indicates a quantum leap by India in warhead production, especially in light of Operation Sindoor against Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025. The Indian numbers had surpassed Pakistan in 2024-2025 itself, with its 180 as opposed to Pakistan’s 170. In 2025, Sipri did not report any deployment of Indian warheads, as opposed to the 12 shown as deployed this year.

  In 2020, Sipri reported Pakistan having 160 as opposed to India’s 150; in 2021, it was 165 for Pakistan as opposed to India’s 156; and 165 and 160 respectively in 2022. In 2023, Pakistan increased its numbers to 170, while India added four more to reach 164. In 2024, India surpassed Pakistan’s numbers by adding 10 more to reach 174, while Pakistan remained at 170. Pakistan’s stock remained static since then at 170, whereas India increased to 180 and now 190.

  Advancements in nuclear delivery systems, though not covered substantially in the Sipri yearbook, also form an essential component of the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics. Both sides are perfecting their nuclear delivery platforms, including India’s Agni-P, along with the race on land attack missiles, including cruise missiles. Pakistan’s test launch of Taimur Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and extension of range through the Fatah-5 land-attack missile system signify the race that has the potential to influence the escalation ladder. The third leg of India’s nuclear triad, the nuclear-armed and -powered submarines (SSBNs) are also advancing with three platforms — Arihant (2016), Arighaat (2024) and Aridhaman (2026) — being commissioned. The SLBMs that would equip these SSBS, based on Prithvi and Agni platforms, are also known to be in advanced stages of development or pacing towards deployment.

  While the inventory of Israel’s plausibly denied nuclear weapons programme, according to Sipri, remains static at 90 warheads for a long time, North Korea’s arsenal has seen an inconsistent pattern with spikes and cut-downs, according to the yearly Sipri estimates. While Pyongyang had 30-40 warheads in 2020 and rising to 40-50 in 2021, it is shown as cutting down to 20 in 2022, and then rising to 30 in 2023, 50 in 2024, maintaining that same number in 2025 and swiftly rising to 60 in 2026. It is unclear whether the cut-down of 2021-2023 was a result of earlier agreements between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un in the 2018-19 period. What, though, is now clearer is the North Korean regime’s efforts to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal along with long-range delivery systems, as well as hypersonic platforms. 

Military spending

  The warhead inventories of the US and Russia, meanwhile, have been undergoing reductions thanks to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which, though, expired on February 5. Building on the START I of 1991 and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the New START capped deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550, approximately 30 per cent from the 2,200-limit set by SORT and down 74 per cent from the START I limit of 6,000 warheads. Accordingly, the 2020 Sipri Yearbook reported the Russian total inventory of warheads at 6,375 (1,570 deployed) and the US stockpile at 5,800 (1,750 deployed).

  According to the yearbook, the Russian warhead inventory now stands at 5,420 (with 1,796 deployed ones) and the US numbers at 5,042 (1,770 deployed ones). Surprisingly, while the total warheads came down in five years, the deployed numbers have increased: Russia from 1,570 in 2020 to 1,796 in 2025-26 and the US from 1,750 to 1,770 in 2025-26, which illustrates the Russian effort to seek deployment parity and surpass the US numbers. With the New START expiring, and no new instrument in sight, the question remains whether the number of deployed warheads is likely to increase as much as the stored ones, as both the US and Russia are likely to intensify their warhead production, along with the likelihood of resumption of nuclear testing, which could also accentuate new warhead development, production and deployment.

According to the 2026 Sipri Yearbook, global military expenditure rose for the 11th consecutive year in 2025, to reach $2.9 trillion — or 2.5 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). Sipri states that this is the highest level of world military spending ever recorded by the institution. A comparison of the charts, though, gave a sudden misnomer. The US spent $954 billion in 2024-25, which, interestingly, was 7.5 per cent less than in the previous year, that too at a time when the US was assisting Ukraine and was preparing for more wars, including in Iran. Sipri, though, attributed this slower pace in 2025 (+2.9 per cent compared with +9.7 per cent in 2024) to a policy shift in Washington, which resulted in scaling back of its spending on military aid. At the same time, Sipri notes, the rest of the world kept on increasing military expenditure at a fast pace. 

Even in the spending scale, the US was far ahead with $954 billion, with even the closest rival, China, spending $336 billion in 2025, which was 7.4 per cent higher than its previous year's spending. Russia, with $190 billion, came third, but also with a 5.9 per cent increase from 2024. Germany, interestingly, spent $114 billion in 2025, a 24 per cent hike, while India was at the fifth with $92 billion, with a 8.9 per cent increase from the previous year. While only the UK ($89 billion) and Israel ($48.3 billion), spent lesser in 2025, most other leading spenders — Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, France, Japan, Italy, South Korea, Poland and Spain — in that order spent more in 2025 as the world’s top 15 military spenders, who accounted for 80 per cent of the world’s military expenditure in 2025. 

China, the second largest, accounted for 12 per cent of the global total, while Russia, the third largest, accounted for 6.6 per cent. While the US and Israel spent less in 2025, they were both directly and indirectly involved in numerous conflicts, be it in Gaza or Ukraine, while girding their loins to take on Iran, first in June 2025 and then in February 2026. With military spending close to 40 per cent of its GDP, Ukraine, at war with Russia since 2022, according to Sipri, “remained the country with the largest military burden in the world in 2025.” 

Region-wise, North America spent $1,027 billion, followed by Europe at $ 693 billion, Asia at $629 billion and the Middle East (assessed separately) as having spent $243 billion in 2024 — a trend that repeated in 2025-26 as well. This spending rate had a markedly sharp spike in five years, which echoes the increasing number of conflicts, especially initiated during or after the Covid pandemic hit globally. In 2019-2020, according to the 2020 Sipri Yearbook, North America had spent $754 billion, Europe at $365 billion, and Asia at $523 billion. While North America spent over $300 billion more in five years, Europe collectively spent double the amount it spent in 2019-20.

  As for the arms sales, along with the highest spending, the US was the biggest defence seller with over 42 per cent of global market share in 2025-26, according to the latest yearbook, while France was a distant second with 9.8 per cent of the global share, followed by Russia at 6.8, Germany at 5.7, China at 5.6 and Italy at 5.1. Israel, known to be a vibrant military industrial complex, was at the 7th position with 4.4 per cent share, followed by the UK (3.4), South Korea at 3.0 and Spain at 2.3, among the top 10 suppliers. 

Airmen from the 576th Flight Test Squadron missile-handling team install a cable on an intercontinental ballistic missile at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in February 2014 (PHOTO: US DEPARTMENT OF WAR)

  Ukraine was the biggest buyer or recipient in 2025-26 with 9.7 per cent of the global defence purchases or imports, while India, a traditional buyer, is placed second with 8.2 per cent share of global imports. Saudi Arabia at third position has a 6.8 per cent share, followed by Qatar with 6.4, Pakistan with 4.2, Japan with 3.9, Poland with 3.6, Kuwait and Australia with 2.8. The most interesting part of this list is the US, the world’s largest arms supplier, also figuring in the list of top 10 recipients, as the 8th largest importer with 2.9 per cent share in global arms imports.

  Echoing these trends, US companies Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman are the world’s three top arms and military services manufacturers, followed by BAE Systems of the UK, and two American companies, Boeing and Rostec. Chinese companies also figure among the top 10 manufacturers, with AVIC and CETC placed at 8th and 9th.

  The yearbook notes that a considerable part of military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) is centred around autonomous weapon systems, which can select and engage targets without human intervention, while recent focus has fallen on areas like targeting, planning and intelligence analysis, as well. Sipri notes the reported uses of AI in conflicts ranging from Gaza to Ukraine, and certainly even the Iran war.

  While the expansion of AI use raises multiple normative, operational and institutional concerns, its enormous benefits are also being harnessed by advanced defence forces, including the potential of AI-enabled decision support systems. The absence of requisite regulatory and normative frameworks to streamline military applications of AI is underlined in the yearbook.

  An alarming trend pointed out is of AI becoming the defining variable in cybersecurity, not only by helping in its enhancement but also by empowering adversaries (including non-state actors) “to discover vulnerabilities, launch attacks and evade detection, while simultaneously providing defenders with new capacity to monitor networks, identify anomalies and respond.” From ransomware, attacks on critical public infrastructure and espionage, the range of cyber operations with military character has considerably expanded. 

  Cyber operations, Sipri notes, are now visible in multiple conflicts alongside kinetic military action. Notable examples cited include Russia and Ukraine engaging in widespread and persistent cyber operations; India and Pakistan overtly integrating cyber operations into armed conflict for the first time in May 2025; and Iran and Israel employing coordinated digital retaliation during their confrontation. While governance structures are still evolving in AI, global cyber governance structures are falling in place, including the United Nations (UN) Convention against Cybercrime and the UN-mandated Global Mechanism for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. 

Along with the proliferation and use of missile systems, the expansive spread of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies and their combat use find mention in the yearbook. With extensive use of a wide variety of unmanned platforms in all recent conflicts — be it Ukraine, India-Pakistan or Iran — Sipri notes that these systems are now produced and exported at much higher numbers than previously, thanks to these conflicts, and by states seeking to replenish and expand their arsenals.  “Advances in guidance, propulsion and payload integration are progressively making one-way attack UAVs more like short-range missiles, adding another layer of complication to efforts to regulate such systems,” says the yearbook. Also noted is the fact that their extensive use in conflict zones “violate principles of distinction and proportionality,” and the push towards “autonomous lethal UAVs raises questions about accountability and compliance with international humanitarian law.”

  As I noted earlier in this essay, due to some inexplicable reasons, the world seems to have returned to its violent ways right in the midst of or after the Covid pandemic hazd spread havoc across the comity of nations. While China sought to intrude into the Galwan Valley in June 2020, months after the Covid outbreak in February that year, and when India and China, like the rest of the world, were coping with its aftermath. Similarly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, was when most of the world was struggling to find its feet after multiple waves of outbreaks of the pandemic had hit many nations, the global economy and social lives.

  The psychology of the leadership in inciting conflicts during human suffering might be difficult to explain beyond the element of diversionary tactics or exploiting opportunities of weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The yearbook notes that the number of interstate armed conflicts doubled from three in 2024 to six in 2025 and involved at least 13 states: Afghanistan–Pakistan; Cambodia–Thailand; India–Pakistan; Iran–Israel/United States; Russia/North Korea–Ukraine; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda, besides the war in Gaza, which Sipri says, falls in a grey zone of a broader conflict “between a state (Israel) and an actor aspiring to statehood.”

  While the overall conflict-related fatalities were estimated at 249, 000 in 2024 and 238,000 in 2025, the use of precision-strike weapons, AI-assisted targeting, autonomous weapon systems, swarms of UAVs and cyber operations being routinely used in armed conflicts raises several ethical and legal questions, especially about human oversight. Violations of international law are rampant, Sipri points out, with increasing child soldier recruitment, sexual violence, starvation tactics and attacks on health services being among the prohibited methods of warfare being used extensively in these conflicts, which also results in large-scale forced displacements.

  Having documented all these ground realities, Sipri seems to have abstained from terming the extensive killings in Gaza as a “genocide”, which adds to the speculation on how the Scandinavian think tank will document and describe the Iran War, especially the killing of over 110 school children in Minab on the first day of Operation Epic Fury.