Vision 2047: India's military modernisation

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s preface sets the tone for the document. He covers seven points. One, prepare India’s military for the complexities of an evolving strategic environment under the vision of Viksit Bharat. Two, create an integrated multidomain and agile force. Three, bring in jointness, synergy and innovation in the armed forces. Four, carry out reforms in organisation, training, capability development and defence diplomacy. Five, achieve atmanirbharta in defence. Six, future wars will demand adaptability, courage and resilience, and lastly, a whole of the nation approach is needed to achieve this vision.

The document sets out India’s aspirations to become a developed nation by 2047, the 100th year of India’s independence. It expects India to have a larger say in global and regional institutions. To do that, India has to become both externally and internally secure, and securing its trade and energy needs is important to achieve that. Decision-making structures, policies and institutions need to become robust to achieve that goal. Without enough financial resources, the aims set out in the document cannot be achieved, and will need civil-military fusion if they are to be achieved. To do all that has been said so far, the document aims to lay down a road map.

With this as the background, the vision document proceeds to assess the geopolitical environment that is likely to exist in 2047. The world is likely to remain interconnected and interdependent, mired with protectionism and conditional trade between countries. It envisions the world to be more chaotic and not adhering to the international rules and norms both in the military and non-military spheres. Non-traditional security threats are expected to loom large. In particular, the demographic and climate changes will have a significant impact on India’s security. India’s “neighbourhood first” foreign policy will be all the more important as India’s security will get increasingly linked to that of the region’s. The technological environment will be dominated by sustaining modern technologies and the race to catch up with emerging technologies like hypersonics, robotics, stealth, drones, quantum and artificial intelligence. The gap between real and virtual is likely to reduce considerably. The present revolution in military affairs (RMA) will give way to multiple RMAs. The vision correctly identifies the need to adopt a pathway that will allow the Indian armed forces to leapfrog between traditional and indigenous development. Technological advances will increase battlefield  transparency, and automated intelligent and autonomous kill chains will replace the present modes of causing attrition to enemy forces.  Manned unmanned teams, robotics, stealth and long-range precision weapons, hypersonic missiles, Fractional Orbital Bombardment systems, drones in swarms will introduce non-linearity of operations. Future battlefields will be impacted by artificial intelligence, big data, large language models, quantum technologies and edge computing that will help in faster decision making due to predictive analytics and automated responses. Warfare will progress from the present network-centric model to data-centric and further to intelligence-centric model.

The security environment is presently dominated by prolonged low intensity conflict and responses short of full-scale war. That is likely to change in the future, wherein the security environment will cover the full spectrum of war to include sub-conventional (insurgency like in the northeast India), proxy wars (like Pakistan inducing terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir) and conventional wars with the overhang of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) capabilities. Non-traditional security threats like piracy (in the Gulf of Aden), narcotics, smuggling of weapons, illegal immigration (Rohingyas in  India), will need a multinational coordinated response. Future security threats will also extend to new domains of warfare like cyber, space and cognitive warfare.

With that visualisation of future wars and the battlefield therein, the document  gives the vision for future armed forces. India’s armed forces should be capable of facing conventional, hybrid, proxy wars leading to gray zone, cyber and cognitive war in an integrated multidomain and multispectrum force. Four key considerations for creating such a force have been spelt out. India’s defence forces should be capable of operating in all and across domains. All three services should be integrated. India should achieve self-reliance in manufacturing defence equipment, strategic thinking and capability development. India’s armed forces should be capable of responding across the full spectrum of conflict. Therefore, there is a need for India’s defence forces to combine advanced technology, strategic adaptability; achieve synergy in joint operations, enhance interoperability and attain seamless coordination.

The document then proceeds to give the vision for the defence forces in 2047 as, “To be an integrated all domain force, dynamic and self-reliant in thought and capabilities, ready to respond across the full spectrum of conflict, to protect and promote national interests, in concert with all elements of national power.”

Actions needed to achieve the stated vision include a wide range of issues from publishing a National Military Strategy to development of infrastructure,  and acquisition of modern platforms under the umbrella of atmanirbharta. On the subject of Organisational Agility and Interoperability, the document prescribes integration of the three services and the logistics, improving joint operations capability and optimising organisational structure to increase efficiency. In order to develop capability and increase the sustenance of India’s armed forces, self-reliance in research and development, innovation and defence production; formalising an integrated capability development plan and technology perspective; dual use infrastructure; creation of a defence geo-spatial agency, three forces for data, drones and cognitive warfare; and raising space and cyber commands have been advocated. Formulating future-centric doctrines has been advised.

Important highlights of the section titled Strategic Culture and Climate are to root the armed forces strategic culture in Indian knowledge and culture, convert the future warfare cell into future operations analysis group and establish Indian Defence University. Training, education and empowerment, military cooperation and defence diplomacy are the other sections in the document. These are not really futuristic.

Three transition timelines have been iterated. In Phase 1 (transition till 2030), India’s armed forces are to carry out restructuring for multidomain operations, ensure stability on the borders and create a policy framework for the future. In Phase 2 (consolidation till 2040), more integration, building capabilities for data- centric operations, integrating space and cyber into operations, operationalisation of Sudarshan Chakra, domination of aerospace and maritime domains is expected. In Phase 3 (Achieve an era of excellence), India’s armed forces are expected to transform into a world-class military with the ability to achieve decision superiority through data-centric operations, exercise control over space, electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace.

Challenges to achieving the vision are listed as sustained investments, creative technology and funding.

China undertook the modernisation of its armed forces in 2016. Such a drastic change in the command and control, organisational structures in one go is unprecedented. Generally, armed forces resort to gradual reforms. China also worked on three timelines. 2020, 2035 and 2049.  By 2020, PLA was expected to complete the mechanisation and make significant advances in informationisation. This phase has been announced as completed. By 2035, PLA is expected to complete the military modernisation, which implies that the organisational reforms are completed, doctrines are updated, modern weapons and equipment are inducted and joint operations capability is improved considerably. By 2049, transform the PLA to be a world-class military capable of winning wars globally.

Immediately after announcing the reforms, the PLA abolished the seven military regions and brought in five theatre commands in their place. The divisions were converted to combined arms brigades. The Second Artillery Corps, which is the PLA’s missile force, was converted into the PLA Rocket Force. A Joint Logistics Support Force was created to support all arms and services. A Strategic Support Force (PLA SSF) was created that had two departments- network systems department and space systems department. The network systems department controlled cyber, electronic and psychological warfare and technical reconnaissance. The space systems department controlled all aspects of PLA’s space warfare, including space launches, telemetry, tracking and control. In April 2024, PLA SSF was disbanded and three different forces- information support, aerospace and cyber space were created. This sudden change in the organisation depicts the agility to carry out reforms as and when one is needed. Through the structural reforms, PLA has reduced one layer of command and control from the previous four to three.

China started modernisation and reforms a decade earlier than India. China has achieved indigenisation in the manufacturing of weapons and equipment barring very few. India’s armed forces have started on the path of modernisation and are moving fast on indigenisation. China achieved theaterisation of its forces overnight. India has spent some time on it, but the theaterisation is near. Integrating logistics support for Indian armed forces is still sometime away, though the process has started. China’s defence budget is almost 3.5 times that of India’s. Therefore, completing the modernisation process of the Indian armed forces is likely to take more time. A comparison of India’s Defence Forces Vision 2047 and PLA’s modernisation plan will clearly indicate the difference in the levels of ambition of both countries. While the document reveals that India’s ambition is regional, the PLA clearly has its eyes on a global footprint.

(The author (retired) is now a distinguished fellow at Gateway House, Mumbai. Views expressed are personal)