Flexing riparian muscles: New Delhi should weigh its options carefully

Under the IWT, Pakistan was allocated control of 80 per cent of waters of three western rivers - the Indus, which originates in Tibet, and its tributaries Chenab and Jhelum, which originate in India

India’s suspension of the 65-year-old Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) following suspected Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks on tourists in Pahalgam on April 22 has altered the dynamics of the already stressed relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The treaty is considered a landmark transboundary water-sharing agreement in Asia, successfully maintaining water cooperation despite wars, cross-border terrorism, and diplomatic tensions. The long- and short-term geopolitical implications of this suspension flow from India’s position as an upper riparian country when it comes to the Indus and its tributaries in the west, and as a lower riparian one in the Northeast, which is watered by the Tsangpo/Brahmaputra with its headwaters in the Tibetan plateau in China.

 

Under the IWT, Pakistan was allocated control of 80 per cent of the waters of three western rivers — the Indus, which originates in Tibet, and its tributaries Chenab and Jhelum, which originate in India. India gets all the waters of the eastern tributaries — the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. Of the 20 per cent allocation from the western tributaries, India is permitted run-of-river hydropower projects and limited storage. About 80 per cent of Pakistan’s agricultural land depends on this IWT allocation. If India stops this flow, the consequences for Pakistan will potentially be catastrophic, cascading from agriculture to its principal exports of cotton and basmati and to electricity supply. The key issue is whether India is in a position to do so. Experts suggest this is impossible during high-flow periods because India lacks the storage infrastructure and the canal system to divert the waters. Its hydropower plants are all run-of-the-river projects that do not require storage. India has not, in fact, built storage even for the permitted volume. The suspension of the treaty, however, enables India to start building such infrastructure without informing Pakistan. It no longer needs to permit Pakistani inspections of the Kishanganga and Ratle hydro projects on the Jhelum and Chenab, respectively — to which Islamabad had, unsuccessfully, objected. More damaging perhaps is the fact that India will no longer share hydrological data with Pakistan. The data determines flood forecasting and water management, though Pakistan claims the data-sharing was inadequate to begin with.

 

Though the impact of suspending the IWT is largely symbolic in the immediate future, the potential long-term impact in a severely water-stressed region is hard to ignore. In the immediate term, this move could threaten regional stability, especially since Pakistan has unequivocally declared that it would consider stopping the water flow an act of war. India putting the IWT in abeyance will have an impact on its negotiations of future water treaties, such as the Teesta water treaty with Bangladesh. The bigger problem could be China’s position as the upper riparian state on the Brahmaputra, the lifeline for agriculture, biodiversity, and hydro power for the Northeast (in India). China has plans to build the world’s largest hydropower project and dam in the upper reaches of the Tsangpo.  In 2016, Beijing flexed its riparian muscles when it blocked a tributary of the Tsangpo after India blamed Pakistan for a militant attack in Kashmir. So how India chooses to leverage its upper riparian status following the suspension of the IWT could well determine its negotiating flexibility with China on the Brahmaputra in the not too distant future.