 "Islamabad-Dhaka overtures have sparked measured interest in New Delhi, as historical grievances, shifting alliances, and China's influence reshape the regional dynamics. But all these developments may not hurt Indian interests tangibly, foreign polic")
It was a scene few in South Asia’s diplomatic circles would have predicted until August last year: Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif extolling the virtues of closer ties with Bangladesh. At a recent reception in Islamabad hosted by the Bangladeshi High Commissioner, Muhammad Iqbal Hussain Khan, Asif declared that both countries were eager to “deepen” economic, political and cultural engagement. The remarks followed foreign secretary-level bilateral talks in Dhaka — the first of their kind in nearly 15 years.
The remarks, broadcast widely by Pakistani news outlets, came in the shadow of ousted Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India (she has presumably been living in New Delhi for over eight months now). Furthermore, the development has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi, particularly as India-Pakistan ties reels from the fallout of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
Last week, a former Bangladesh army officer and close aide of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus suggested that Dhaka should collaborate with China to occupy India's northeastern states if it attacked Pakistan. Though Dhaka quickly distanced itself from the comment, the episode has further vitiated India-Bangladesh relations.
Yet, most seasoned foreign policy analysts are hesitant to see a strategic sea change. Many point out that occasional flirtations between Pakistan and Bangladesh are hardly new — or especially effective. “Pakistan and Bangladesh have come closer earlier as well,” said Professor Harsh V Pant, vice-president at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. “Even if there’s a bonhomie now, what is it going to achieve? There has always been a strong imprint of ISI and the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh. India has lived with a malevolent Pakistan and a recalcitrant Bangladesh in the past — back when our economy was weak and our global diplomatic stature wasn’t so prominent.” Pant suggested Dhaka’s latest overtures to Islamabad may be a tactical move, but with history never far from the surface, it’s unlikely to deliver much by way of tangible economic or military outcomes.
Notably, following the foreign secretary-level talks, Bangladesh called on Pakistan to issue a formal public apology for the 1971 war atrocities and pay $4.52 billion as its share of undivided assets and foreign aid funds.
Former Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri, who served in Nepal, was similarly dismissive of Pakistan’s diplomatic manoeuvres, saying instead of cornering India globally, Islamabad cornered itself. “It’s tiresome for Pakistan to constantly take on a country that’s rising. India matters globally. It’s always difficult for a large country with civilisational ties across a region to maintain stability without overreaching.”
Still, India’s own diplomatic missteps, according to some experts, haven’t gone unnoticed. Former Home Secretary Gopal Krishna Pillai pointed to the 2015 blockade of petroleum exports to Nepal — a move widely seen as punitive — as the moment Kathmandu turned towards Beijing. Though later corrected, the episode dealt a blow to bilateral trust.
“We haven’t been successful in getting our neighbours to see our position as reasonable,” he said. “You can’t get rid of your neighbours. You have to live with them, and see some of their interests as well.”
The Bangladesh tangle
Some of those neighbours are now voicing similar challenges. Farid Hossain, former Minister (Press) at the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi, said anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has long had roots — but that it has grown louder in recent months under the current ruling dispensation.
“The current dispensation especially has powerful voices from far more radical, fundamentalist Islamist elements, who have historically harboured deep-seated resentment against India, and even tried to establish closer cooperation with Pakistan after the 1971 war,” he said.
But even under Hasina, who was widely seen as friendly towards New Delhi, there were long-standing grievances over unresolved issues — from the Teesta river water-sharing deal to the pace of infrastructure cooperation. “The transshipment ban, the tightening of visas, the shelving of railway projects — these have been amplified by anti-India forces as signs India is not a genuine friend,” Hossain said.
India’s decision on April 8 to halt transshipment privileges for Bangladeshi goods headed to third countries has particularly stung. The move has disrupted textile and apparel exports, a fifth of which had relied on Indian routes. “There’s a feeling that India is waiting for an elected government to take over in Bangladesh before re-engaging,” Hossain said.
China, not Pakistan, may be the larger geopolitical variable. Pant noted that Bangladesh’s defence imports from China peaked during Hasina’s tenure. And Beijing has remained circumspect in its response to the Pahalgam attack, condemning it only through its Ambassador to India and urging restraint on all sides.
But behind the scenes, Beijing’s slant is clearer. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the country’s envoy in Islamabad have both made overtures to Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. They’re sending a signal that they’re in Pakistan’s corner, said Ashok Kantha, former Indian Ambassador to China. “Any expectation that geopolitical uncertainty caused by the Donald Trump’s administration in the US will make China more forthcoming is unlikely to fructify.”
Tightrope for others
Meanwhile, in a surprising twist of regional diplomacy, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan — long a diplomatic pariah — has emerged as an unlikely voice of calm. Kabul was among the first to condemn the Pahalgam attack and extend condolences to the victims' families. They stressed the attack disrupted efforts at “regional security and stability”.
“Quietly, links have been established with the Taliban, below the radar,” Puri confirmed. In January, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai. India reiterated its humanitarian and development commitments, while the Taliban stressed it posed no threat to Indian interests.
Elsewhere, leaders appear to be hedging. Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, who swept to power on the back of his fiery ‘India Out’ campaign, has since moderated his tone following the withdrawal of Indian troops. In Sri Lanka, newly elected President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is seen as steering Colombo back toward constructive engagement with New Delhi.
“South Asian governments that have balanced China and India smartly have always done better — they’ve been more stable,” Pant concluded. “Once you drift too far to one side, it becomes difficult. The Pakistan model? It’s a disastrous one.”
