What to expect from the Trump-Xi summit

Incremental progress on trade and technology is possible, but any tactical accommodation could limit the agency of other nations

Fresh from attending the 18th Brics summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping will be travelling to Washington for a much-awaited summit with United States (US) President Donald Trump. This will be their third meeting in just one year — after the Busan summit on October 30, 2025, and the Beijing summit on May 14 and 15, 2026.

Mr Trump will have a weaker hand to play on this occasion. His popularity ratings are down into the 30s on the eve of crucial mid-term elections to the US House of Representatives and the Senate in November. The Iran war continues to fester with the US unable to force an outcome that it can project as a win or at least a no-loss. The US economy faces headwinds with inflation rising and US Treasuries under selling pressure. Domestic opposition to data centres that lie at the heart of the artificial intelligence revolution is growing. This is the one domain in which the US considers that it retains an edge over China but that may be eroding.  

But the US has just fired a shot across the Chinese bow on the eve of the summit. The US Congress has passed legislation authorising the President to impose a 100 per cent tariff against any country purchasing   oil from Russia. China and India are the largest purchasers of Russian oil. One doubts that Mr Trump will impose these tariffs on China knowing that China will almost certainly retaliate with its own restrictions on the export of rare earths and other critical components to the US, which could threaten even critical defence industries in the US. India does not possess such leverage. There is a possibility that India will be penalised, while China will be exempted at the discretion of the President. 

Chinese commentary projects Mr Xi going into the summit with more cards to play. In Busan, China agreed to suspend its restrictions on rare earth exports to the US only for a year and this will expire in November. One key American ask of the Chinese leader will be to set aside these restrictions permanently. What will China expect in return? 

The Beijing summit had envisaged the setting up of a permanent bilateral Board of Trade and a Board of Investment to foster economic relations between the two countries. Despite US efforts, these have not been established so far. The Chinese readout says consultations on “working mechanisms” are continuing. The US wants to institutionalise managed trade. The Chinese are not in a hurry. US commentary suggests that the only realistic expectation may be the extension of the Busan truce on rare earths and a commitment to pursue “working mechanisms”. 

Mr Trump may ask Mr Xi to persuade the Iranians to accept a peace deal, which includes the opening of the Strait of Hormuz — something the Chinese have also pressed for. The visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Beijing in advance of the Washington summit suggests that China may well play a mediatory role, given its friendly relations with Iran and the West Asian countries. China had earlier brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which led to the normalisation of their bilateral relations. 

The Chinese are insistent that Taiwan is a “red line” in US-China relations. Chinese commentary urges the US to explicitly “oppose Taiwan independence” and to stop arms supplies to the island. Mr Trump had suspended the delivery of $14 billion in advanced weapons to Taiwan before his visit to China in July this year. This remains in place. China wants the deal to be cancelled altogether. This is unlikely. Mr Trump believes that this is a good “bargaining chip” to use with China.  

It is reported that there is a serious debate in the Trump administration over Taiwan. The State Department under Marco Rubio and a majority in the US Congress want the US to maintain its commitment to Taiwan’s defence. The White House and Mr Trump himself believe that fighting a far-away war to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion does not make sense. The Chinese hope that this Trump sentiment could be exploited to heighten Taiwan’s vulnerability and persuade its public opinion to accept Chinese sovereignty while being allowed to retain an autonomous status for an extended period of time. But the “one country, two systems formula” as applied to Hong Kong does not inspire confidence.  

The expectation is of modest results from the summit, but there could be incremental progress as there may be two more summits on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference scheduled for November 18 and 19, in Shenzhen, China, and on the sidelines of the G20 summit, which will take place in Miami, US, on December 14 and 15, 2026. There will be pressure on both countries not only to keep their relations on an even keel, but to work on an agreed set of norms to manage competition in trade, investment and technology. Such tactical accommodation, limited though it may be in scope, may have the effect of limiting India’s own agency in these domains. Our constant effort has been to move from being a rule-taker to a rule-maker. 

The competition between the US and China is structural and inherent in their status as number one and number two powers in the world. That will leave space for countries like India to play that rivalry to their own advantage. But one should acknowledge that even a tactical and limited accommodation at the superpower level tends to have more magnified effects on countries down the line. This is why not only India, but even US allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia are deeply concerned about a US-China rapprochement, even if it may be limited in scope. It is telling that on the complaint of President Xi Jinping, Mr Trump had advised the Japanese Prime Minister to avoid “provoking” China by her statements on Taiwan. He did not want his allies and partners to upset his script for better US-China relations. This is proof that something far less than a G2 may be sufficient to alter the geopolitical space in the Indo-Pacific.

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The writer is a former foreign secretary