Why India needs Russian oil: Energy security outweighs US pressure

India’s oil security is becoming increasingly fragile. Over 80 per cent of its crude imports come from just two suppliers — West Asia and Russia — both now facing geopolitical stress. In this environment, resuming full purchases of Russian oil may not be a choice but a necessity. Here are eight reasons why.

 

First, West Asia — India’s largest energy supply pillar — has become increasingly fragile. The war is spreading across the Gulf, while shipping through the Strait of Hormuz faces disruption, and attacks on oil facilities operated by Saudi Aramco and others have raised fears of falling production and supply shortages. India remains heavily dependent on the region: In 2025, about 48.7 per cent of its crude oil imports, 68.4 per cent of its LNG imports, and more than 91 per cent of its LPG imports came from West Asia. With crude oil and refined fuel stocks covering barely 30 days of consumption, India has little buffer against such shocks.

 

Second, the economic consequences of supply disruptions for India that imports 90 per cent of its crude oil needs could be severe. Oil prices have already risen 23.6 per cent, from about $72 per barrel a day before the war began on February 28 to around $89 per barrel now. Another week of disruption could push prices above $100 per barrel, worsening India’s current account deficit, weakening the rupee beyond 94 per dollar, and increasing inflation across the economy.

 

Third, India’s energy security cannot realistically depend on short-term permissions issued by Washington. On March 5, the United States Treasury issued a one-month waiver allowing India to buy Russian oil cargoes already stranded at sea. The volumes involved are small and offer little real relief. India cannot manage its energy security through short-term permissions issued by the US government. More broadly, India and Russia are sovereign states, and their bilateral energy trade does not fall under US jurisdiction. Any such attempt by Washington should not be accepted.

 

Fourth, India’s alternative supply options are limited. Imports from the US rose 82 per cent to $9.8 billion in 2025, but the US itself runs a net crude deficit and has limited spare export capacity. West African and Latin American crude can partly fill the gap, but only with higher freight costs and longer transit times. These constraints make it difficult for India to replace large volumes from its traditional suppliers.

 

Fifth, Russia has already proved to be a reliable supplier for India. Since the start of the Ukraine war, it has become India’s largest crude oil source. In FY25, Russia supplied about 35 per cent of India’s crude imports, worth around $50 billion. Supplies remained steady, but India gradually reduced purchases under US pressure. Discounted Russian oil helped shield India from global price spikes and lowered the country’s import bill.

 

Sixth, the legal mechanism used to pressure India over Russian oil has collapsed. In August 2025, the US imposed a 25 per cent tariff on Indian exports to penalise purchases of Russian crude. But the policy quickly unravelled. On February 6, Washington withdrew the tariff after President Donald Trump said he had received assurances from the Indian Prime Minister on reducing Russian imports. Just two weeks later, on February 20, the US Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for those tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), effectively collapsing the legal framework used to impose such trade pressure.

 

Seventh, Washington now has limited legal tools to impose new trade restrictions on India over Russian oil. Within hours of the court’s judgment, the US introduced a uniform 10 per cent tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, but this measure applies equally to all countries and it cannot single out India for buying Russian oil. Other US trade laws also offer little scope. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 permits tariffs on national security grounds but requires that they apply uniformly to all countries. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows action against unfair trade practices harming US commerce, but it does not authorise penalties simply because a country imports oil from a third country. In practical terms, the legal and economic constraints that previously discouraged India from buying Russian oil have largely disappeared.

 

Eighth, other major economies like Europe are already adjusting their policies in response to energy realities. After following the US in imposing sweeping sanctions on Russian energy, the European Union now faces low gas storage levels, limited LNG capacity and disruptions to West Asian supply routes. As a result, the EU is urging Ukraine to allow Russian oil to transit through its territory again — an indication that energy security is beginning to override the sanctions framework Europe once supported.

 

The conclusion is straightforward. India should restore Russian oil imports to earlier levels while continuing to diversify supplies over the long term. In a volatile global market, energy security must take precedence over American pressure. 

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The author is the founder of GTRI