Balancing acts: PM Narendra Modi's visit strengthens Sri Lankan ties

As first foreign dignitary to visit Sri Lanka since election of supposedly China-leaning President Dissanayake, both countries have added an impetus to recalibrating relations that began three yrs ago

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-day state visit to Sri Lanka underscores India’s geostrategic aim of recalibrating and strengthening relations in the strategically important Indian Ocean Region against the backdrop of China’s ascendant ambitions. After his two-day state visit last month to Mauritius and then attendance at the seven-nation Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (Bimstec) summit in Thailand, his visit to Sri Lanka can be seen as a mutually balancing act among the key actors in the region. As the first foreign dignitary to visit Sri Lanka since the election of the supposedly China-leaning President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, both countries have added an impetus to recalibrating relations that began three years ago, when India extended financial assistance worth $4.5 billion to tide over the country’s economic crisis.

 

The symbolism was as important as the seven memorandums of understanding (MoUs), covering power-grid connectivity, digitisation, security, and health care, and five projects, including those relating to solar and railways, which were announced during the visit. As with Mauritius, where the newly elected (and also reputedly pro-Chinese) Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam invited Mr Modi for the country’s National Day celebrations, Mr Dissanayake sought to balance competing interests between Beijing and New Delhi. The 19-gun salute in the capital’s Independence Square and the Mitra Vibhushana, Sri Lanka’s highest civilian honour, conferred on Mr Modi can be seen as part of this paradigm. These gestures were augmented by agreements that carry considerable political significance. The signing of the five-year defence-cooperation agreement for training Sri Lankan military personnel in India as well as information and technology sharing was one of them. The agreement between India and the United Arab Emirates to develop an energy hub and multiproduct pipeline in Trincomalee, a natural harbour in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-speaking east, where civil war had once raged, also emphasised the shift. Mr Dissanayake referred to this development as his “inclusive approach”.

 

Crucially, this project can be seen as part of the delicate balancing act by Colombo, which signed an agreement in January with a Chinese state-owned company for a $3.7 billion investment in an oil refinery in the island’s south. This would be Sri Lanka’s largest single foreign investment. Mr Dissanayake reiterated, as he did during his first visit to India in December as President, that he would not allow his country to be used to undermine India’s security. This statement is an oblique reference to the fact that Colombo imposed a ban on foreign research vessels following New Delhi’s concerns last year that Chinese ships were being used to spy on India. The visit to India was Mr Dissanayake’s first foreign tour after being elected to office, though he visited Beijing just a month later. China is Sri Lanka’s largest creditor and largest foreign investor. For all the notable bonhomie and goodwill on display between the two leaders, much will depend on how efficiently India can get its ambitious projects in Sri Lanka off the ground. Over the decades, India’s record on this score has not been encouraging, with key infrastructure-connectivity projects under, for example, the aegis of Bimstec — of which Sri Lanka is a member — yet to see substantial progress, even though they have the potential to transform regional trade.