Delayed civic polls are quietly weakening India's cities and villages

India is urbanising at an unprecedented speed and scale, with nearly 60 per cent of Indians, close to 800 million citizens, expected to live in cities and towns by 2050. Yet the economic returns to this urban transition remain weak, and urban local bodies are unable to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units. Globally, there are hardly any examples of well-functioning cities that developed without empowered, accountable local governments. In a democratic country, timely elections are the foundations of empowerment and legitimacy. However, that is not the case on the ground. As a recent report in this newspaper showed, polls to major urban bodies in Maharashtra, including the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, are being conducted after delays of nearly four years. Karnataka presents an even starker picture. Elections to Bengaluru’s civic body were last held in 2015; since the council’s term ended in 2020, elections have been postponed repeatedly. As of 2020-21, the average delay in conducting municipal elections after the expiry of councils was 22 months. 

The situation with rural local bodies (RLBs) is only slightly better. In fact, elections to several block and zilla panchayats across Maharashtra and Karnataka and gram panchayats in Tamil Nadu are delayed. This clearly hinders development work and governance, as RLBs are eligible for  Finance Commission grants only if they are duly constituted. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts were explicit in their intent to entrench democratic decentralisation. Articles 243E and 243U mandate that elections to RLBs and municipalities, respectively, be completed before the expiry of their five-year term or within six months of dissolution, while Articles 243K and 243ZA vest the superintendence, direction, and control of RLBs and municipal elections in State Election Commissions (SECs). In practice, these provisions are routinely flouted. A central cause lies in the systematic weakening of SECs. The Supreme Court has repeatedly attempted to address these problems. It has held that SECs enjoy powers comparable to the Election Commission of India within their domain; that elections must proceed in the existing wards or on existing electoral rolls if revisions (in the ward boundaries or rolls) are not completed in time; and that SECs may approach constitutional courts if states fail to cooperate. Yet delays persist. 

The political disempowerment of local bodies is compounded by lack of financial autonomy. The data compiled by the Reserve Bank of India shows that municipal corporations generate only modest revenues of about 0.6 per cent of gross domestic product (2023-24), and are heavily dependent on state transfers. Meanwhile, only 1 per cent of the revenues of panchayats come from their own sources. Delayed elections weaken the legitimacy and trust in representative democracy, while weak finances constrain capacity and service delivery. Although state governments often invoke federalism to argue against central overreach, the same cannot be denied to governments below them. It is important to accept that local bodies are best-positioned to provide basic services to citizens, and can be an engine of growth and development. It is thus critical to empower local bodies both politically and financially. It will be interesting to see the observations of the Sixteenth Finance Commission on the issue.