Collusion and collision during the Emergency

THE EMERGENCY

An Unpopular History

Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr

Har-Anand

180 pages; Rs 399

The Emergency, imposed by prime minister Indira Gandhi between June 25, 1975 and January 18, 1977, remains one of the darkest periods of Indian politics. How harmful was this phase to the cause of Indian democracy? Parsa Venkateshwar Rao offers some answers in 10 well-written chapters covering the parliamentary debates and Supreme Court proceedings over the nature of fundamental rights.

He jumps into the narrative with the historic judgement of June 12, 1975 when Justice Jagmohanlal Sinha, hearing the election petition against Indira Gandhi, declared her election from Rae Bareli null and void and disqualified her for six years from contesting an election.  

Events moved rapidly after that: From June 12 to 25, Opposition parties led by Jayaprakash Narayan organised a big protest meeting in Delhi demanding Indira Gandhi’s resignation; she approached the Supreme Court in appeal against Justice Sinha’s judgement; then, without waiting for the final Supreme Court verdict, her government decided to suspend the Constitution and impose an internal Emergency.  

By proclaiming Emergency, Indira Gandhi pre-empted all Opposition and was able to put her major dissenters and critics in prison. Part XVIII Article 352 (4) of the Constitution requires the proclamation of Emergency to be laid before each House of Parliament. Mr Rao shows how this phase saw the emergence of the quintessential “rubber stamp” Parliament that approved the statutory Resolution on the Proclamation of Emergency. A Bill to amend the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971, was also approved. Another important Bill introduced by the government on August 5, 1975, was to amend the Representation of the People Act, under which Indira Gandhi’s election as Member of Parliament had been declared void and illegal, to legally regularise her election and provide her legal protection.

Most members participated cautiously in the phony debates because they knew that some of their dissenting colleagues had been arrested, and even those present were not immune from the watchful eyes of Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian regime. Some Opposition leaders were forthright. In response to an explanatory pamphlet from the government, Era Sezhiyan from Tamil Nadu made the thoughtful observation that, “I may concede that whatever has been done is completely constitutional.  But that does not take you to the democratic way. Democracy is something more than being constitutional…”. Independent MP P G Mavalankar described the amendment to MISA “as the most obnoxious piece of legislation”.  But the performance of the Congress MPs was, unsurprisingly, pathetic.

The Supreme Court did not cover itself with glory either. On November 7, 1975, a judgement validated Indira Gandhi’s election, though it struck down the provision in the constitutional amendment that put the prime minister’s election beyond judicial scrutiny. 

Did any citizen get protection against executive arbitrariness under MISA and Article 21?  The central issue before the Supreme Court was the maintainability of the “writ of habeas corpus” a pillar of a citizen’s right in a democracy.  Chief Justice A N Ray opined that courts cannot enforce fundamental rights during the period of their suspension. Only H R Khanna, the lone dissenting judge, famously observed that, “life and liberty are not the gift of the Constitution”. He further observed that “Article 226 under which the High Court can issue writ of habeas corpus is an integral part of the Constitution and hence … cannot be taken away”.  Indira Gandhi’s riposte was the passage of the 42nd Amendment that reduced the Supreme Court and high courts’ rights to pronounce on the constitutional validity of laws. 

If Indira Gandhi was protecting herself legally and constitutionally, on the one hand, she was projecting herself as a defender of democracy in the interests of the poor on the other. This was the period when she announced the 20 Point Programme of social development and started implementing schemes under “Garibi Hatao,” the slogan on which she had contested the 1971 Lok Sabha election. Mr Rao makes the valid point that the economy was in bad shape at a time that saw social unrest and the Railway strike. But this would hardly justify the suspension of citizens’ civil rights. 

The fact that economic revival was not at the centre of the Emergency is clear in chapter V, which discusses three crucial media Bills that were introduced in February, 1976: (a) To repeal the Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publications) Act 1956; (b) to repeal the Press Council Act 1965; and (c)  the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Bill. Then Information and Broadcasting Minister V C Shukla, an enthusiastic champion of censorship, piloted these three Bills and also approvingly put forward a “code of conduct” evolved by a captive group of editors. These laws made the press subservient to the Emergency regime, so much so that only official statements and pronouncements were published.

The author has successfully shown that Indira Gandhi had imposed the Emergency to protect herself not only because of Justice Sinha’s adverse electoral judgement but also because she found herself encircled by opposition groups that posed a major moral challenge to her rule. Although he has missed the 40th anniversary of the imposition of the Emergency by a year, his book marks a useful addition to the literature of a period that Indians should not be allowed to forget.