India's Afghanistan predicament

INDIA'S AFGHAN MUDDLE: A LOST OPPORTUNITY
Harsh V Pant
HarperCollins; 190 pages; Rs 450

India's Afghan Muddle is set against the backdrop of the imminent withdrawal of United States forces in Afghanistan and attempts to highlight India's options in the emergent geopolitical scenarios in the region. The author, a professor of international relations at King's College London, has been a long-time observer of South Asian politics and security issues. In this work, Mr Pant has relied on news reports and independent analyses, from India and elsewhere, to construct an Indian narrative on the Afghanistan imbroglio.

The objective of this work is threefold. First, the author draws attention to the urgency of the situation. He makes a case for India playing a proactive role in Afghanistan considering that a power vacuum will embolden forces that will inflict great damage to the Indian national interest. The second objective is to review the trajectory of India's Afghanistan policy to demonstrate how "India has largely been reactive in a strategic environment shaped by other actors". The third objective is to give a lowdown on the regional players and their conflicting interests, which make this challenge a seemingly insurmountable one.

India's Afghan Muddle begins by outlining India's core interests in a safe and stable Afghanistan. Scarred by experiences with a hostile Taliban regime, India has concentrated its energies on blocking the re-entry of the proxies of the Pakistani military-jihadi complex. It is clear to India that a radical Islamist regime backed by Pakistan is sure to cause a spillover of such elements into India. While Pakistan continues to push the Haqqani network back into Afghanistan under the garb of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, India's core interest lies in developing effective resistance to such radical forces. Other Indian interests include the possibility of making Afghanistan a "land bridge" to Central Asia and acting in a manner that befits a regional power.

Next, the book looks at India's role since the fall of Taliban in three phases. In the first phase, India acted as a support provider that tried to build the institutional capacities of a war-ravaged state, involving itself mainly in "brick-and-mortar" engagements. The second phase witnessed a dip in India's fortunes as a growing footprint of Pakistan's proxies began attacking various symbols of Indian presence in the country.

This phase also witnessed a decline in India's geopolitical footprint even as the United States partnered with Pakistan in the Global War on Terrorism. India's inability to protect its own interests in this phase sparked a fear even amidst the co-operative forces in Afghanistan. India's position was undermined as a perception gained ground that a nation that cannot uphold its own interests cannot be banked on to do the same for others. Consequently, India's policymakers had to acknowledge that an improved on-ground security situation was a pre-condition for protection of all the other interests.

The third phase saw the Indian state clawing back in the aftermath of changing geopolitical equations arising from the death of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad. This event made United States perceive Pakistan as a part of the problem rather than a solution, opening up opportunities for India. India forged a security partnership with Kabul and started playing a greater role in equipping the nascent Afghan armed forces. Instead of supplying arms to Afghanistan, India financed the arms bought from Russia. India also aligned with Iran, particularly in sharing intelligence.

The most interesting section in the book is the one that presents the strategic interests of all the players in the region. It immediately becomes clear to the reader that in this maze, each agent is pursuing orthogonal or even opposing goals. While Iran's primary objective in Afghanistan has been the reduction of the United States' footprint, Pakistan continues to see Afghanistan in pursuit of "strategic depth". On the other hand, China has preferred to take a back seat, getting involved only in a few copper mining investments. Then there's Russia, which seeks to rebalance power in Central Asia. Despite these disparate goals, the future will broadly be determined as a contest between two alliances that have diametrically opposite interests in the region - the Saudi-Pak-China combine and the India-Iran-Russia alliance.

The last chapter surveys India's options and this section appears undercooked. It is not clear whether the author's definition of a proactive India also includes stationing of Indian forces in Afghanistan. The maximum and minimum bounds of what constitutes an effective strategy for India are not explored. Mr Pant makes a point that managing Pakistan will be the most important factor in determining the stability of Afghanistan. However, considering that the military-jihadi complex continues to call the shots in that country, how such a nexus can be dismantled through endogenous or exogenous changes is not explored in sufficient detail.

India's Afghan Muddle is an excellent summary of the Afghan situation seen from an authentic Indian strategic perspective. The author attempts to reignite the debate of India's future role in a changed Afghanistan. With recent changes at the helm in both the countries, the arguments presented in the book couldn't have come at a more appropriate time.

The reviewer is a geopolitical analyst with the Takshashila Institution, an independent policy think tank