No political reform in China since long: Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard

Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard is a professor at the Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School. His latest book publication is Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party, 4 vols (2017)

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi recently met at Wuhan for a meeting that is being described as a major ice-breaker. While we know the Indian reaction to the meeting, it is hard to figure where the meeting stands in President Xi’s priorities…

That the meeting figures high in China’s priorities can be seen from the fact that this is Xi Jinping’s first “informal meeting” in China. China has been worried about the Quad Australia, India, Japan, and the US, which was revived on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2017. China is increasingly concerned about the disruption of the international order caused by an unpredictable Donald Trump. Influential strategists in China see an international environment becoming more and more adverse to China and is therefore arguing for a recalibrating of its foreign policy. More economic resources are allocated to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in order to beef up Chinese diplomacy abroad. The Belt and Road initiative is a flagship project, which India has refused to join due to the fact that it involves a corner of the disputed Kashmir region. Realising India’s strategic interest in the region and India’s friendly relations to Iran and other important countries in the region, China seeks to moderate Delhi’s concerns. Chinese analysts often take a long-term view of the international order and they know that India, not Japan, will be the major potential rival to China in the region and in the very long run probably in the world. However, currently it is the US and according to Chinese thinking, it is necessary to first deal with the main contradiction. Therefore, co-existing peacefully with India is in China’s national interest.

The President Xi has just become chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for life. What do you think was behind the decision?

There are two different views on this. Some would say that he doesn’t want to give up power, he has too many enemies due to the anti-corruption campaign and if he steps down in 2023 then he may be attacked by his enemies, so he wants to protect himself.

But the other take is that he truly believes that China needs him — that he and a senior group of leaders believe that there are very serious issues that China needs to tackle. In 2013, 340 proposals on the economic reforms programme were received to take reforms forward. These have not really been implemented. So there are important issues in terms of stalled initiatives. There is also the issue of seeing the anti-corruption campaign to its end. And also the external environment — a US President who is on the cusp of launching a trade war; North Korea…so the international situation is also complicated. In those circumstances, he might have thought that it is important to have a strong unified leadership — that this is not the time to speculate on leadership change.

I think also that Taiwan is coming up. I think you will see more initiatives on Taiwan. In 2049 you have the 100 years of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and they would really like Taiwan back before. And I really think Xi Jinping would like to see some progress in negotiations with Taiwan: For that to happen, negotiations have to start now to conclude in 2049. These things take time.

So it could be that all these issues weighing on him. I think he has a sense of a mission. He comes from an important political family. His father, Xi Zhongxun was an important political leader who rose to become deputy Prime Minister of China. After being expelled in the Cultural Revolution, he came back and he was the one who started the Special Economic Zones. 

So the internal situation, the external challenges, a sense of a mission — and by saying ‘I am staying on’ he has ended the discussion on who would succeed him! And he may have wanted that. He has brought his old companions back. Some of them are people who would not have been expected to return to positions of power. For instance, he has brought his old companion Wang Qishan back as vice president, who would not have been expected to return to positions of power after he left the Politburo Standing Committee.

You mentioned unfinished reforms. Which reforms of the unfinished ones are the most important?

It is a combination of reforms that have not been implemented — and reforms that have actually been rolled back. You’ve not really had any political reform in China for a long time.

In terms of making the system more democratic?

Yes, more open, more transparent, more democratic….since 2008-09 you’ve not really seen political reform. And more recently, it seems as if you’ve rolled back the clock! In the 1980s, Deng Xiaopeng introduced some badly needed reforms and institutionalised politics. He felt the party needed younger leaders and he formed advisory committees and convinced the old leaders to move over there. In 1982, he also introduced term limits. 

Deng Xiaopeng also talked about the separation of party and government – that the party was too involved, it should withdraw and do other things – ideology and so on – and leave it to state officials to run the economy and day to day business. 

Today you don’t hear anything about separation of party and government. 

Illustration: Binay Sinha

If anything it is the other way round…?

Oh yes, it is the party taking over the state! The party is involved in everything. And you see that in the new re-structuring — the party is taking over the state, you don’t see that separation any more. They also actually said last year that China is in a new period so we don’t have to follow Deng Xiaopeng’s policies any more. 

So now they talk about division of labour, rather THAN separation of party and government. And the division of labour is decided by the party. 

Also, in business. If you look at state owned business, then recent regulations specify that the party organs stationed in the company should be strengthened and important decisions in the company should  first be discussed in the party committee, then in the board and then implemented by the management team.

Also, this notion of overlapping posts – that if there is a board, then the party secretary and the chairman of the board should be the same person.And in a Chinese company, the chairman of the board is the number one – not the CEO. So you see the party moving forward. And it is everywhere.

Does that mean that local solutions and policies dictated by the local party units are going to supplant the centrally dictated Chinese policy of ‘one size fits all’? I’m trying to understand President Xi’s motivation in pressing to end the separation between party and government…

If you have that separation and you talk about reducing the role of the party in government – then who’s in charge ? Xi Jinping wants the party to be the core. He argues that what happened in the Soviet Union was because they let things happen. The Communists didn’t stand up for the party in the Soviet Union. 

Another way of looking at it would be that strengthening the party means more democracy, not less…

That depends on how you define democracy. Power would be vested in the party organisation. Within the party organisation there will be debate – and that you see in China today. 

So you could say that we see autocratic Party rule of Chinese society, but within the Party the debate will be multifaceted reflecting different views on China’s political future.