After co-opting Dushyant Chautala, will BJP now give in to Sena's demands

The Maharashtra and Haryana election results have led to a flood of theories, inferences and conclusions. All of these say that the BJP has been put on notice, and that neither it’s model of politics, nor it’s model of governance is invulnerable. 
 
Only the result of the 2024 general election will tell us if this is true or not. But there is what I think is an important aspect that the analysts have been missing. 
 
This is that after every concerted effort to change it, the age-old form of power distribution re-asserts itself. I call this the — after the term ‘basic structure of the constitution’ — the basic structure of government and power in India. 

 

It dates back 2,000 years. In that sense, it’s embedded in our disc operating system. Those who ignore it, or try to over-ride, always fail. Those, who go along with it with some minor changes, manage to rule for a long time. 
 
But for the last 70 years, first the Congress and now the BJP have been trying to mould the governance of India into a unitary mould where political power is exercised in the regions also by the central authority.
 
They have tried this despite the fact that the 1950 Constitution explicitly recognised that this was sort of centralisation unworkable. In fact, that was the main wisdom of those who crafted it. The rest of the Constitution is woven around this idea. 

 
Both national parties have used nationalism as the binding appeal because both have got into their heads that the western model of national state requires this. That’s fine. 
 
The Congress used secularism and socialism, which is inclusive in nature. The BJP has been using religion and socialism, which is almost wholly exclusive. One tried to build a majority. The other has been trying to use it. 
 
But none of this is going to make a difference because of what till Akbar’s time was known as Samantwad and then, after he tweaked it, Mansabdari. 
 
Money was central both. Under both the systems power flowed from wealth, not muscle alone. 

 
And this is what almost all the state elections after 2014 have shown. Whether it was Kamal Nath in MP in 2018 or Sharad Pawar and Bhupinder Singh Hooda now, their ability to oppose electorally has been hugely reinforced by their ability to finance this opposition. 
 
This is exactly how Samantwad and Mansabdari worked. Samants and Mansabs were local chieftains who could ally with, or against, the central power. Everything depended on how much land revenue they could collect and how many soldiers they could command. It was a delicately balanced pact of mutual advantage.
 
The only demand of the Samants and Mansabs was to be left alone to do as they wished. Dynastic succession was central to this system. Any challenge to this would quickly see a shifting of allegiance. 

 
Equally crucial was the overwhelming power of the central authority to punish the wayward. The British called it paramountcy, or the ability to use the threat of force to keep the equilibrium. 
 
In 1950, Article 356, the power of the central government to dismiss state governments, formalised this power. But since the Bommai judgement of the Supreme Court in 1992 it stands diluted, which has made the modern Samants and Mansabs more powerful.
 
That’s what we have seen in recent assembly elections. Despite the BJP’s best efforts, these locally powerful chieftains have pushed back. Indeed, they have pushed back against their long-time patron, the Gandhi family, also. 

 
Their message: leave us alone or else! And if the BJP doesn’t receive this message, it will have a problem in 2024. 
 
The co-opting of Dushyant Chautala shows what they call “positive movement in this direction”. Now we have to see what happens with the Shiv Sena’s demands.