The third and by far the most ominous outbreak of the deadly H5N1 bird flu virus in two years has once again exposed the country's vulnerability to this menace, as also the lack of preparedness in dealing with a potential crisis. The manner in which the West Bengal government has dealt with the problem so far is a very good example of how not to handle such potentially perilous hazards. As a result, instead of being contained at the place of origin, the infection continues to spread rapidly to other areas. Shockingly, though the danger of the bird flu re-surfacing has been imminent due to the persistence of this virus in neighbouring Bangladesh and Myanmar and, more so, after its occurrence in Manipur in July last year, the West Bengal government took no precautionary measures and indeed, was not at all prepared to deal with the problem when it arose. It is particularly dismaying that, even after the mass mortality among the chicken had been noticed, the state authorities took their own time to report the problem to the Centre and initiate proper control measures. The apathy did not end there. The timely warning issued by the World Health Organisation (WHO) that this outbreak could be more perilous than previous ones, went unheeded. Worst of all, the culling operations are being handled shoddily, without even providing protective gear to all those engaged in the task, thus compounding the risk of it further spreading into thickly populated areas, and the possibility that this might turn into a pandemic. The lapses in compensation disbursal, moreover, are deterring poultry owners from cooperating with the authorities in the on-going culling operations, thus further increasing the risk. Should the problem balloon into a crisis "" which cannot be ruled out under the present appalling circumstances "" the consequences would be disastrous. | |
| The central government cannot be absolved of its responsibility for multiple failures. For, regardless of frequent outbreaks and the presence of the fatal flu virus in countries all around India, adequate bio-safety measures like effective ceiling of borders and immunisation of birds in vulnerable belts had not been taken. Even basic operational needs, such as augmenting the existing diagnostic facilities, have not been taken care of. It is well known that the sole Bhopal-based High Security Animal Disease Laboratory (HSADL) has a limited sample testing capacity and, as such, is incapable of handling the thousands of samples that pour in simultaneously during an epidemic. The same is the case with the New Delhi-based National Institute of Communicable Diseases, insofar as testing humans is concerned. Besides, little has been done to facilitate the domestic production of avian flu vaccine and thus to reduce the dependence on imports. |
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| The adverse economic fall-out of the outbreak of the disease has already begun to be felt, and pinches the Rs 32,000-crore poultry industry. Domestic sales of poultry products have begun to drop, and countries like Oman have banned the import of these products from India. The least that the government can do is to hasten the process of dividing the country into disease-prone and disease-free zones, according to the norms laid down by the World Animal Health Organisation (OIE). This would let the production and sale of poultry products to go on undisturbed in the non-affected areas. Besides, all the elite breeding stock, including the pure line and grandparents, need to be immediately vaccinated in order to avert a complete breakdown in poultry production. Otherwise, not only the poultry but also the lives of millions of human beings would be in jeopardy. |
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