Keeping a balance

What the PM's trip to China achieved

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s much-anticipated visit to the People’s Republic of China has probably taken the relationship between India and China forward — but by how much, and how sustainably, remains open to question. In particular, while there is a degree of clarity on what the Indians expected and did (or did not) get, it is far from certain as to how the Chinese authorities have perceived the achievements — or even the importance — of Mr Modi’s visit. Still, it is worthy of note that Mr Modi has engaged the Chinese with caution, and, thus, there appear to be no major setbacks immediately visible — although this trip repeated the problematic blanket acceptance of China’s claim to Tibet that Mr Modi made in September last year. But there appears to have been no specific progress on such issues as China’s provocative issue of “stapled visas” to residents of Arunachal Pradesh, or to information sharing about the Brahmaputra. The only headline step forward was the easing of some visa processes and placing them online — which should help build people-to-people and business-to-business confidence. Taken together with the conclusion of several business deals valued at about $22 billion during Mr Modi’s visit, relations between India and China should see renewed momentum.

There is little doubt that, at the moment, China has the strategic upper hand. India may appear to be resurgent, but doubts persist about the degree to which it can and will cooperate with other Asian and Pacific Rim powers such as Australia and Japan — and, above all, questions are still being asked about how far the United States, which looks to be in a long-term retreat from engagement, could serve as the lynchpin of any such coordination. Given that, it is not the best time perhaps for any bold step forward on the border or on any other problematic and outstanding issues. China is in a powerful bargaining position and needs to be seen as rising to satisfy a noisily nationalist internal constituency. So from that point of view, the very lack of progress on the border is itself something of a relief. There is no telling how, given current relative positions, it would have turned out.

The question remains: how has Mr Modi’s apparent willingness to keep India open as a “swing state” in great-power politics worked out? Certainly, China’s welcome to India in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation suggests that Beijing is willing to give New Delhi’s taste for multilateralism the benefit of the doubt. It may be too much to read into a relatively unarticulated foreign policy, but it seems likely that Mr Modi, expected earlier to be “tough” on China, will instead keep India’s options open in multilateral terms — at least until partial success in his domestic agenda gives India more bargaining power globally. If this is the plan, it seems sensible. China appears to be responding — the statement’s emphasis on bilateral nuclear talks may indicate a qualitative change in the relationship. Or it may not, depending on how the internal agenda works out. Only time will tell if any of these are real, or just optics.