Pakistan's paradox

Upholding constitutional values offers a mixed message

Pakistan usually makes the headlines for the wrong reasons, and Imran Khan’s ouster as prime minister is certainly part of that broad story. But the manner of Mr Khan’s dismissal has offered faint hope for the functioning of the rule of law in the country. Mr Khan is admittedly part of a long line of 23 Pakistan prime ministers since independence not to complete a full term in office; his predecessors were mostly forced to step down before the completion of their terms following military coups, clashes with the country’s powerful military-intelligence complex, corruption charges, in-fighting, or all of the above.

Mr Khan, widely reputed to be a candidate of the military-Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) combine, saw his position weakened when he chose to take on his sponsors for reasons that remain unclear, and will go down in history as the first prime minister in Pakistan to lose his position on account of a vote of no-confidence in Parliament. That this vote, held dramatically in the middle of the night, was held at all is the result of a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court. Earlier, Mr Khan had sought to avoid his dismissal through constitutional legerdemain, having the deputy speaker of the Pakistan Parliament block the Opposition’s motion of no-confidence by dissolving the legislative body and calling for elections. Members of the Opposition then submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court, which ruled that Mr Khan’s decision to stop the vote from taking place was unconstitutional and ordered that it should go ahead.
 

The Supreme Court’s decision has received much approbation within the country and in the world media for upholding Pakistan’s constitutional values, such as they are. But just as the first peaceful transfer of power in Pakistan between the Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-N in 2013 did not fundamentally alter the fractured nature of the political process in that country, the impact of this precedent too is unclear. For one, it does not suggest the emergence of a staunchly independent Supreme Court. In fact, it has been argued that ruling against a prime minister who had lost the confidence of the military-ISI organisation — in effect, thwarting a “civilian coup” — was no great challenge for the apex court. For another, several of the judges are known for fairly questionable judgments in the past, including former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s lifetime disqualification from Parliament on corruption charges.

Also, the military remains a powerful player in Pakistan’s politics and the economy without any of the accountability that elected representatives must face. Now, as the leaders of a rag-tag coalition of Opposition parties jostle for position in the post-Imran Khan government, it is by no means clear whether the incoming administration will be in a position to tackle Pakistan’s most urgent problems — a sliding economy, falling incomes, rising debt, and empty forex reserves. Negotiating these issues while balancing relations with its two superpower clients — the US and China — will demand a level of leadership that Pakistan’s political set-up has not been equal to so far. In that sense, the upholding of constitutional values is encouraging, but it should not be seen as a sign of fundamental change in Pakistan.