Security risks from delay

Manifest risks to national security should spur quick decisions

There has been no official word so far on the news flowing from China and pronouncements from the Pentagon in Washington. Taken together, the two suggest that China is gearing for possible military action on the Tibetan plateau through a change of command structure and the mobilisation of forces. That the government – like all its predecessors – prefers to play such issues close to its chest is something that has come to be expected, but that is no reason for accepting official silence on a matter of national security. In its annual report for 2015-16, the defence ministry notes that there has been an “increase in assertiveness” during routine patrolling by the Chinese army, but it is otherwise full of the usual anodyne statements. Given the news reports of the past few days, the ministry must give the country its assessment of the security situation on the disputed land border with China, and whether the short-term threat perception has changed for any reason.

Short-term capabilities are born out of medium-term decisions. It is an unhappy fact that the expenditure on defence, seen in relation to GDP, remains too low. Virtually all equipment procurement programmes – whether being built domestically or negotiated with overseas suppliers – are running many years behind schedule. Four years after the Rafale was picked as the appropriate choice of fighter aircraft, and a year after Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a reduced order size, no contract has been concluded. Meanwhile, the first of six new Scorpene submarines has ventured out for sea trials and will be inducted into the navy later this year, four years behind schedule — yet without torpedoes, its most important armoury for anti-ship warfare. It is already known that new destroyers are being commissioned without either key ship-to-air missiles or enough anti-submarine helicopters, and with only sub-optimal sonar systems. Even basic equipment like a new assault rifle for the infantry is caught in a bureaucratic logjam. War reserves are being used up for routine operations, there isn't enough ammunition to last a short war…the list goes on.

These problems did not materialise in a day, and there are no overnight solutions. The question is whether enough is being done to make the country's defences progressively more secure, at a fast enough pace. Admittedly, the Modi government has taken a variety of initiatives — for instance, to indigenise the manufacture of defence equipment, improve fighter aircraft maintenance for improved operational availability, and speed up procedural clearances for various acquisitions. However, the actual signing of contracts has been relatively rare. As for warship production, a navy that talks of having more than 60 additional warships in a decade, over and above replacements, is commissioning perhaps three vessels annually, most of them as replacement. If manifest risks to national security do not act as a spur for quick decisions and adequate budgets, what will?