Waiting for the next time

That Ajmal Kasab is Pakistani is the only real concession made by Islamabad so far

The admission by Pakistan that Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving terrorist of the Mumbai attack is a Pakistani, is the only real concession that Islamabad has made so far in the wake of the attack on Mumbai in late November. For the rest, it has been the usual story of obfuscation and bare-faced lies, with even the media and other organs of civil society in Pakistan lined up firmly behind the army and the perpetrators of the attack. The climbdown that Pakistan has done so far is the result of a combination for India of good luck (a terrorist captured alive), investigative acumen (producing a substantial dossier on where the attack came from, monitoring of telephone calls, and the like) and help from international quarters. At the international level, the United Nations Security Council resolution calling the Lashkar-e-Taiba a terrorist organisation has been another breakthrough for India, though not a very significant one because of the LeT’s constant re-inventing of itself under new guises.

If truth be told, these are slim pickings for seven weeks of intense diplomatic effort. The over-riding western concern has been to prevent war between the South Asian neighbours. The predictable suggestion aired recently that India and Pakistan must talk to each other is really playing Pakistan’s hand—because what it would like to focus on more is of course the Kashmir issue. India’s immediate concern is the export of terror—on which there can be as much polite diplomatic exchange as there has been between the Pentagon and Al Qaeda. The hard truth is that New Delhi must fight its own battles. The home minister, P Chidambaram, virtually signalled the latest position by saying a few days ago that Pakistan would pay a heavy price the next time it sponsored a terrorist attack on India. In other words, the Mumbai attack was now history, other than the effort to wrest some diplomatic mileage by presenting the evidence of Pakistani involvement to the major capitals of the world.

Two lessons should be drawn from this experience. First, preventive action to ward off terrorist attacks is easier than retributive action after an attack takes place. The Mumbai attack showed up glaring failures: the failure to use intelligence on the attack and even the route of the attackers; the lack of an effective crisis management group that failed earlier, during the Kandahar hijacking nine years ago; the failure of coordination between the many agencies involved; and the failure to even commandeer civilian aircraft to ship the National Security Guards from Delhi to Mumbai, instead of waiting for the NSG’s slow turboprop to come from Chandigarh and then reach Mumbai. The failures are so many that a full-fledged inquiry is in order, so as to learn the right lessons. For a start, did the NSG guards have night vision equipment when they went into the Taj and Oberoi/Trident? Judging from the television footage, they did not. Indeed, did the NSG even have proper training for fighting inside a building? Doubts arise because it took them 48 hours to deal with a handful of attackers. Surely, all this needs to be corrected. But judging from the evidence of airport security having lapsed back into its semi-stupor, it is clear that no lessons have been learnt about maintaining the level of alertness at a much higher level.

The second lesson is that taking on a nuclear-armed state militarily is not easy, and has risks. If the risks have to be minimised, then there have to be properly trained special forces with the latest equipment, and clearly identified strike targets that justify a quick in and out. If Pakistan is to be taught a lesson the next time, preparatory action must begin now.