Arun Jaitley will be remembered as the finance minister during two of the biggest seismic events in India’s economic history — demonetisation and the goods and services tax (GST).
While helming affairs at North Block, he put in place a number of economic laws and measures. These include the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Black Money Act, amendments to the Benami Act, the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, banking reforms through the ‘Indradhanush’ programme, mergers of a number of state-owned banks, and a record number of divestment proceeds. For policy watchers, however, his biggest achievement was perhaps fiscal rectitude, something on which he had the unequivocal backing of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
In informal conversations, current and past bureaucrats, some of whom are still in very powerful positions, have spoken highly of him as a minister who trusted his bureaucrats’ judgement and experience. They would always count on his deep knowledge of the law, the Constitution, and parliamentary processes.
To some critics, it seemed that his reliance on officials may have been detrimental at times. It is still unclear what arguments bureaucrats had placed in front of Jaitley before the finance ministry sent a communication to the RBI last October, saying that it wanted to start consultations with the central bank under Section 7 of the RBI Act on a number of issues.
But did his inclusive approach create problems? Critics of the GST say that its complex structure, incorporating five rates when the ideal situation would have been two or three, was a result of Jaitley trying to please everyone. One of his bigger achievements was to get the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) enacted, as a mountain of stressed assets hobbled the banking sector. Timely capital infusion in public sector banks and the move for merger of weak banks with strong banks ensured some stability in the financial sector.
Journalists covering the finance ministry will remember his informal interactions in North Block. These were different from his “durbars” in Parliament and elsewhere, in that these were more on policy than political.