He also said even the December 2015 asset quality review (AQR) by the central bank has not helped resolve the issue, except in turning public attentions to the same.
Stating that timely resolution of NPAs is of essence if we were to restore corporate investment and create jobs, Acharya asked bankers to take NPA resolution "with a certain sense of urgency."
The noted economist who joined the central bank only last month from New York University, noted that since asset quality review of December 2015, up to a sixth of public sector banks gross advances are stressed (NPAs, restructured or written-off), and a significant majority of these are in fact NPAs and for banks in the worst shape, the share of assets under stress has approached or exceeded 20 per cent. This estimate of stressed assets has doubled from 2013 in terms of what had been recognised by banks.
"Though the AQR has taken a massive stride forward in bringing the scale of the problem out in the open and stirring a public debate about it, relatively little has been achieved in resolving the underlying assets to which banks had lent," Acharya rued, adding similar was the fate of the several resolution mechanisms and frameworks offered by RBI as progress has been painfully slow.
financing and primarily provide sweat equity have had somewhat of a field day, facing limited dilution of their initial stakes nor much of a threat of being outright replaced.
"There is a connection between these two outcomes - the lack of a comprehensive recognition of stressed assets by banks and the absence of any resolution.
"Both stem from the structure of incentives at our banks and the fact that stressed assets have been an outcome of excessive bank lending, en masse, in a relatively short period from 2009 to 2012, and to a concentrated set of large firms in a number of sectors such as infra, power, telecom, metals (iron & steel, in particular), EPC, and textiles," he said.
"Only a bank that fears losing its deposit base or incurring the wrath of its shareholders is likely to recognise losses in a timely manner. But in many of our banks, such market discipline is simply not present at the moment.
"In others, even if some such discipline is at work, banker horizon is too short until end of the CEO's term. Banks lobby for regulatory forbearance, perhaps some loan prospects turned sour due to bad luck, but beyond a point, concessions in recognising losses just ends up being a strategy of kicking the can down the road and leaving them as legacy assets for the next management team to deal with," he said.
"The loss of capital that will result on banks' books and the fear of vigilance actions that such haircuts might trigger have made it almost impossible to get banks to embrace restructuring," he noted.
Admitting that there is no right price at which the market for stressed assets clears if left alone to private forces, he said even with an orderly resolution mechanism under the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, there is no reason for banks rush to file cases.
Warning that recovery is a long way off, Acharya said
sectors with the most stressed assets have so much excess capacity relative to current or near-term utilization that there is no sign of a pickup in higher capacity utilisation.
Noting this has forced "promoters to stay afloat with rollovers from banks which only increase their indebtedness, partly disengaged, partly disgorging cash from the few assets that are running," he warned that "the end result is the silent atrophy of the true potential of these assets."
Stating that we are at "a crossroads and have an important choice to make," he warned "we can choose the status quo, but this would be insanity. It would risk a Japanese or an Italian style outcome."
"Or we can choose to call a spade a spade as Scandinavia did to resolve its banking problems in the early 90s and the US did from October 2008 to June 2009, even if only after letting a significant bank fail.
Suggesting some ways to effectively resolve the bad assets issue, Acharya said first there has to be an incentive provided to banks to get on with it and restructure the stressed assets at a price that clears the market for these assets. If they don't do it in a timely manner, then the alternative should be costlier in terms of the price they receive.
Thirdly, the government should not be footing all the losses bank book from bad asset sale. Wherever possible, private shareholders of banks should also be asked to chip in.
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