Just What Is A Plan?

When A P J Abdul Kalam, director general of the Defence Research and Develop- ment Organisation (DRDO) announced plan 2005 in November 1994, his budget from the defence ministry was Rs 12.4 billion and total funding for military R&D -- some of which is funded by the armed services -- came to Rs 14.9 billion, according to the department of science and technology (DST). This level of funding constituted a 36 per cent increase since 1991-92 in real terms and was 24 per cent higher than at the peak of the build-up in 1980s. Aside from the five openly nuclear powers, only Germany and Japan were investing a military R&D at a higher rate. Only the US, the UK, France, Sweden invest a greater portion of their defence budgets in R&D than India's 6.5 per cent. The figure for Russia is only 6.4 per cent and for China less than 4 per cent. If the defence ministry had followed through on plan 2005's spending increase, even the British figure of 9.1 per cent would have been eclipsed.

DRDO's budget has stagnated under plan 2005, actually decreasing in real terms in 1996-97 and 1997-98. DST figures are not yet available, but total military R&D funding is generally 20 per cent over and above the DRDO budget and had followed roughly the same trends since the 80s. What then does the ministrys reluctance to increase funding for R&D mean for India's security?

The most important effects are economic. As long as DRDO launches new projects on the assumption that funding will dramatically increase, the funds set aside will be wasted when the expected crescendo of rupees plays out as a diminuendo instead. That money could be better spent in other areas that contribute more directly to Indian security. Just as importantly, the work of Indian science and technology professionals -- many of whom take jobs at DRDO and affiliated institutes out of a special sense of national purpose -- will be squandered on efforts that are going nowhere.

Even the projects on which DRDO has lavished funds most generously have been troubled. Of those plan 2005 was meant to support most directly, the light combat aircraft and the Arjun tank have suffered the longest technical delays. While the Integrated Guided Missile Development Plan has progressed more smoothly, only the Prithvi ballistic missile has been certified for production and induction into the armed services. But even Prithvi has been delayed by a distinct lack of interest from the army and the air force, as well as political pressure from the US.

Simply bringing these three to term will be a challenge, but Abdul Kalam continues to dream up Quixotic new projects and promote them with fantastic claims -- without regard to India's 25 years without a war and its improving relations with China and the US. Among those he has said are in progress since launching plan 2005 are a carrier-based fighter and an indigenous aircraft carrier to launch it from, a medium bomber, an airborne warning and control system (Awacs), aground-launched anti-Awacs missile (although none of India's potential enemies has an Awacs), a nuclear submarine, a submarine-launched missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile, an air-to-air missile, a laser guided bomb -- this last despite the fact that India has just bought hundreds of state-of-the-art smart bombs from France, Russia, the UK and the US. Any one of these would take the entire Indian R&D budget to do properly, but DRDO simply assembles a small team of engineers and technicians to make an initial stab at each. Not

surprisingly, these token efforts have not led to much more than a dissatisfied exodus of talented people.

If their leaving is bad news for DRDO, it appears to be a shot in the arm for science and technology in India. Before plan 2005, military R&D had expanded from 15 per cent of all R&D funded by the government in 1982-83 to 28 per cent in 1994-95, a figure exceeded only by France, the UK and the US among the advanced industrial powers. But military R&D as a share in the national scientific endeavor has dropped since the 80s because economic reform has led to dramatic increases in R&D investment by private firms. It is these firms that are luring the best young minds away from the stifling confines of DRDO's institutes.

With brain drain less of a problem, an obvious question is why the military R&D budget should not be cut further, thereby encouraging more scientific talent to join productive parts of the economy. If funding for military R&D were halved, it would still account for 3.2 per cent of the defence budget, a figure comparable to those of Japan, South Korea, Spain or Taiwan, all with more successful military industries than India's. Even if those funds were reallocated within the defence budget, India might well enjoy a simultaneous improvement in its military capabilities and an increase in its economic competitiveness.

(Eric Arnett is the leader of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes project on military technology).