Old Economy Vahan
Compared with Jaffna, Srinagar looks like the venue of a Sunday school picnic. Jaffna looks like a bombed out battleground under siege. It did a couple of years ago. It must look worse today. Entire neighbourhoods have been razed. The rest is dilapidated. Power and telecommunication facilities are in short supply. The town hall looks like that of a one-horse nineteenth century colonial town. Buses that look like second world war vintage trundle down potholed roads. All of this contrasts starkly with modern, high-flying, fun Colombo.
On the other hand, the Kashmir valley, which was one of the more backward parts of the subcontinent in 1947, is one of the most prosperous today, more certainly than Jammu and Ladakh. And remember, one of the points some of the more spooked of Admiral Bhagwat's opponents held against him, sotto voce of course, was that he had appointed a Kashmiri Muslim as staff officer to the naval chief. Contrast this with the fact that there is not a single Tamil -- or at least wasn't two years ago -- in the Sri Lankan armed forces operating in the north.
These differences need to be kept in mind by those who have spent the last few days condemning the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka, insisting on seeing the issue only through the prism of the danger of Balkanisation across south Asia. The Sri Lankan ethnic divide is different to the Kashmir issue. To condemn the Tigers out of hand as thugs and assassins is simplistic. The fact is that the island's Tamils have suffered discrimination, neglect and subjugation at various times and, whether the rest of us like it or not, the large majority of them support the Tigers even to the extent of offering their children as cannon fodder.
Even though the group of journalists among which I visited Jaffna and nearby rural areas a couple of years ago was zealously shepherded by government officials and army officers, some of us perceived a strong sense of commitment -- even among little old ladies -- to the Tigers' cause. The population of Jaffna had been reduced from 7,00,000 to about 5,00,000 in the past 15 years but the common man's determination to struggle on was still apparent.
If and when India finds itself in a position to mediate, it must be even-handed. The danger to India's integrity in the south-east of the peninsula does not stem from the possibility that Sri Lankan Tamils get justice but from the possibility that justice is denied to them over a long haul. It is difficult to see 70 million Indian Tamils getting drawn into Eelam, even if Sri Lanka's two million Tamils were to win independence. The way to keep India's Tamils -- or the people of any other state, for that matter -- happily within the Indian Union is to ensure rapid economic prosperity across the country, and across social groups, not by helping to deny the rights of those with whom Indian Tamils strongly sympathise.
All of this is not to argue that India should rush in to help the Tigers or somehow help to bring Eelam into being. Not at all. Indeed, India would probably be best off avoiding involvement as long as it can do so without losing strategic influence. Some analysts have argued for the Indian army or some patchwork multinational force to go in, essentially to bring the Tigers to heel and then negotiate a settlement that would keep the island's political integrity intact. That would be a foolish move, as unlikely to succeed as the IPKF a decade ago -- or the US attempt to subdue the Vietcong three decades ago.
Nor is mediation likely to yield very much. The Tigers are adept at using such opportunities to buy time to regroup and strengthen their military positions. They have already demonstrated their unwillingness to accept anything less than independence. The Sinhalas meanwhile, egged on by hawkish Buddhist monks, have been unable for several years now to agree on the devolution package with which President Kumaratunga won her previous mandate. There seems little hope of lasting peace and mediators are more likely than not to emerge with egg on their faces.
One can only hope that Jaswant Singh's offer to broker peace if both sides invite India is only a strategic move to block any other major power getting into that role. It could be predicated on the belief that at least the LTTE will not play ball. It would be best for India to steer clear without appearing to wash its hands off Sri Lanka. For even the fall of Jaffna, which now seems likely in the next few days, need not mean endgame. Jaffna has fallen before, and been retaken. Neither the Tigers nor the government is going to throw in the towel in a hurry.
The continuation of the Sri Lankan civil war does not do India any harm. Indeed, cynics could argue that India's commercial interests would be hurt if Batticaloa and Trincomalee, some of the finest harbours in Asia, were to become fully operational. After all, trade between east Asia on the one hand and Europe and West Asia on the other is likely to increase vastly in the new century and, for the moment, Indian ports are the only available ones in this region.