Memes at war

The US-Iran 'virtual' conflict spotlights the growing impact of cognitive warfare

12 min read

Updated On: Jun 10 2026 | 7:43 AM IST

Anushka Bhardwaj

Georgie Koithara

Representational image

Modern warfare is no longer fought only across land, air, and sea. The ongoing conflict in West Asia demonstrates that the information ecosystem is a crucial battlefield with no actual ‘ceasefire’. Since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, the United States (US) and Iran have planned and executed online campaigns to try and shape the narrative and popular understanding of a complex war. Analysts describe this as “cognitive warfare”, a form of conflict where the primary target is not infrastructure or territory but public perception, emotional response and, ultimately, political behaviour.

“Conflict communication has moved from official statements. It is a 24/7 emotional contest over perception. The difference in the ongoing conflict is that now it is speed, humour, and cultural remixing through memes, artificial intelligence (AI) videos, parody, and platform-native propaganda,” says Nancy Snow, propaganda expert and professor emeritus of communications at California State University.

Since a temporary ceasefire was announced on April 8, the physical warfare has abated. However, none of the nations have loosened their grip on digital narrative building. With reports of some ships being attacked around the Strait of Hormuz, US President Donald Trump was quick to post two memes: Bye Bye, ‘Fast ships’ and ‘Lasers: Bing, bing, gone’. These memes virtually showed Iran warships being destroyed by US fighter jets.

A social media post shared by The White House on its official X account amid the ongoing war with Iran on May 4, 2026 (Photo: The white house/ X)

The geoeconomic battlefield

Within 24 hours, Iranian embassies across multiple regions reposted Trump’s memes claiming that the US cannot match the Iranian sense of humour and that they are on the right side of history. This showed that the propaganda campaign by both the nations is not working in a vacuum. Time and again, the machinery has picked words, instances, images, and announcements from each other’s posts.

“Unlike conventional US strategy which has been more institutionalised in the form of press briefings and presidential statements, the Trump-era style relies heavily on spectacle, insult, and personal dominance. The irony is that Iran has learned to meme Trump back at Trump. It has adapted to the American attention economy,” says Snow.

According to Mohit Vashisth, founder, New Delhi-based think tank Centre for New Age Warfare Studies, this is ‘memetic warfare’, where large volumes of AI-generated, emotionally provocative, low-cost content is used to flood digital ecosystems and influence perceptions. “The objective is often not to convince audiences of a specific truth, but to create confusion, emotional polarisation, or narrative fatigue.”

Experts note that the aim perhaps is not to explain the technicalities of the warzone. “A meme does not need to explain the Strait of Hormuz or nuclear escalation; it simply tells viewers whom to laugh at, whom to fear, and whom to blame,” says Snow, adding that this is called mood control in modern conflicts. Whoever controls the narrative controls the mood.

Iran’s strategic communications apparatus has become particularly notable for its use of platform-native and meme-oriented content. A recent study by London-based think tank Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) documented how Iranian embassy and diplomatic accounts on X dramatically altered their communications strategy following the outbreak of war. Rather than relying on formal diplomatic language, embassy accounts increasingly used memes, satire, AI-generated content and reactive humour.

“Modern cognitive warfare operates through decentralised ecosystems involving influencers, authors, conferences, coordinated digital campaigns, bot amplification networks and platform-native content designed for virality,” says Soumya Awasthi, fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. One of the clearest indicators of institutionally driven cognitive warfare, according to Awasthi, lies in patterns of coordination and scale.

“Indicators include extreme or repetitive messaging and the scale of organised effort behind the content,” she says, pointing to slick Lego-style videos and Teletubbies-themed political content as examples of communication strategies that appear far more structured than organic online behaviour.

A screengrab of a video shared by the Iranian embassy in South Africa on its X account on April 16, 2026 (PHOTo: Iran embassy in south africa/ X)

Iran, a revelation

Even before the outbreak of war, the US had been actively using memes to address global and internal challenges, leading most experts to believe that it was the US that initiated the cognitive warfare. However, Iran’s retaliation came as a revelation, considering its limited exposure to the digital ecosystem.

“Instead of competing with the US in conventional media dominance, it leverages emotionally resonant, highly shareable content to amplify anti-war and anti-US narrative globally,” says Vashisth.

The scale of engagement was substantial. According to the ISD, Iranian diplomatic and official accounts collectively increased posting volumes from roughly 10,500 posts in the 50 days before the war to approximately 40,000 in the first 50 days of the conflict. Likes rose from around 660,000 to 22 million, while cumulative views surged from 55 million to nearly 896 million. The study found that several embassy accounts individually generated more engagement during the conflict than the entire monitored network had produced before the war.

“This is a historic phase in war communication. It is not controlled by a central propaganda ministry. It is in open space and there is multiplication of ideas. Even if the content is produced by the government; where it goes, whom it reaches, at what pace, all of this is managed externally,” says Michael Neiberg, chair of war studies at US Army War College in Carlisle.

The conflict has also highlighted the strategic importance of what analysts call “pre-seeded narratives”. Awasthi argues that digital information warfare increasingly rewards first movers. “The actor that frames an event first often receives the greatest amplification and reach.” States therefore maintain pre-prepared communication templates and narrative packages designed for rapid deployment once events unfold.

There are dedicated social media pages, not necessarily created by governments, which amplify official content — and the views are crossing millions. “Audiences now directly consume battlefield footage, drone strike videos, telegram updates, AI-generated imagery, and meme content within minutes of an event occurring. This creates a “continuous psychological battlespace” where public perception changes hour-by-hour”, says Vashisth.

Non-government channels not only amplify official posts, but also add layers to what has been communicated. “Sometimes, there are some ideas that the government is reluctant to say. This barrier is broken when it is not centralised,” says Neiberg.

Researchers note that Iranian embassy accounts in countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and India were especially effective at producing viral content aimed at global audiences rather than purely domestic constituencies. One widely circulated post from the Iranian Embassy in Tajikistan featured an AI-generated video of Jesus slapping Donald Trump into a pit of fire after Trump shared an AI imagery resembling Jesus Chirst. Trump later deleted the post and clarified that he was depicting himself as a doctor. Another viral post from the Iranian embassy in South Africa showed an AI-generated Trump parody singing altered lyrics to the 1980s song Voyage, Voyage.

The significance of these campaigns lies not merely in their humour but in their strategic design. As Awasthi notes, embassies increasingly function as “distributed narrative nodes” rather than purely diplomatic institutions. Beyond posting content online, embassies also cultivate diaspora networks through outreach events, cultural programming and social engagement, creating channels through which narratives can travel organically across transnational communities.

Vashisth says the Ukraine war demonstrates how strategic communication can directly influence military and diplomatic outcomes. “With presidential messaging, Ukraine effectively used social media, drone footage, and short-form videos to maintain global attention and sustain the Western political support.”

While the undertone of the cognitive warfare by Iran and the US remains similar, it differs in virality, objective, and target audience. With digital restrictions and limited internet exposure, Iran’s strategy has been identified as more global than local. On the other hand, US’ narrative building starts from home with making content about the war that--- also targets Democrats’ handling of the crisis over the years.

Awasthi notes that Iran is not simply speaking to its domestic population or regional allies but also directly targeting the US audience. Iranian messaging has frequently focused on US debt, domestic political tensions and perceived military weakness. According to her, this serves a dual purpose: Projecting Iranian ‘resilience’ while simultaneously attempting to weaken confidence inside the adversary state.

Cyaba, a real-time AI-powered platform that analyses online information, studied the Iranian social media strategy in two phases. The first phase focused on pro-Iranian campaigns with narratives such as Iran successfully striking military targets across the region, projecting Iranian military and technological superiority, and portraying the minimal loss after US strikes. Each of the posts got over 10 million views.

The second phase, beginning on March 23, focused more on US’ failures than Iran’s defence. According to Cyaba analyses, the second phase was mostly meant for the US audience. Large-scale military funeral processions with flag-draped coffins, designed to convey the scale of US losses, soldiers in distress on the battlefield, simulating desperate pleas and grief over fallen comrades, children mourning the death or deployment of a parent in the US military — such content tried to leverage themes of innocence and family separation to maximise emotional impact.

Digital warfare

Playing with emotion

The funeral procession videos reached up to 6.5 million views each. The videos of the children grieving, the most widely circulated of the three, featured identical dialogue and visual staging across dozens of accounts, strongly suggesting content produced from a small set of centralised prompts. “For the general public, raw war information can become overwhelmingly violent. Symbols have a much stronger impact in that case,” says Neiberg.

According to Neil Lavie-Driver, a psychology researcher at the University of Cambridge and an academician in the field on information and extremism, Iran’s strategy has moved from Islamic undertones. “The propaganda produced by Iran is not visibly promoting its theocratic ideology, but rather speaking the language of the West and referring to Western grievances about Jeffrey Epstein etc,” he says.

As generating global support and holding the narrative becomes an integral part of cognitive warfare, the experts believe that militaries across the world have little choice but to evolve. “Some governments are still reluctant about this. The military feels that this is something they are not qualified to do but eventually a switch will have to come,” says Neiberg, adding that if not for disseminating, such strategies are important for countering false information.

Describing it as an ‘integrated information ecosystem’, Awasthi notes that integration leads to an information environment where propaganda no longer arrives through clearly identifiable state channels alone but is diffused across thousands of interconnected digital actors.

Going forward, strategic asymmetry can make less resourceful nations equal challengers in narrative-building. “If the communication strategy is expanded, it is cheaper. At a lower cost, you can test which medium reaches your target audience in the best way. Most of the cost is borne by the social media giant,” adds Neiberg.

However, no evolution of this calibre comes without risks, especially in the middle of a global conflict. Multiple studies have revealed how AI-generated material can destabilise even professional analytical workflows.

According to Factnameh, an Iranian fact-checking organisation and member of the International Fact-Checking Network, misinformation during the conflict evolved rapidly from recycled or miscaptioned content into entirely AI-generated battle imagery. Viral posts circulated online claiming to show destroyed Israeli cities, downed F-35 fighter jets, missile strikes and civilian protests that never occurred.

One prominent fake narrative claimed that Iran had downed multiple Israeli F-35 aircraft. Images were circulated widely across Persian-language media and social media ecosystems despite obvious visual inconsistencies and later analysis suggesting a 98 per cent probability that one of the images was AI-generated.

The Cyabra study also stated that around 20 per cent of the accounts sharing war information were inauthentic and still gathered over 50 million views and thousands of reshares. Awasthi identifies manipulated satellite imagery as a particularly serious concern because of both its immediate and long-term cognitive effects. She points to China’s repeated publication of maps that show disputed territories within its borders as an example of how sustained visual representation can gradually shape geopolitical perceptions across generations.

By virtue of the algorithm, the fake and the real information is disseminated together and at the same pace. “Misinformation also becomes more dangerous because social media algorithms amplify emotionally charged content regardless of accuracy,” says Vashisth, adding that content that provokes outrage, fear, anger, or triumph spreads faster than nuanced reporting.

Analysts and fact-checkers increasingly refer to this phenomenon as “synthetic OSINT”, where fabricated military analysis, AI-generated satellite imagery and pseudo-technical battle assessments are designed to mimic legitimate open-source intelligence. During the conflict, several widely followed “OSINT” or open source intelligence accounts on X were documented spreading false or manipulated wartime content despite presenting themselves as verification-oriented analysts. Investigations found that some accounts relied on AI chatbots such as Grok for verification while amplifying fabricated images, recycled footage and false strike claims that later spread into mainstream reporting ecosystems.

“AI-generated images and videos blur the line between satire, propaganda, and fabricated evidence. Even when a meme is technically parody, it can create false impressions about events, motives, or battlefield realities,” says Snow.

In the current warfare ecosystem, memes, AI-generated imagery, satellite analysis, diplomatic institutions, influencers and open-source analysts all coexist within the same contested information space. What makes the current conflict notable is not simply the presence of propaganda, which has accompanied war for centuries, but the speed, scale and algorithmic sophistication through which narratives are now manufactured, amplified and emotionally optimised for digital audiences.

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Written By :

Anushka Bhardwaj

With a passion for telling stories, Anushka Bhardwaj completed her post-graduation in journalism from the Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi, in 2022. In her two years with Business Standard, she has covered a number of subjects including brands, advertising, sports, politics, gender, quick commerce, features, and lifestyle. Her idea is to look beyond the news in all stories. Bhardwaj's writing has won her the Business Standard Seema Nazareth Award in 2025.