India's China policy and Cold War dynamics

Former diplomat Vijay Gokhale's latest work, delves into the complex geopolitical landscape of 1949-59, exploring the intricacies of India-China relations, and the lessons learned

Crosswinds: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition Over China

Author: Vijay Gokhale

Publisher: Penguin Randomhouse

Pages: 699

Price: Rs 256

Since his retirement from his assignment as India’s foreign secretary in 2020, Vijay Gokhale has honed his reputation as one of the most shrewd and perceptive analysts of Chinese affairs and of India-China relations. What mark his writings, whether op-eds, research papers or books, are rigorous documentary research, wide reading of existing literature and offering valuable insights, using as a lens, his command over the Chinese language and rich experience serving in China and negotiating with the Chinese. Within the space of only a few years of retirement, he has produced two widely acclaimed books related to China and India-China relations, including The Long Game: How Chinese Negotiate with India, and Tiananmen Square. His latest book, Crosswinds: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition Over China is an outstanding piece of contemporary history writing, covering the period 1949 -59 and laying bare the complex interplay of interests, attitudes and the changing perceptions of the leaders of India, China, the US and the UK as they sought to manage a transformed but still evolving post-World War II geopolitical landscape.

Mr Gokhale uses the Taiwan issue as the pivot for his story of the drama unfolding in the Indo-Pacific and explores, with extensive archival evidence, the trajectory that shaped the Asian order, which eventually succumbed to the dynamics of the Cold War despite a different vision that animated India’s foreign policy in these formative years. Nehru was sound in assessing that post-war Asia was driven by the forces of nationalism rather than an ideological attachment to communism, that the cause of regional peace would be advanced by acknowledging and accommodating rather than confronting, even subverting, the upsurge of nationalism. The early recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was based on this perspective. Nehru believed that a partnership between India and China as the two largest emerging states in Asia was indispensable to preventing the Cold War from locking the region in an ideological and military confrontation that would limit India’s diplomatic space and threaten its vital interests. While the overall strategic approach was sound, it was pursued without carefully crafted tactics. It relied on personal diplomacy that was driven by impulse, predilections and prejudices of the leading actors, making them vulnerable to being manipulated by more seasoned players.

In recognising the PRC, India under Nehru failed to obtain any assurance concerning the sanctity of India’s borders. The recourse to personal diplomacy in disregard of institutional processes and professional opinion led to distorted perceptions and neglect of substantive interests. The book lays bare the damage to India’s external relations from Krishna Menon’s inflated belief in his own persuasive powers and dismissive arrogance in dealing with his interlocutors. Indian diplomacy became disconnected from India’s substantive capabilities and this led to the rude awakening in 1962 when China launched a border war against the country.

Crosswinds exposes the differing perceptions and interests of the US and the UK concerning relations with China. It is easy to see why the UK was keen to establish early relations with the PRC, hoping thereby to safeguard its own extensive commercial interests in China and maintaining its colony in Hong Kong. But it wanted to pursue this policy without alienating the Americans who wanted recognition to follow assurances from China on adhering to existing treaties and agreements. The British justified their own early recognition of the PRC by citing pressure from India, when it was they who were urging Nehru not to delay recognition.

On the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1955 and then later in 1958, the British were concerned about armed conflict breaking out because of the rigid positions being taken by Washington but in this case, too, the concerns of India and other Asian countries were cited as a reason for counselling American restraint. The UK repeatedly deceived both India and the US in pursuit of its own interests. The Chinese followed the same tactics using India to serve their own interests rather than in the belief that India was a credible and trusted mediator. The US emerges as a much more straightforward player, difficult to deal with but not deliberately duplicitous.

In the Epilogue, Mr Gokhale attempts to draw important lessons from his study of the 1949-59 decade. In a sense the wheel has turned full circle as the US and China are once again locked in a dangerous confrontation over Taiwan. The stakes are much higher than in the 1950s. Nehru was right to be concerned about the possibility of an armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific because it would have seriously impacted India’s interests.

The stakes are much higher today. India has greater agency in view of its rising economic and military capabilities. It has a strong partnership with the US and with major powers such as Japan and Australia. This has enabled India to contribute to the maintenance of a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Mr Gokhale views with suspicion the recent efforts by the UK to re-insert itself into the region through the Australia-UK-US alliance (AUKUS) and its military bases and security arrangements in several Indian Ocean Rim countries. The suspicion may have some basis but perhaps it is also worth considering the risks of the much deeper security engagement with a US whose geopolitical priorities may change.

 The reviewer is a former foreign secretary and an honorary fellow, CPR