Unquiet flows the Indus: Will treaty pressure shift Pakistan's stance?

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty will certainly put pressure on the Pakistani government - but whether it will be enough to change its behaviour remains to be seen

In 2020, when border tensions between India and China were at their height, New Delhi made it harder for Chinese companies to do business in India and banned several apps including TikTok in an attempt to make China come to heel. In an interview to Business Standard, former foreign secretary and former national security advisor Shiv Shankar Menon said pithily: “If you think banning apps is going to work, good luck to you.” He explained: “I’m not sure whether the owners and developers of those apps are going to generate sufficient pressure on the Chinese government to make it change its behaviour on the border.”

 

But the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan is certainly going to put pressure on the Pakistan government — whether enough to change its behaviour is to be tested. Though it is the one agreement that has withstood all face-offs between India and Pakistan since it was signed in 1960 with the World Bank as guarantor, Islamabad was quick to tangle with New Delhi every time there was any talk that Pakistan’s access to water would be impeded in any way. It has now — and earlier — warned that any intention of India to mess around with the treaty that affects Pakistan’s right to water will be seen as “an act of war”.

 

Originating in Tibet, in the upper reaches of the Himalaya, the Indus moves through Jammu and Kashmir and enters its most dependent area, across the international boundary into downstream Pakistan. It flows through the fertile plains of Punjab (Pakistan) and then Sindh, eventually draining into the Arabian Sea. The river was and continues to be the lifeline of Pakistan’s economy. It is directly responsible for the employment of nearly half of Pakistan’s labour force and at least a quarter of gross domestic product.

 

In April 1948, for the first and only time, India stopped the Indus waters from flowing into Pakistan. For the bureaucratic elite of the new country, this was the first realisation that India could weaponise water against their country and that Pakistan was at the mercy of a hostile government. Little wonder then, that in 2009-10, after India filled the Baglihar dam in 2008, leading to a severe drop in flow to the Chenab river, Lashkar-e-Taiba co-founder Hafiz Saeed made fervent speeches about water flow or blood. In 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari (and also now, after a gap) wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post, flagging water as a major issue between Pakistan and India. While congratulating American President Barack Obama, Mr Zardari pleaded with the United States to re-hyphenate Pakistan with India on a number of issues including water, which, he said, was fraught with serious consequences, not only as a potential environmental catastrophe but also as fuel for the rise of extremism and terrorism in South Asia.

 

India quickly latched on to Pakistan’s vulnerability and after the 2016 Jaish-e-Mohammad attack on an Army base in Uri, an attack that killed 19 soldiers, Prime Minister Narendra Modi observed at a meeting with officials of the water resources ministry that “blood and water cannot flow together”. A few weeks later on the banks of the Ravi in Bathinda, he said he “would not let a drop of the Ravi flow into Pakistan”.

 

It would take nine years for India to announce it was suspending the treaty. What does Pakistan stand to lose by the suspension? Take, for instance, the cost of tomatoes, a staple. Today in Lahore, the price of tomatoes per quintal (100 kg) is between 3,600 Pakistan rupees and 4,000, according to the Pakistan Ministry of Agriculture. But if the water level in the Chenab goes down by September, rabi sowing will have to be delayed. This, in turn, could cause shortages and a serious price spike, leading to price rise.

 

The Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), a state-funded body, has warned the country is looking at absolute water scarcity by 2025. From time to time, Pakistan has sought arbitration over water: When it lost the case over India’s right to build the Baglihar dam, a Senate panel accused the Indus commissioner at the time, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, of “betraying” the country by “giving” India the ability to control water supply. Mr Shah fled Pakistan and sought asylum in Canada. He is now a Canadian citizen, according to newspapers in Pakistan, and demands for his extradition and a trial in Pakistan have been rejected. In 2018, Mr Modi inaugurated the Kishenganga power plant amid calls from Pakistan that the dam violated the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan sought World Bank intervention. Their plea was unsuccessful.

 

Experts say the treaty was an established mechanism for dialogue and communication between two countries that do not engage in regular dialogue. Now neither nation has recourse to this mechanism. Can India build dams fast enough to prevent the flow of water to Pakistan? And will water become the single-biggest instrument of coercion and force Islamabad to change its behaviour? If that happens, it could be a global first. And India will have won a war without firing a shot.