India’s bilateral trade deficit with China continues to grow, in a manner that will concern New Delhi. According to the recent data, in the first seven months of 2026-27, it reached a record $83 billion, 30 per cent higher than in the same period the previous financial year. There is real concern that, over the entire year, it could reach $150 billion. In 2025-26, it had touched $112 billion. It is worth noting, however, that the time of knee-jerk protectionism against Chinese imports is, in general, past. The government has realised that India’s own industrial ambitions require a certain openness to specialised imports from China. India’s electronics production and exports, particularly of mobile phones, have grown considerably in the past year. Much of that growth is dependent upon being part of supply chains that require inputs made in China. It should be noted, therefore, that a growing trade deficit with one country, particularly when it dominates the manufacturing space the way China does, is not necessarily deleterious if it supports India’s own attempts to build a space for itself in manufacturing and other value chains.
The question the government should, thus, ask itself is whether domestic value addition is dependent on other countries and whether supplier ecosystems are emerging within the country at sufficient scale. If that is indeed happening, then at least some of the trade deficit is amply justified. The other question that needs asking is a more difficult one. As the Union finance minister said in Bangkok during the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the fundamental cause of the trade imbalance is that the Chinese market remains difficult to penetrate for Indian goods. She mentioned pharmaceuticals, among others, as a sector that was underperforming in terms of Indian exports to China.
This is not a problem that India alone faces. This is a global imbalance, caused by the fact that China’s state-led economy continues to artificially prioritise investment and production — and thus exports — over consumption. This is why its surplus in merchandise trade reached over $1 trillion in just the first 10 months of 2026, driven in part by growing exports of hi-tech goods that are needed to power the technological and artificial-intelligence transformation. If Chinese firms overinvest and create excess capacity, which then translates into low-cost exports, it is because the structure of their economy incentivises them to do so — through state support, directed credit, local-content preferences, and a slew of hidden and not-so-hidden subsidies. The weak purchasing power of Chinese households — caused by financial repression, quasi-administered wages, and an overdependence on the faltering real estate market as a store of wealth — doesn’t help.
This is not a problem, therefore, that New Delhi can easily solve on its own. It must continue to lobby for easier access to the Chinese market, but the bigger prize is to somehow speed up the internal transformation of the Chinese economy. This might require, in the end, multilateral efforts. It is unfortunate, however, that no attempt is being made at multilateral levels to directly address this. Leadership is required, and the natural candidate for it — the United States — is missing in action. President Donald Trump, who is now in China, is greatly concerned about trade imbalances but does not share this vision of how to address them. He would prefer to cut specific, sector-by-sector deals — but has so far largely failed to find any that stick. India must watch to see if any opening can be created for genuine multilateral action on this front — all while ensuring that its own unavoidable economic integration with China strengthens, and does not weaken, its position in global supply chains.