Nato's China syndrome

From being a distant threat, Beijing takes centre stage

Three issues were expected to dominate the 75th anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in Washington. They were US President Joe Biden’s health, the war in Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas conflict. But it was China that ended up dominating proceedings. This was reflected in the final communique with its unprecedented mention of China. The text approved by all 32 Nato members described China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine, urged Beijing to “cease” all material and political support to Russia’s military, and highlighted concern about China’s nuclear arsenal and offensive capabilities in space. The short point about this explicit language — a departure from bland references to the country in a 2019 statement — is that Nato has signalled a significant intensification of its commitment to Ukraine. As the summit began, the first batch of US-built F16 “Fighting Falcon” fighter jets was transferred to Ukraine from Denmark and the Netherlands, and is expected to be in action later this summer — a major boost for Kyiv’s abilities to stave off successful Russian aerial attacks in recent months. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke of a “clear and strong bridge for Ukraine’s Nato membership”. But this outcome is contingent on the cessation of hostilities first.

Behind the gala dinners curated by star chefs and banquets hosted by royals, Nato members are acutely aware that the future of the alliance (and Ukraine) is critically dependent on a known unknown: The outcome of the US presidential election in November. Ever since his fumbling performance in the first presidential debate last month, Mr Biden’s fitness for office has become an urgent concern. It is unclear if his ability to read his summit speech from a teleprompter without too many stumbles reassured his Nato allies; he does not appear to have allayed concern in his own party. Should Mr Biden choose to soldier on with his campaign, he will likely strengthen the chances of his Republican rival, Donald Trump, making it to the White House. In his first term, Mr Trump had criticised, not without justification, Nato allies’ unwillingness to bear their share of expenditure. Though that asymmetry has changed since, with most member-nations exceeding or meeting their obligations to spend 2 per cent of gross domestic product on the alliance, Mr Trump’s close ties with Mr Putin could add an unpredictable element to the Nato-Ukraine dynamic.

Beijing’s own response to the Nato declaration is to describe the statement as “obvious lies and smears” and insist that trade flows between Russian and China did not target any third party. But the explicit language of the declaration has overtly reshaped the Russia-Ukraine war as a proxy Nato-China conflict. This takes place at a time when Nato members Hungary and Turkey maintain cordial ties with Moscow. So far, China’s aid to Russia has been deep but just short of supplying weapons. But the Chinese military is now on Nato member Poland’s borders, conducting joint military drills with Moscow’s ally Belarus. Such joint drills have been held before, but this is the first exercise since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. How Nato handles the new paradigm of the conflict at a time of a critical leadership transition will be the toughest test of its unity and resilience yet.