Pakistan's lines of control

Forgotten Kashmir: The Other Side of the Line of Control

Author: Dinkar P Srivastava
Publisher: HarperCollins

Pages:304

Price: Rs 699

This book by Ambassador D P Srivastava fills a void in our understanding of the developments in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The author has made a bold attempt to unravel the web of intricacies surrounding PoK since 1947, relying mostly on Pakistani sources, especially the memoirs of major actors who shaped the events there as well as on his own close observations during his posting in that country in the 1990s.

The author offers a fresh perspective on Pakistan’s approach to Jammu & Kashmir where its preferred option had always been the use of force; the camouflaged tribal uprisings in 1947-48 was in reality a well-planned operation backed by the central government, fully in the know of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. It was revealing that the Pakistan government systematically changed the status quo of PoK by way of decrees, constitutional amendments, and central legislation issued from time to time. These changing circumstances not only undermined the will of the people in PoK but also considerably weakened Pakistan’s position on the United Nations’ proposal of holding a plebiscite in 1949 under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).

The author notes that Jawaharlal Nehru demonstrated sincerity in resolving the Kashmir issue by showing flexibility on various alternatives proposed by UNCIP, including a limited plebiscite confined to the valley and proportionate reduction in forces. But these options became untenable as Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces from PoK in violation of the principles of plebiscite based on the UNCIP resolution of August 1948, to which it agreed in writing in December 1948; India was to withdraw only partially since it had the responsibility of assisting local authorities for maintaining law and order. Moreover, Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession to the Indian Union was in accordance with the principles of the India Independence Act 1947.

Through the Karachi Agreement of 1949, Pakistan occupied 80 per cent of the PoK territory as well as the Northern Territories — Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), a fact that was deliberately kept hidden (revealed only in 1993 by a PoK High Court judgement) since it amounted to a violation of the principles of plebiscite. The President of PoK, Sardar Ibrahim Khan, was sacked three times while other local leaders were subdued to fall in line. Frustrations against repeated central interferences were manifested in the Sudhan revolt in PoK in the 1950s. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PoK) interim constitution was adopted in 1974, 26 years after the territory was illegally occupied by Pakistan, but G-B had to wait for another three decades before it got an Assembly in 2009.

The author takes us through the twists and turns in PoK in the aftermath of the Simla Agreement in 1972 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s position domestically was weakened by the creation of Bangladesh. He asserted the immutability of the UNSC resolutions on J&K, even as he candidly admitted in the Pakistan National Assembly that India’s position was stronger on J&K under UN resolutions. There is a hint of a tacit understanding between Indira Gandhi and Bhutto to divide J&K along the Line of Control, which the latter rolled back, domestic compulsions prompting him to keep the issue alive in perpetual confrontation with India. General Zia-ul-Haq tightened the situation in PoK by dissolving the elected government even though there was no sign of revolt. Ironically, Pakistan keenly promoted Azadi in Indian J&K, while denying the same to the people of PoK.

The author exposes duplicity in the United Kingdom’s propagation of a plebiscite in J&K in 1947, while rejecting it in its former colonies, especially in Cyprus where it claimed domestic jurisdiction in 1957. Had this principle of self-rule through plebiscite been applied across regions at that time, several nations would have been liberated much earlier and remained less chaotic today. If Pakistan’s position on plebiscite was weak and wavering from the beginning, the proposal now is even more irrelevant under changed circumstances of direct control of PoK for decades. In contrast, India always upheld democratic credentials and composite culture in J&K.

The book encourages readers to consider how Pakistan’s unilateral measures in PoK have always resulted in painful consequences for India. It continues to use the region as sanctuary and a launching pad for cross border terrorism across LoC. Its illegal occupation deprived India of geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, thus limiting India’s ability to influence developments there. Further, ceding of more than 5,000 square kilometres of northern areas to China under the Sino-Pakistan Treaty in 1963 has given China free will to construct the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which India rightly rejected as a project falling in the disputed region. Security implications apart, CPEC infrastructure projects could embroil Pakistan into indebtedness and force it to lease them out to China on a long-term basis. All these will have long-term consequences for India’s future.

The reviewer is an Indian Foreign Service officer, currently working in the Ministry of External Affairs