A new Sino-centric global order?

BRI has potential to create overseas investment opportunitiesfor the Chinese private sector

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has fascinated several countries around the globe and has also raised questions among many others about the motivations behind this remarkable initiative. Certainly, the BRI is a powerful illustration of China’s growing capacity and economic clout in the emerging global economic and security architecture. Moreover, it is also a conduit of Chinese strategic access. Through this initiative, China is striding towards turning its economic advantage into a political advantage, which will widen the country’s room for strategic manoeuvre.
 
What are the key objectives and expectations from the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), which is scheduled to be held in Beijing on May 14-15? Labelled as the biggest diplomatic event of the year for China, the BRF has three main objectives — to review the progress of the initiative and to build consensus among participating political leaders and professionals to sustain the momentum of cooperation; to discuss major cooperation measures going forward, facilitate greater synergy of development strategies, deepen partnership and work for interconnected development; and finally, to advance international cooperation for win-win outcomes and to foster China’s image as a responsible great power.
 
Since its inception, the BRI has given the broad impression that it’s a Chinese national initiative. However, China underlines that this initiative is meant to be a major international public good benefiting all countries along the belt and road. China expects that the forum will generate synergy among national, regional and global developmental agendas, and thus, will make it more participatory and inclusive.
 
The BRI has become a defining strategy for economic outreach to China’s partners and is an attempt to create a favourable international environment conducive to China’s continuing development. With full political and financial support from the Chinese government, it has become one of the main tasks in China’s diplomacy and an essential research agenda among Chinese universities and the think-tank community.
 
The BRI is also seen as a part of the new round of China’s “opening up” strategy. China is facing challenges of overproduction and overcapacity, particularly in the steel and construction material sectors. This initiative aims to create more overseas demand, and thus could help in addressing China’s domestic economic problems. The BRI also has immense potential to enable tremendous overseas investment opportunities for the Chinese private sector. Further, the BRI promises significant progress in continental and maritime connectivity — both hard and soft, and its effective implementation will be immensely consequential to regional stability and global peace.
 
Most importantly, the BRI is a smart strategy of President Xi which integrates domestic and international goals, and is comprehensively expanding from economic engagement to fostering closer political, cultural and security networks with Chinese characteristics in Asia and beyond. While China claims that the BRI is committed to the principles of “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits”, evidence so far from a few projects under this initiative points to the contrary. In fact, it is a strategy to forge a new network that is centered on China, organised according to Chinese interests and guided by Chinese values.
 
Much of the planned BRI infrastructure is in regions and countries where security is weak and the politics unstable. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or Hambantota Port and Mattala International Airport (Sri Lanka) are some examples and indicators of the fact that China’s decision to invest overseas in such projects is heavily guided by political and strategic considerations. Far from being a game-changer, as proposed under the BRI, many of these projects seem to be economically unsustainable for the host countries.
 
Overlooking India’s sovereignty concerns, particularly with regard to the CPEC, parts of which pass through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), is another question mark on China’s real motivations. Indeed, an article published in the Global Times (the state-run Chinese daily), titled “China ready to play a greater role in resolving conflicts in South & Southeast Asia”, on May 1, 2017, further strengthens reasons for alarm when it says that “Beijing can’t turn a deaf ear to the demands of Chinese enterprises in protecting their overseas investments”. It adds that China has made massive investments in countries along the Belt and Road, and it has “a vested interest in helping resolve regional conflicts including the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan”.
 
When Beijing wants to settle its own territorial disputes with neighbours bilaterally, how does it expect other countries to accept such proposals? Is the logic of “community of shared destiny” under the BRI an extension of a Sino-centric world? Selective interpretation of history and a mismatch between China’s stated objectives and its actions of the ground are increasing apprehensions about the BRI among many countries.
 
Overall, the BRI marks a new phase in the growing salience of geopolitical considerations in Chinese foreign policy. The dream of restoring China’s traditional place and the creation of a Sino-centric order begins to loom large over economic and developmental matters. Perhaps, the BRF will provide a platform to learn lessons from the developments so far from the BRI. China could consider de-linking some controversial projects and adopt a more inclusive approach for greater support and involvement, like it did for the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The writer is a Research Associate at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. The views are personal