Bank resolution regime changes may up creditors' risks: Moody's

Analysts however also noted that it was too early to form any definitive conclusions

International rating agency Moody's has warned that implementation of the bank resolution regime as proposed by the high-level FSDC working group may raise risks of the creditors to the domestic banks and other financial institutions.

"Modifications to the bank resolution framework, if implemented as recommended, may increase the risks for many creditors of domestic lenders, including holders of both senior and subordinated debt," Gene Fang and Srikanth Vadlamani, analysts at Moody's Investors Service said in a note.

At the same time, the analysts noted that while it is too early to form any definitive conclusions, in the event of its implementation, Moody's could lower its assumption of government support for all categories of bank securities, including senior unsecured debt.

In June 2012, the sub-committee of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) had constituted a high-level working group with then RBI Deputy Governor Anand Sinha as chairperson and the then Economic Affairs Secretary Arvind Mayaram as co-chairperson, to suggest ways to strengthen bank resolution regime.

The report was presented to the RBI Governor on May 2 and the central bank has sought public comments on the report until May 31.

Implementation of the report will also require establishing new regulatory bodies and legal framework, a complex and lengthy process.

The problem could arise for creditors as senior debt holders of a bank get priority over other bond holders if the bank goes in for liquidation. Subordinated debt, also known as junior debt, is riskier and considered as second-level debt at the time of winding up operation.

In addition, Moody's said there could be a significant differentiation between bank senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings resulting from the principle of depositor preference, as currently defined under the proposal.

The high-level committee report specifically stated depositor preference as a policy objective, which excludes deposits, inter-bank liabilities and short-term debt from losses in order to limit systemic instabilities.