Book review: Exposing the real motives of Xi Jinping's 'globalisation' rant

Revolution has been a favourite word for book titles, especially for those about China. Elizabeth Economy’s The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, perhaps unintentionally, is different from the rest. Despite the title, the book presents a very convincing portrait of a counter-revolution mounted by President Xi. In domestic and foreign policy, Xi has overturned Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that Economy calls the Second Revolution after that of Mao Zedong. Within weeks of becoming general secretary of the Communist Party in November 2012, Xi left no doubt of the direction in which he wanted to take China — back to the future.

Among Xi’s first field trips was to lead his colleagues on the Standing Committee of the Politburo to visit the National Museum, a short ride across the Tiananmen Square, to view the newly inaugurated “The Road Toward Renewal” exhibition. Walking past the larger-than-life statues of the Buddha, Confucius, and Karl Marx, Xi and his colleagues viewed photos and paintings depicting China’s Century of Humiliation since the Opium War and the party’s stunning achievements since the Communist revolution. Reforming a corruption-ridden communist party, building a powerful innovative economy, and creating a powerful military were to be the tools to realise “the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history”. Within weeks, he flew south to board a guided missile destroyer just back from patrolling the South China Sea to underscore the importance he attached to military dominance as a key part of the dream. The dream consists of “a world-class military, a game-changing economy with world-class technology, and a global footprint that matches — and perhaps even exceeds — that of any other country”.

Economy, who has established herself as a leading expert on China’s environmental challenge and its global hunt for resources, has deployed her vast knowledge to offer a rich mosaic. Her book chronicles Xi Jinping’s policy moves to ensure his personal authority and China’s world leadership. To consolidate authoritarian control (changing the party constitution to make him a leader for life), he systematically dismantled the liberal gains of the past decades such as growing freedom of speech, especially on the internet, greater contact with the world outside, and market economic mechanisms. Transparency and openness have been snuffed out and party control inserted in every aspect of life, from the internet to newspaper and travel. Instead of promoting private enterprise, Xi’s China seeks to dominate the world with its gigantic state-backed firms built on government patronage and often pilfered technology. He has deployed China’s considerable resources to promote soft power through Confucius Institutes and Chinese official media.

The ThirdRevolution Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State Author: Elizabeth C Economy Publisher: OUP, Pages: 360, Price: Rs 1,531

It is a measure of the despondency of the Western world about Trump’s presidency that, notwithstanding Xi’s unabashed authoritarianism, they seemed ready to anoint the Chinese president as the new defender of globalisation, welcoming, in Economy’s words, “an illiberal state seeking leadership in a liberal world order”. The Davos crowd warmly applauded Xi’s keynote address as Trump was settling into the White House. Xi played to the gallery, repeatedly affirming his support for globalisation — something Trump had denounced to win the elections. Nobody seemed to have noticed that in all references to the interconnected world, Xi has added a subtle modifier, calling it “economic globalisation”. (Surprisingly, even the careful analyst Economy seems to have missed the nuance, calling Xi’s speech a “rousing defense of globalisation”.) This is deliberate: China’s version of globalisation is an à la carte system of pushing exports, Confucian paternalistic philosophy, and statist economics, inviting international capital and technology while barring foreign ideas and political values. Economy devotes a chapter to show Xi’s efforts to create the tightly controlled ChinaNet — a chilling negation of the borderless world of information promised by globalisation.

Economy has arranged her rich material in chapters that clearly demonstrate Xi’s all-out efforts to centralise power while building party and state control over all aspects of life. In practice, this meant cracking down on advocates of liberal political reform, curtailing NGO activities, and erecting a Mao-style personality cult — annulling the democratising progress achieved since the Deng Xiaoping era. Meanwhile, China’s state sector “continues to incur ever-higher levels of debt, consume valuable credit, and provide few new jobs” — not the ideal conditions for leading an open global economy.

Her comprehensive chapters on Xi’s ambition to build China as an innovative nation and cope with the environmental degradation also shows the built-in challenges it faces in pursuing global dominance.  Without success in innovation, China cannot rise to the top of the world economy — and without controlling environmental degradation, its economic achievements would be empty. China’s economic ambition is similarly kneecapped by Xi’s determination to keep the party in command. Party control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) — a non-negotiable condition of Xi’s reform — is unlikely to create global winners. As Economy observes, “By enhancing the role of the state and diminishing the role of the market in the political and economic system, as well as by seeking to limit the influence of foreign ideas and economic competition, the leadership has deprived itself of important feedback mechanisms from the market, civil society, and international actors.” She further observes that China’s soft power bid, too, has fallen flat as China is unable to present “a set of social norms, political values, and cultural dynamism that attracts large segments of the world’s population”.
 

Economy deftly weaves her own reporting, anecdotes, and research into the big picture of China’s ambitious push that she relates in this important and timely book. She notes that even before taking over the party secretary’s job, Xi was involved in planning to take over the South China Sea, which he soon included in the list of China’s core interests. Despite promising the US to not militarise the area, he undertook massive reclamation projects, dredging 2,900 acres on which to build airports, missile bases, and communication centres. 

Economy is right that Xi’s calls for a “community of common destiny” affirm his desire for a world order grounded in partnerships (which China has) over alliances (which it does not); still, such concepts remain considerably more in the realm of abstraction than practice.

How successful has Xi been in his prodigious effort to turn China into a major world power and replace the US as the leader not of an alliance but of a “community of common destiny”? Economy remains sceptical. Trump’s America may be loath to lead the way on addressing the world’s many challenges, but “China,” she writes, “is not prepared to replace it. Global leadership requires a willingness to subordinate one’s own narrow interests for the benefit of the larger community.” China’s aggressive stance towards its East Asian and Southeast Asian neighbours, and the growing regional criticism of its Belt and Road debt trap suggest that China does not really believe in a common destiny. 

China has, to be sure, played a greater role in global governance — from UN peacekeeping force to combatting climate change, development assistance to infrastructure financing — but in the field of global security and finance, and certainly in protecting human rights, Xi has in effect pursued a “China First” policy. By reversing the liberalising trend of China’s past decade, by taking aggressive military actions against its neighbours, and by promoting selfish interests in the guise of promoting global development and peace, Xi has shown the hollowness of his claim to world leadership.

Economy avoids predicting either China’s linear rise to greatness or the “inevitable” failure of its contradictory approach. Her well-documented, clear-sighted analysis is a sobering read for readers whipsawed by contrasting predictions of China’s imminent collapse or of its inexorable rise to world dominance.

The reviewer is founding editor of Yale Global and author of Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers and Warriors Shaped Globalization (Penguin)