A hollow submarine fleet?

The govt and the navy must conduct a dispassionate review

The Indian Navy's fleet of 13 submarines, already far smaller than the 24-26 needed for tackling a two-front threat from China and Pakistan, now has another dark cloud over it after potentially vital secrets relating to the six Scorpene submarines that are set to join the fleet over the next three years were leaked. The navy, apparently keen to ensure the smooth induction of the Scorpene fleet, is playing down Australian newspaper reports that a disgruntled employee from French shipyard, DCNS, which is the "original equipment manufacturer" of the Scorpene, stole 22,400 pages of documentation that reveal the vessel's technical specifications, capabilities and vulnerabilities. While Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has said the "worst case scenario" would be determined and catered for, his ministry and the navy seem to have decided, after reviewing only a tiny percentage of the documents leaked, that the damage can be contained. This optimism is in sharp contrast with the concerns of the French officials, who have remarked on the potential seriousness of the leak.

New Delhi must first establish what documents are in the open, and in whose possession. A submarine can survive in wartime only as long as it remains undetected. In the deadly cat-and-mouse game in which anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels scour the ocean for enemy submarines, the ASW side could obtain major advantages from technical information about the radiating frequencies of a submarine's electronics, radar or moving parts such as its propeller. If an enemy obtained such an advantage, it would only be known in wartime when it would manifest in the sinking of one or more submarines. In assessing the loss of Scorpene secrecy, therefore, it would be prudent to err on the side of pessimism, and assume the worst.

True, the "worst case scenario" makes for bleak reviewing. It would mean, as The Australian has pointed out, that India's "six Scorpene submarines, costing a total of $3 billion (Rs 20,000 crore) could be dead in the water before they sail." That demands pursuing restitution with DCNS, which might prove difficult given the defence ministry's traditionally sloppy contracting. The navy can be forgiven for being pessimistic about quickly acquiring more submarines, given the record in this respect. The acquisition of four Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) submarines in the 1980s was mired in scandal, which resulted in the delayed induction and the cancellation of a proposal to induct two more boats. The delay in concluding the Scorpene contract, which was signed only in the mid-2000s, meant that the expertise acquired while building the HDW submarines withered away. Then came a delay of four years when DCNS raised the cost of fitment items.

The point is that reflexive denial or sticking one's head in the sand is not a strategic option. It should now be obvious that DCNS will have to be counted out for the next submarine contract. And, since the extent of security risk involved in the leakage of documents cannot be properly estimated, the government should cancel the contract for submarines on which work is yet to begin at Mazagon Docks. In the contract for six Scorpenes, one - INS Kalvari - has already gone for sea trials, and at most another three would be getting worked on now in the submarine shed. So the contract for the last two submarines should be scrapped, and a new one with another supplier hastened. It would also require speeding up the unacceptably delayed Project 75I, to build six conventional submarines with "air independent propulsion" to quickly fill the gaping void that would have been created in India's submarine capability.