A more mature federation

Is India maturing as a federation or not? Going by the little fracas that developed last week between Nagaland and New Delhi, it would appear not. Nagaland wants to develop its own energy sources; the Centre is saying no. Nagaland says it has the right under Article 371A; New Delhi disagrees. Clearly, Centre-state relations are stuck in a time warp. This is alarming for at least three reasons.

First, until 1996 the states needed the political goodwill of the Centre, but now it is the other way round - no central government can govern efficiently if the states don't co-operate. Second, several provisions of the Constitution have become obstacles in the way of better Centre-state relations. This is because in the matter of political relations, the Constitution borrowed altogether too much from the British-designed Government of India Act of 1935. That Act was intended to maintain central power, not hand it over to the provinces, as they were called in 1935, which were to be managed by "unreliable natives". Sadly, the Congress still views parties that have sprung up after 1947 in the same light. It was in consequence of this that it insisted on "going it alone" until 2002. Deep down, however, in spite of having led a coalition government for almost a decade, it is still distrustful of the "natives". Third, therefore, this government has been buffeted by a boatload of contradictions and has allowed governance to slide as a result because much of its decision making is guided with an eye on winning the next election, Telangana being a case in point. So whether it is fiscal issues like the goods and services tax or national security issues like the National Counter Terrorism Centre; whether it is tensions over foreign policy or control over natural resources; or indeed a host of other issues, the Centre and the states are often locked in combat.

Clearly, this has to change because it makes no sense at all. As evidenced over the last 10 years, excessive economic muscle with the Centre and excessive political muscle with the states are bound to ensure an all-round failure. The time has, therefore, come for new rules of engagement. The National Democratic Alliance in 2000 set up a commission to review the working of the Constitution under a retired chief justice of India, M N Venkatachaliah. Nothing came of that commission, because its remit was unnecessarily large. It would be far better to constitute a body (like the one that looked only at financial laws) to take a completely fresh look at Centre-state relations. The Sarkaria Commission was the last to do so, between 1983 and 1988, and it had recommended a status quo. Political circumstances have changed since then. It is time to set up another commission with the narrow agenda of examining the concurrent list, which, in a very large measure, has now outlived its utility. One of its objectives should be to prune it by moving appropriate provisions to state and central lists.