Of course, autonomy is intricately linked with responsibility. In this context, I would like to flag off a few issues. I won’t dare to advise you or even give suggestions. These are just few observations from someone who has been tracking the Indian central bank for long.
- The RBI has created an enforcement cell recently — a valuable addition to the organisational architecture. But compared with most central banks in developed markets, its market intelligence is poor. Probably, a dedicated cell will do the job better.
- There is a technical committee on financial markets but I am not sure how many meetings it has held in past few years. You may not agree with the market participants but what’s the harm in listening to them? Senior executives of the central bank have also stopped attending the meetings of industry bodies such as FIMMDA (Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association of India) and FEDAI (Foreign Exchange Dealer’s Association of India) which represent the community of bond and foreign exchange dealers.
- The RBI vision document on payments (covering the period between 2015 and 2018) spoke about setting up of an external committee on payments. Has anybody heard about this?
- Probably you would also need to create a panel, including external members with impeccable integrity and expertise, to look into regulations and governance. Currently, the Board for Financial Supervision (set up in 1994) looks into financial regulation and supervision but its focus is primarily on inspection and audit. Based on feedback from different participants, there could be a framework for regulations.
- You may also look at creating a framework for three other critical issues — inflation forecasting, liquidity management and RBI intervention in foreign exchange market.
- On several occasions in the past few years, the RBI’s inflation forecast has been off the mark. This dents its credibility and also influences the Monetary Policy Committee’s approach to the policy rate.
- Right now, overnight call money rate is the prime measure of systemic liquidity. But call money is a very small portion of the entire system. Shouldn’t we have a framework for managing transient and durable liquidity?
- What is the right level of local currency? How do we measure volatility in the foreign exchange market? The RBI doesn’t need to tell the market the preferred rupee-dollar exchange rate but there should be a framework to decide this. Right?
- Also the RBI should welcome investment bankers, private equity managers, treasury experts et al at a senior level. Globally, central bankers do this to build in-house expertise. Similarly, RBI executives should be encouraged to have stints in the private sector to hone their skills. And, instead of a democratic transfer policy where executives are periodically rotated through different departments, I think making some of them stick to certain assignments will help build expertise.
- RBI should also consider setting up an appellate body to deal with bankers' dissatisfaction. It doesn't need to be like SAT (Securities Appellate Tribunal), a separate body to which one can appeal against Sebi (Securities and Exchange Board of India) orders, but it can be on the lines of the Regulatory Decisions Committee of FSA, UK. It’s an FSA board committee but operationally separate from the rest of the UK regulator.
- Finally, you would need to revive the almost defunct local boards of India and recast the central board if you want to change the advisory board into a supervisory board. Of course, the government will play a key role here and your familiarity with the North Block will come in handy to get this done.
Central banking is a science, not an art. By experience, expertise and intuition, most past RBI governors have done a phenomenal job. Appreciation for feedback, efforts towards consensus building and a framework for different policies will perfect that science.