Between BRICS and Quad

Geopolitical shifts have increased difficulties for India

India has some tightrope-walking to do as the Russia-Ukraine crisis drags on for longer than anticipated. This much is evident from the recent flying visits to New Delhi first by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and then by Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Both developments need to be viewed in the context of India’s position over the Russia-Ukraine war, consistently abstaining from voting on all resolutions by both the West and Russia. The international community has broadly recognised the fact that India’s abstentions amount to a balancing act designed to protect its interests. But the growing isolation of Russia in the international community and, by extension, China, due to Beijing’s unequivocal expression of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow just before hostilities broke out has made India a consequential player along this axis.

This is the context behind the energetic outreach by China to secure Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) summit in China in September and a possible trilateral leaders’ meeting on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China dialogue, which China currently chairs. The limited post-meeting readout suggests that India is looking at a resolution of the boundary dispute in Ladakh and along the Northeast and a possible demilitarisation of the borders ahead of any prime ministerial visit. Mr Lavrov’s meeting, which will be scheduled once Foreign Minister S Jaishankar returns from an overseas trip, must be seen in the context of India’s decision to abstain from a UN resolution brought by Russia on the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. India also skipped a post-vote statement explaining its position. Earlier, however, India had indicated disappointment that Russia had not allowed dialogue and diplomacy to play out before its military operations in Ukraine, in language that is considered consequential in diplomatic terms.

New Delhi’s position on Russia-Ukraine hostilities and consistent calls for peace and dialogue must be weighed against the pressures being placed on India by US President Joe Biden to pick a side in the current crisis, at a virtual meeting of the leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) —the US, India, Japan, and Australia —earlier this month. Within this grouping, India has been the exception as the other three members have all unequivocally condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, both Japan’s Fumio Kishida and Australia’s Scott Morrison held pre-planned visits to New Delhi that turned out to be strategically timed in the context of global developments. Interestingly, however, though Japan and Australia have followed the US line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they have not pressured India to do the same. This may be an encouraging development but it is likely to amount to only a reprieve since it is evident that the power-play between the US and China will run through Moscow and Kyiv for some time to come. Ultimately, this might mean that while outward neutrality may serve India well in terms of protecting its immediate economic interests (such as in securing the supply chain for oil and gas supplies) geopolitical shifts will demand that New Delhi will have to face the tricky question of weighing its position vis-à-vis the Quad and BRICS, presenting a major challenge to its position of studied neutrality.