Fixing MPLADS

The Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) was initiated in 1993, committing public money to benefit each parliamentary constituency. The scheme seeks to build relationships between elected representatives stakeholders and ground-level government institutions and civil society. It is a political response to fulfiling those local needs that do not get picked up through the top-down planning process. However, it does create a significant challenge for policy makers and administrators: devising norms, guidelines and procedures for the effective utilisation of the huge funds placed at the disposal of the legislators. There are issues of accountability, determining development priorities, the sustainability of assets and above all, passing the test of a level playing field among competing political candidates.

The scheme's constitutional validity and use of funds was challenged before the Supreme Court. However, a five-member bench dismissed the petition and described MPLADS "constitutionally valid". It was also examined by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. In 2007, the commission recommended to abolish both MPLAD and MLALAD schemes.

The allocation is Rs 5 crore per MP per annum since 2011. Guidelines provide an elaborate inventory of project selection criterion, accounting procedures, selection for implementing agencies, reporting system and monitoring mechanism. It lays a special emphasis on the creation of durable community assets such as drinking water, schools, roads and sanitation, and earmarks allocations for areas inhabited by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The district magistrate and local bodies are the focal authorities for implementation. Up till April, about Rs 29,000 crore has been disbursed, with an outgo of approximately Rs 4,500 crore annually earmarked for MPs.

The Public Interest Foundation commissioned a pilot study in nine districts in the four states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra and discovered some common features. Fulfiling locally felt needs is the point of MPLADS. Thus, the guidelines do not provide an elaborate process for selection of works. There is no prescribed platform or any mechanism where stakeholders can express the needs of the area. Currently, MPs recommend works based on informal information channels - local supporters and party members. The guidelines do not envisage the adoption of works from the district development plan and the prioritisation is often narrowed to selected places preferred by interest groups. Considerations of maintenance do not seem to be a criterion.

MPLADS guidelines have a few missing links. Detailed specifications on maintenance and the transfer aspects of the projects are necessary to ensure the qualitative benchmarking of the assets created under MPLADS. The assets created are transferred to the users' agencies for their maintenance. Systems need to be in place to ensure the sustainable management of assets created under MPLADS - and an annual allocation of 10 per cent of MPLADS fund for maintenance and repair of assets may be introduced. The guidelines merely specify the maximum size of projects, without outlining other equally important aspects to optimise the project outcome such as specifications in terms of project size, coverage, spread, and for durability.

Regarding the allocation of funds to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe population - as is detailed in clause 2.5 of the revised MPLAD guidelines of 2005 - the very basis for allocating funds with reference to under-served group was missing. In none of the four states was there a conscious effort to identify projects that would address the their inclusivity. There is a strong case to revise the MPLAD guidelines to make the relevant provision mandatory.

One of the weakest links found in this MPLADS implementation evaluation study was ensuring proactive disclosure for greater awareness about the MPLADS projects. This needs to be especially strengthened to ensure transparency and accountability. All important information such as the name of the MP, total expenditure incurred, the time taken in completion, the department responsible for upkeep should form a part of this mandatory public disclosure at the physical site of the project; and should be regularly updated on the website.

It was felt that the preference of elected representatives over implementing agencies largely determines the job allocation. According to the norms, the district authority is empowered for the selection of implementing agencies. In general, after getting recommendations from the MP, the beneficiary organisation selects executing agencies of their choice and get the estimation done. In certain cases, especially if the project is in the same vicinity as that of the MP's, the choice of the MP in the selection prevails, though MPs justify the selection of implementing agencies is based on efficiency considerations. In the case of Maharashtra, the majority of the works were recommended below Rs 15 lakh so as to favour the labour societies. And these labour societies, according to the field survey, are run by sub-segments of the community or party workers connected to the MPs.

The field study also highlighted serious operational inadequacies. The guidelines provide for selection within 90 days of the commencement of the financial year. However, the proposals from the elected representatives are received throughout the year. The institutional set up at the district level is inadequate to handle MPLADS. The checking of eligibility, technical feasibility of the projects, financial estimates and in-depth physical verification is very perfunctory.

It is important that the guidelines of the scheme are strengthened so as to create a feasible alternative for integration of MPLADS with the district planning, without jeopardising the flexibility built into the scheme. Mandatory inspection of schemes by state- and Centre-level officials must be adhered to. Moreover, there is a need for proper appraisal of MPLADS spending and their outcomes on the lines of mid-term appraisals of Five-Year Plans. This will help make MPs more accountable. Finally, the scheme should get subsumed in the district and state plan after five years.

Misra is former chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Director of the Public Interest Foundation. Singh is a research associate there