In defence of secularism

Supreme Court limits the scope of identity politics

On Monday, the Supreme Court delivered a judgment with deep and wide implications for Indian democracy. Asked to rule on Section 123 of the Representation of the Peoples’ Act, 1951 (RPA), the apex court underlined the secular, non-sectarian and impartial character of the republic by firmly stating that electoral appeals to caste, creed, language or other divisive factors as the basis for voting could lead to disqualification. A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court passed this judgment by a single vote, as it happens, with Chief Justice T S Thakur tilting the scales in favour of the decision.

The judgment was closely argued but deserves to be carefully scrutinised. In essence, the question turned on whether the RPA, as written, would disqualify candidates who appealed for votes on the basis of their own religion, or whether it would more broadly disqualify candidates who appealed for votes based on the religion of the voters being appealed to. Clearly, the second interpretation is more expansive in its protection of Indian public secularism. This was, in fact, the point that Chief Justice Thakur made when he said, “...an interpretation which has the effect of eroding or diluting the constitutional objective of keeping the state and its activities free from religious considerations, therefore, must be avoided.” It shows a fine appreciation of the scale of the ambition of the founders of the Indian republic and the framers of its Constitution, who sought quite explicitly to create, in a deeply divided society, a unifying and inclusive democratic ethos. However, debased electioneering has become since then, the ideals of the republic remain the same, and that the country’s highest court has chosen to emphasise these ideals and their unchanging nature is very welcome.

Law is about relating the ideal of justice to reality, and it can be nobody’s case that mobilisation on the basis of caste or religion is unknown in India. The dissenting judges, in fact, pointed to the value of such mobilisations as crucial methods to remedy “histories of injustice”. That Indian democracy has seen a sustained increase in the voice and political power of individuals hitherto excluded because of characteristics such as their caste, religion or gender is a tribute to precisely such mobilisations. As can be seen in Uttar Pradesh even today, as it heads towards another Assembly election, caste and religion are fundamental electoral realities. It is important to note that the majority judgment is not saying that addressing historical injustice is grounds for disqualification. That would indeed run counter to the aims of the framers of the Constitution. Nor is mobilisation itself a problem; the reasons that individual voters choose to vote for one candidate or another, and if they choose to do so in comport with other individual voters, are their own. What is seen as problematic, and thus disqualifying, are appeals by candidates on the basis of voters’ identity.

The Supreme Court had a delicate path to discover between electoral reality and the needs of India’s secular identity. The path it has chosen to tread, by a four-three majority, is indeed the one that offers Indian secularism and inclusiveness the greatest chance to thrive even within the constraints of cynical politicking. For those who still disagree, it might be instructive to mull over the ramifications of the opposite ruling.