India needs to manage effects of radicalism, violence in West Asia

In scenes that were shocking even by the standards of violence-torn Afghanistan, the nation's parliament building in Kabul was attacked on Monday morning, presumably by members of the Taliban. According to reports from the scene, all six gunmen died, but not after wounding dozens and creating chaos. A large car bomb was followed by coordinated firing; members of Parliament had to flee the building. It is to the credit of the Afghan security forces that there were no fatalities. This daring attack is a reminder that militant Islamism is not growing more quiescent to India's west. Across a broad band of Central and West Asia, from Xinjiang to Palmyra, there is religion-driven unrest. The number of people driven to become refugees by the rise of the fanatical, medieval-minded Islamic State, or IS, is between 11 million and 13 million; it has caused a major refugee crisis. And the political, strategic and economic implications for India are yet to be understood in New Delhi.

Each of the individual Islamist uprisings, rebellions or movements has its own specific, internal logic. The Pakistan Taliban are partially a resistance movement against still-existing feudalism; the Uighur resist the homogenising Chinese state; the Muslim Brotherhood's demands seek changes to Egypt's economy as much as to its ideological organisation. But it is not wise to assume that, therefore, they are completely separate from each other; the theme of increasing radicalism spreads from one to the other with ease. The rise of the IS - with its unspeakable violence and an open savagery that has not been seen for decades - means that many other organisations, both Sunni and Shi'a, will be forced to resist moderating influences. It is tempting for many powers to view the complicated circuit-board of influences and antagonisms in West and Central Asia purely from the point of view of realpolitik and, thus, to identify and support enemies' enemies - which is what lies behind the IS's mysterious ability to keep its manpower and funding routes intact, even while regional powers are supposedly unified in condemning it. But the struggle, clearly, extends beyond that: it is ideological at its heart.

Given that fact, there is little India can do in a real sense to affect its outcome in West Asia. However, it will become necessary to insulate Indian interests. By and large, Indian Muslims have been resistant to the IS's lure of radicalisation. This must not be taken for granted: ensuring the continuation of this benign fact must be one of the focuses of domestic national security and other policies. When it comes to foreign policy, it must be remembered that millions of Indians live and work in West Asia. Naturally, their safety is paramount. Their remittances, too, are important for the country's economy. However, increasing radicalisation and decreasing oil revenues taken together suggest the stability of their host countries cannot be taken for granted forever. But it is far from clear whether any strategic planning for worst-case scenarios is being carried out. This must be made a priority in New Delhi.