Premvir Das: Why India-US defence ties will endure

US interests in the IOR are likely to continue seeing India as the major regional power

Eyebrows are being raised at the amazing changes in the political environment in the United States, which have brought an entirely unexpected protagonist — Donald Trump — into play and created uncertainty around the world. With a focus on tightened immigration procedures and scrutiny of entry into the country, including those related to work, India is very much an affected party, given its footprint in IT services there. While the larger relationship and its several elements can be discussed separately, how is the changed scenario likely to impact the developing defence cooperation between India and the US?
 
In the last 15 years, military engagement between the two countries has progressed at a pretty fast pace, given the historical suspicion that had existed during the Cold War years. Joint exercises between the armed forces have enhanced qualitatively, the Malabar events at sea leading the way. Purchases of platforms and weaponry have crossed $15 billion in this same period, with force multipliers and aircraft with long reach such as P8I, C130J and C17 added to the Indian inventory.

 
To this should be added American readiness, with the support of Congressional legislation, to transfer high-end technology to us. The transfers have not only made India a reasonably credible Indian Ocean Region (IOR) player, but also emphasise the “major regional power” role that the US would like India to discharge in this part of the world. All this would not have happened if the two countries did not see their mutual concerns in convergence. The question is whether this stance will remain unchanged in the Trump administration.
 

Improvement in defence engagement began during the Clinton days, but picked up only when President George W Bush took a personal interest in enhancing the overall relationship. Mr Bush saw India as one of four or five major powers in the years to come, and one with which the US would have compatible interests. Along with cooperative measures in defence, he supported efforts in countering terrorism and sharing intelligence, and the requisite mechanisms were put in place. His most significant contribution, of course, was to have signed the civil nuclear deal with India, which opened the supply of hitherto frozen nuclear components to India for peaceful purposes not just from the US but from all other countries.

 
The Obama administration did not see India in the same significant terms but continued the generally supportive engagement. The last several years have seen America become more involved with Russian intervention in Ukraine and affairs in West Asia (Syria in particular) and the activities of the radical Islamist group, ISIS. Finally, China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea flowing from the rebuilding of some reefs and for possible use as military stations, with implied sovereignty over those waters, have posed challenges to American predominance. 
 
This brings us to President Trump. His focus areas are now well articulated: Create jobs, “Make in USA”, improve infrastructure, deal with countries bilaterally rather than through multilateral groups, re-negotiate important trade deals and impose immigration restrictions. But as yet we have no idea of his world view and the role that India may be seen to play in it; the new US secretary of defence and the national security advisor do not have backgrounds familiar with Indian concerns. US relations with Russia are likely to improve despite some strongly held views to the contrary by senior Congressmen and Senators, while those with China could see a downturn.

 
The first should facilitate improvement in our own interface with Russia, which has diminished in the last decade partly due to the growing links with the US; this will be a positive. It is the China card which will put our diplomacy to serious test. Affairs in the South China Sea will, almost certainly, test the Trump presidency and America’s perceived interests in the western Pacific. While allies like Japan can be expected to toe the US line, the country that can be expected to come under pressure to take a more assertive position will be India.
 
So far, we have remained diplomatically distanced by maintaining that freedom of navigation and adherence to international laws by all is necessary. Mr Trump, being a self-professed deal negotiator, may ask for something more. Our policy so far has been to seek engagement with the US based on shared values such as democracy and common interests; we may now have to think of positions which will meet the standard of transactions — what do we give in return for what we get? It is a whole new way of doing business in international relations where we may have some learning to do.

 
This having been said, US interests in the IOR — our area of primary interest — are likely to continue seeing India as the major regional power. This will see the defence engagement continuing despite likely Chinese protestations on arms transfers. America’s approach towards Pakistan is unlikely to change very much, given its compulsions in Afghanistan. It will ask us to be more assertive on the South China Sea and reformulation of possible options to do this may already be underway. All things considered, the transition brings both challenges and opportunities. Our trump cards lie in the IOR; how we play them will determine the deal we get.  The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has also served on the National Security Advisory Board