T N Ninan: Turning the tide

On the third anniversary of the attack on Mumbai, today, the success to celebrate on the internal security front may be far removed from Mumbai, and located in the jungles of the tribal heartland of eastern India. The killing on Thursday of Kishenji, ranked third in the hierarchy of the Maoists, is only one element in a developing story. Last year, the man who was then third-ranked, Azad, was also killed, while no fewer than eight members of the Maoist politbureau (which usually has 21 members) are said to be in various jails — including Kobad Ghandy. Several area commanders have been killed in recent months, and news reports from the Maoist-affected states of Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal speak increasingly of the Maoists being on the back foot, with Bihar apparently showing up best in a recent review.

The home ministry is reported to be unhappy even now with the performance of states like Orissa and Jharkhand in facing up to the Maoist challenge, but high-profile Maoist attacks of the kind that was once common have become rare in state after state. The last big attack occurred in mid-2010, when 76 policemen were killed in Chhattisgarh.

It would be premature to claim that the fight against the Maoists is being won. When you are dealing with an insurgency that has survived from the 1950s, and spread to half a dozen states, it will be a very long time before anyone can declare victory. But it may be fair to say that the tide has turned — and that would be no mean achievement. If the story earlier was that the number of Maoist-affected districts was increasing, that no longer seems to be true. The home ministry’s annual report for 2010-11 is careful to make no claims at all about how the fight is going, and the statistics it cites on the number of incidents and people killed don’t suggest a change of trend. What the report does focus on is the effort being put into increasing the size of special forces of all kinds, better equipment, training and mobility (including armed helicopters), and better coordination between state and central forces. It would appear, though, that all those resources are making a difference in the fight on the ground.

One problem is politicians. In state after state that goes to the polls, local politicians have been inclined to do quiet deals with Maoists in the hope of winning a few extra seats. Y S Rajasekhara Reddy did it in Andhra Pradesh, and Mamata Banerjee did the same in West Bengal earlier this year. In each case, though, the Maoists have shown that they use a truce to regroup. Reddy eventually used the Greyhound force in Andhra Pradesh to hit back powerfully, and Ms Banerjee now seems to be doing the same thing in West Bengal. There is no other way to deal with armed rebels.

However, as everyone knows, the battle will not be won with just the gun. The Naxalite movement has its roots in rural poverty and exploitation, and tribal alienation. The reality in rural India has not changed enough to cut off the fresh supply of cadres, which is the key change required. Security forces can and do compound problems because guerrillas are often hard to differentiate from ordinary folk. The government has started special development programmes for affected districts, but it is obvious that more needs to be done. Nevertheless, it is worth pausing on the anniversary of a tragic event, when all security systems failed, to recognise that when it comes to what the Prime Minister once referred to as India’s biggest internal security problem, there is change that one can see.