Zorawar Daulet Singh: The other 'great game'

Russia is working at forging a new Eurasian security architecture as American unipolarity recedes in Western Europe, signalling the end of Atlanticism

The “great game” typically inspires the shenanigans of power politics in South Central Asia. But another game is being played in the core of the international system — in western Eurasia. This one is over the direction of Europe and its consequences for a trans-Atlantic consensus that has shaped international politics since the Cold War. Last month’s trilateral meeting between Moscow, Berlin and Paris in Deauville where French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a “technical, human and security partnership” between Europe and Russia is perhaps the origin of an alternative conception of Eurasian security that could include Russia in a future European security equation.

Observers of Russian politics, including in India, have noticed the ascent of the “westernisers” in Russian foreign policies inferring that this has permanently altered the Russian worldview at the expense of the east. This, however, is not an ideological phenomenon. Neither is it unprecedented. Since the late seventeenth century, Russia has at crucial phases drawn upon the modernisation and innovation processes of Western Europe, while preserving its multivector worldview.

Today’s “modernisation alliances” between Russia and Germany, France and Italy are akin to the interdependence of the past. It is historically appropriate that in lieu, Russia has twice made a decisive contribution to save Europe from itself. By annihilating the hegemonic agendas of Napoleon and Nazi Germany, Russia ensured that Europe remained a plural enterprise, and reinforced its own position as a vital balancer in the continent. Russia’s persistent focus on Europe is based on a historical pattern whereby its principal opportunities – leveraging German industry to modernise Russia, which, in turn, ensures Europe’s energy security – and threats – US military infrastructure in Eastern Europe – have emanated from there.

Ironically, the most potent challenge to Russian security came from the post-second World War American involvement in an emasculated Europe. The end of bipolarity severely weakened the Russian balance in Europe paving the way for an almost unrestrained influence of Washington in European affairs. Despite assurances that erstwhile Warsaw Pact members would not be integrated into the western alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (Nato) eastward expansion proceeded unchecked, paralleled by the European Union’s own expansion into Eastern Europe.

The age of American unipolarity in Europe ended in August 2008. Just two months before the Georgian war, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev made an important speech in Berlin calling for a pan-European security architecture. Medvedev asserted that Russia does not seek to be “embraced” or socialised by the west but wants to play a role as the third pillar in the “whole Euro-Atlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok”.

The ensuing events of August 2008 provided an opportunity to assault the entire edifice of post-Cold War American security policies in Europe. The Russian bluff had finally been applied. In the Georgian war, Russia by smashing a US proxy state in effect froze the expansion of Nato that began in the 1990s and exposed the fragility of US security guarantees in Russia’s near abroad. The Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia was a reflection of this new reality: that without an accommodation of core Russian interests, US defence of the status quo in the Euro-Atlantic space and, indeed, elsewhere would become unsustainable.

What we are seeing is a game of influence between Washington and Moscow over Europe, which gets reflected to some extent in Nato forums. Eastern Europe or “new Europe” has been marginalised since the Georgian war and even further after the global economic crisis, which has made upholding provocative security commitments on the eastern flank of the Eurozone both expensive and dangerous. “Old Europe” or Western Europe, especially Germany and France, is gradually regaining a veto over European political-security issues.

The recent summit between Russia-France-Germany, the second such “brainstorming” meeting time since 2003 when all three opposed the Iraq invasion, is important since this format has bypassed Brussels (the seat of the EU and where US influence is highest) to engage directly on European and global issues. Russia by participating is, in effect, legitimising and shoring up the Berlin-Paris axis in Europe and hoping that this manifests in both countries having a larger say in Nato’s and the EU’s future direction.

By engaging Nato from a relative position of strength, Russia is seeking to shape the postures of the Western European members of the alliance and moderate US preferences. Russia’s high economic interdependence with Europe alone has made this Cold War tactic stale.

Russia is also interested in gaining leverage over conflict resolution in Afghanistan since turmoil there ultimately impacts Russian security via export of terrorists and opium, and threatens to destabilise allied regimes in Central Asia. Since 2008, Moscow has been offering access to Russian airspace to enable Nato to maintain its supply-line in Afghanistan. Aside from expanding logistical routes, Moscow is evaluating providing hardware and training to the Afghan military and has already signed an agreement with Washington to conduct joint anti-narcotics operations in Afghanistan.

Besides acquiring some influence over what happens in Afghanistan, Russia’s engagement with Nato will seek to limit western military investments in the alliance’s newer member states. Finally, given the broader changes in the international system with the likely emergence of the Asia-Pacific region as a core zone of the global political economy, a policy of Ostpolitik also serves Old Europe and Russia as it preserves their leverage on issues of high politics.

While it would be interesting to follow the next Nato summit in Lisbon this November, which Medvedev will attend, one suspects that for Moscow’s vision of “indivisible” or equal security to gain further traction, Russian resurgence would need to continue demonstrating successes in its economic and military modernisation that would enhance Moscow’s bargaining leverage with the west. The aftermath of the global economic crisis and the growing probability of a prolonged stagnation in the Atlantic zone suggests that an opportunity to build a new Eurasian security architecture will find greater resonance in this decade.

The author is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, New Delhi.