One sky, one command

Gone are the days of phased and linear warfare where wars unfolded in neat sequences and in the order of mobilisation, concentration of forces, shaping operations and the final decisive battle, the pièce-de-résistance, in the tactical battle area (TBA). This construct assumed three things: that battlespaces could be geographically contained, time could be sequenced into distinct phases, and contact between forces was the decisive moment. None of these erstwhile assumptions holds today. In a world of networked, interconnected, multi-domain capabilities, the battlefield is not where forces meet. It is a place where effects are generated. Cyber intrusions can paralyse command and control (C2) well before mobilisation. Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) can increase transparency and expose the real-time locations of fielded forces, and long-range precision fires can significantly degrade combat power well before troops come into contact.

In such an environment, the concept of a TBA becomes irrelevant.

In the future, there won’t be a separately demarcated and understood ‘terminal’ phase because conflict will be continuous, contiguous, and span multiple domains. The notion that wars will be decided in the TBA is a hangover from the previous century, where battles were geographically bounded and temporally phased. That construct has been replaced by a fundamentally limitless battlespace where effects will precede direct contact, shape the outcomes and often decide the winner well before the first shot is fired in the conventional sense. The modern battlefield, therefore, needs modern warriors and, more importantly, modern strategists. Not minds which are confined to the comfort of two-dimensional maps, nor commanders who believe that exercising direct control over every piece of terrain and the volume of airspace above it will translate into victory.

The overarching problem is that a traditional mindset still lingers in strategic discourse, creating operational paralysis, thereby stymying progress. Wars of the future will not be won by capturing grids on a map alone —they will be won by shaping outcomes across multiple domains, often beyond what the map can even depict.

The question of who controls the air above the battlefield is almost as old as military aviation itself. During World War I, aircraft were viewed as an extension of land forces, and their primary tasks were reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and tactical support. Air operations remained subordinate to the requirements of armies fighting trench battles. Since aviation was still in its infancy, there was little conceptual distinction between controlling terrain and controlling the airspace above it. However, the rapid development of airpower soon exposed the limitations of this approach. The World War II campaigns in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific reinforced the lesson that fragmented control of air assets reduced effectiveness, while unified command maximised flexibility and responsiveness. The early success of the German blitzkrieg owed much to the close integration of air and land power, but the very manner in which the Luftwaffe was employed in the rest of the war ultimately limited Germany’s strategic potential. Rather than pursuing sustained control of the air as an independent objective, the Luftwaffe was increasingly used as flying artillery in direct support of advancing ground forces. This approach delivered impressive tactical results against Poland and France, but it left Germany ill-prepared for prolonged campaigns against opponents with resilient industrial bases and well-equipped air forces. By subordinating airpower largely to the needs of the army, Germany frittered away the many gains of blitzkrieg, trading long-term strategic advantage for short-term tactical success. Glimpses of the same are visible during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

This section aims to journey through the period from 1914 (WW I) to the present day to examine the intricacies of airspace control and how the concept has evolved. At this stage, it would be prudent to analyse the evolution of joint airspace usage and associated C2 functions through historical datasets. The relationship between land forces and air forces in controlling airspace has evolved through the following distinct phases:

World War I: The army controlled tactical airspace.  During WW I, aviation functioned primarily as an adjunct to the land forces. Aircraft were allocated to armies and corps for reconnaissance, artillery observation, liaison between adjoining forces and tactical bombing. Their employment was directly under the command of the ground commanders. Airspace control was primarily based on predetermined procedures (procedural control), relying on geographical sectors, time- and altitude-based separation to avoid conflicts, and pre-planned artillery schedules. There was no centralised authority, nor were there any radars and therefore no composite air situation picture.

The inter-war period: Emergence of independent air commands. The limitations of army-controlled aviation led theorists such as Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell to argue that air power should be centrally commanded to exploit its operational and strategic potential. Their central proposition was that the land commanders should ask for air effects, but air forces should control the employment of air assets. In the book, The Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet has gone on to say, “Aerial offensives, which can be carried behind the enemy’s lines where neither land nor sea weapons can reach, may prove helpful to either the army or the navy. But just because such aerial cooperation may prove helpful to them does not necessarily mean that such aerial weapons should be placed under the direct control of either of them, if for no other reason, to avoid dividing them”.

World War II: Centralised airspace control.  Just prior to the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force’s Dowding System integrated radar stations, observer networks, filter rooms and fighter control centres into a unified command architecture. Rather than allocating fighters to the local land commanders, Fighter Command exercised centralised air control over the entire air battlefield.

The Normandy landings (1944). Perhaps one of the most complicated joint operations successfully executed by the land, sea and air forces was the Normandy landings in June 1944. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force managed a highly congested airspace through dedicated air corridors, altitude blocks, fire support coordination measures, airborne operation zones and naval gunfire coordination. The number of aerial assets involved during the invasion was staggering. 11,590 military aircraft supported the invasion, nearly 1,400 transport aircraft were involved in paradrops and over 3,700 fighter aircraft provided air cover. The ground headquarters requested air support, while the centralised air headquarters allocated and deconflicted airspace. What must be understood here is that if centralised control was not in place, the entire war effort would have been wasted. The land and naval forces must concentrate on their primary tasks and leave airspace control to those who have been given that mandate.

The Vietnam War: North Vietnam had centralised radar networks with SAMs, fighter control and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) as part of the system. All these were placed directly under a unified air defence (AD) command. The US strike packages required centralised synchronisation of escorts, electronic warfare aircraft, helicopters and refuelling. This demonstrated that airspace management had, by then, become an operational-level function.

The Arab-Israeli Wars (1967 and 1973). In 1967, Israel achieved effective control of the air through offensive counter-air missions, destroying opposing air forces before they could come to bear on its own land forces. This was done through centralised command and control of all aerial assets, with tactical freedom for land forces to use their integrated aerial assets under a unified command structure. In 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian forces operated beneath a centrally controlled integrated air defence system comprising radars, SAMs and AAA. The army manoeuvred within an AD umbrella rather than controlling the airspace independently.

Operation Desert Storm (1991): The coalition forces introduced a modern model of centralised theatre airspace management through the Joint Force Air Component Commander  using the Air Tasking Order  and Airspace Control Order to coordinate activities of all involved forces. The land commanders nominated targets and requested effects, but the airspace allocation and mission execution remained centralised.

The drone era (Nagorno-Karabakh): Azerbaijan had an integrated command structure incorporating all elements like UAVs, loitering munitions (LMs), EW and artillery. Artillery units received targeting data from drones but did not control the drones independently.

The drone network served the entire campaign rather than individual formations.

From WW-I to contemporary multi-domain operations, land forces have increasingly become important users of the air domain. Helicopters, UAVs, missiles and SAMs have now become ubiquitous across the entire battle space.

However, the authority to manage the airspace, including identification, deconfliction, dynamic tasking, AD coordination and prioritisation has historically migrated towards a specialised air command with a comprehensive theatre-wide perspective, rather than further fragmenting command and control.

In warfare, control of territory is rarely confined to land alone. Every battlefield extends vertically into the air, and as military technology proliferates, from drones to LMs, attack helicopters to guided rocket systems, and from surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) to SAMs, the question of who controls the airspace above the battlefield has become increasingly important. When operating in the same battlespace, delineating C2 responsibilities is not just a procedural matter — it is an operational imperative. Today’s battlefield bears little resemblance to that environment.

Recent conflicts have highlighted the consequences of inadequate and inefficient airspace management. In the Russia-Ukraine war, both sides struggled to deconflict manned and unmanned systems, control of air defence (AD) weapons and use of long-range aerial and terrestrial-based weapons. The result was confusion, suboptimal use of the aerial domain and, most importantly, inadequate control of the air. Similarly, during the US-Iran war, three F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft were shot down by friendly fire, AD systems were unable to detect drones and LMs, and ballistic missiles were being extensively fired by both sides, all at the same time. How then does one optimally control the airspace? 

What needs to be clearly understood is that airspace is not real estate. Unlike terrain, which can be captured and held by boots on the ground, operations in the airspace are far more fluid, fast-moving and interconnected. A fighter aircraft flies at a tactical speed of 14 kilometres a minute, covering nearly 100 kms in seven minutes. A missile can pass through multiple terrestrial sectors, such as the TBA, concentration areas, assembly points, and rear maintenance areas, in a single launch. Drones, surveillance platforms and satellites can simultaneously operate over the same piece of land at different altitudes. Now imagine dividing this already- crowded and congested space among multiple users and stakeholders, each controlling their own assets. The result can never be effective C2; it would result in mass confusion, a rather uncomfortable situation for a commander. 

The evolution of air power and airspace control from World War I to the drone age.

Modern warfare demands that the entire air dimension of the battlespace be handled as a single, coherent system, requiring real-time coordination of aircraft, drones, and missiles; continuous tracking and identification of all airborne assets; and dynamic targeting when needed. The battle managers should not be worrying about who owns which asset – they should focus on the orchestration of battle, which will require unity of command, a fundamental principle of air combat that terrestrial forces need to appreciate and understand. When different entities and services attempt to control overlapping airspace, the risks begin to multiply. In future wars, despite advanced technology and greater visibility, the fog of war still exists, and dividing the airspace into sectors, akin to conventional terrestrial battles, would only compound it. Friendly aircraft may be mistaken for hostile; multiple systems may engage the same target; and resource allocation will suffer due to incorrect prioritisation. The bottom line is that fragmentation will reduce combat effectiveness.

This does not mean that the army’s concerns are misplaced. Far from it. They must retain the ability to react when required, be proactive when needed and, more importantly, deploy the weapons of choice when and where needed. Every soldier may soon be a drone operator. But not every drone operator can be an airspace manager —the bottom line is that capability grants access to the airspace, not ownership of it. While technology can democratise access to airborne systems, it must not democratise responsibility for airspace management. Possessing aerial capability has a force-multiplier effect, but it does not automatically confer the right to independently control, deconflict, and manage the skies. 

A schematic showing the proposed division of airspace between the army and the air force, with a buffer zone for deconfliction to enable safe and coordinated operations.

There is a crucial difference between operating in the battle space and controlling it. The land forces must deploy and use all available air defence assets and be able to operate drones for surveillance and targeting. But these capabilities must operate within a larger, centrally controlled framework to enable coordinated operations. It is not about inter-service hierarchy — it is purely operational logic. Air forces are structured, trained, and equipped to manage exactly such complexities by integrating data from multiple sensors, coordinating airspace requirements, balancing offensive and defensive postures, and regulating the tempo of the battle to minimise enemy air interference.

The Union War Book of India clearly mandates that India’s air defence be entrusted to the Indian Air Force (IAF). In line with the mandate, the IAF embarked on an ambitious project to develop the Air Force Network (AFNet), linking all air force units via a dedicated, secure communications network. Building on the backbone of AFNet, the IAF developed the Integrated Air Command and Control System, designed to handle India's air defence. The system was envisaged to integrate all shooters and sensors nationwide, including civilian radars and army AD assets. With long-, medium-, and short-range sensors and shooters, fighter aircraft, the Airborne Warning and Control System, and inbuilt redundancy, the system has been the backbone of AD in India for over two decades. The Indian Army embarked on a similar programme called Akashteer, and the Indian Navy created its own system called Trigun. All three systems were independent and did not communicate with each other.

The IAF had overall situational awareness across the country due to the extensive coverage of IACCS, making it best suited to lead airspace control, while other services contributed capabilities and sensors. Lately, the large-scale proliferation of drones, SAMs, and surface-to-surface long-range vectors used by land forces has sparked a debate over ownership and control of all assets operating in the battlespace. Rather than contributing to improving command and control, the debate is about who should control the airspace. A legacy thought process because of a legacy mindset. What should be debated and focused on is not who controls the assets, but how to use them efficiently. There is a need to understand the fundamental paradigm that airspace is not a commodity to be divided. It is a space to be managed because, in war, coherence will be decisive.

A mechanism designed to ensure efficient airspace management is depicted in the graphic above. This system has been in vogue for some time and has proven efficient. Integrating sensors and shooters of all users would enhance the effectiveness of airspace management protocols and mechanisms. One must remember that flying in or operating through common airspace is a capability. Command and control of that airspace is a responsibility that comes with accountability because more users in the air demand greater control, not less.

The modern battlespace is not just a geographical area – it is a dynamic continuum of highly contested effects spanning land, sea, air, space and cyber domains. There will not be any fixed boundaries, no clearly defined frontlines and Forward Edge of Battle Area, nor will there be a Forward Line of Own Troops. The battlespace will exist simultaneously across all domains at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Actions in one domain will generate immediate effects (first-order, second-order, or cascading) in other domains. Viewing the battlespace through a purely land-centric lens would be tactically unwise because it extends vertically into air and space, laterally into cyber networks, and invisibly into the cognitive domain. Pure airspace control, therefore, will not suffice. Increasingly, it will be about battlespace control across domains, with the air domain as the primary manoeuvring space for speed, reach and simultaneity. 

A Ukrainian serviceman launches a Leleka reconnaissance UAV in Ukraine in May 2026 (Photo: Reuters)

The way forward is rather simple, and one must strive to be altruistic. The answer does not lie in redistributing control downward, but in integrating capabilities up the chain and outwards into the web, which is the heart of systems warfare. In an era when wars may be won or lost well before boots on the ground come into contact, clinging to archaic ideas like TBA and asset ownership is not just outdated but operationally dangerous. The battlefield is no longer just real estate: It is a continuum in which control must belong not to the nearest commander but to the best-suited commander who can see and shape the entire battlespace. A starting point is integrating all shooters and sensors into a single, seamless network. The rest will follow. For necessary operational freedom, the system requires adequate visibility and transparency, and for that, Akashteer needs to be integrated with the IACCS, which is a sine qua non. Littorals, ownership of assets and the desire to get everything ‘under command’ have no place in this mosaic and are best forgotten.

In the end, this is not a debate about control of airspace – it is a question of confidence. The land forces must have confidence in the air force and its capabilities, because that is the air force's primary job, and it is fighting on the same side. A soldier advancing across rugged terrain, armour breaking through a narrow corridor, and an infantry battalion holding on to an important bridgehead should not be looking up, wondering who owns the sky and whether the next threat will appear from above. Their focus must remain where it matters the most: the fight in front of them. This assurance cannot come from fragmenting airspace into tactical fiefdoms. It comes from knowing that the domain above is being managed with clarity of purpose and unity of command that match and often surpass their own operational tempo. It comes from the quiet, professional certainty that experts are watching the immediate battle, seeing the larger picture, prioritising, and neutralising threats well before they even materialise at the tactical edge. Modern wars demand that land forces fight unburdened by the anxieties of the vertical dimension while simultaneously utilising it for their own advantage. Air and space power, when centrally orchestrated, do more than just support the battle. They sanitise, shape and, where possible, preempt it.

The true measure of effective air space control, therefore, is not how visibly it is exercised on the front, but how little it needs to be questioned by those fighting. When the foot soldier no longer worries about the sky, it is not a sign of neglect —rather, it is a mark of mastery.