Civil-military synergy: More urgent than ever for national security

It is time for third-generation reforms to improve coordination between the two arms, as modern threats demand unified civilian-military responses, not siloed strategies

Both the civil and military arms of a nation are crucial to governance, with jointness — collaboration among services — and integration, which involves alignment between civil and military institutions, as key aspects.

 

Civil-military coordination varies across political systems — authoritarian regimes see military dominance, while democracies emphasise civilian control. Post-colonial India has had to consciously evolve its civil-military relationship, shifting from a command-driven structure to one based on democratic norms and institutional synergy. Samuel Huntington’s 1957 all-time classic on civil-military relations advocates military autonomy under civilian control. Echoing this, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his first Combined Commanders’ Conference in 2014 stressed the need for a professional military operating within the framework of civilian supremacy. Of the 100-plus countries gaining independence after World War II, more than 70 experienced military rule. In contrast, India has upheld democratic governance and civilian control, achieving success in civil-military coordination despite challenges.

 

When it comes to providing aid to civil authorities — whether in times of disaster or for maintaining law and order — civil-military coordination in India has been notably successful. Their support is marked by speed, discipline, and unique capabilities such as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) emergency response, heli-lift, and underwater rescue. Their role extends beyond borders, evacuating Indians during crises  and serving as “first responders” in regional humanitarian efforts.

 

Despite a shared commitment to national security, there are differences between the civil and military wings. Military officers, trained in a command-and-control system, value hierarchy, speed, and uniformity  — irrespective of personal views — which is unlike the civil services. Short-tenures in the military limit continuity, while civil services enjoy longer tenures, creating asymmetry in institutional memory. Differences arise in areas like procurement—where the military prioritises operational performance, but the ministry insists on lowest bidder selection; and modernisation, where rigid military standard operating procedures can delay technology adoption.

 

Natural assets like land, spectrum, and airspace are also contested: The military sees them as vital for preparedness, while civilian authorities view them as national resources for broader development. Duplication in logistics, training, and infrastructure across the three services reflects a lack of joint planning and is viewed as inefficiency by the civil side.  All this has resulted in a deep trust deficit in civil-military relations over the years.

 

The 1999 Kargil War exposed serious coordination gaps. In its aftermath, the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was established to enable joint planning, along with the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for improved intelligence sharing, and India’s first tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command. Although the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was proposed, it was not implemented at the time.

 

Strategic policymaking was strengthened with the appointment of a National Security Advisor and the empowerment of the National Security Council, while the National Technical Research Organisation boosted technical intelligence capabilities. A Department of Border Management was created to reverse the earlier approach of keeping border areas underdeveloped, and a new defence procurement procedure (DPP) was introduced to better address the unique requirements of the armed forces.

 

These reforms marked a shift in India’s security approach. They emphasised modernisation, tech adoption, and border development. However, they overlooked civil-military trust deficits and optimal dual-use resource use. However, the IDS, DIA, and the Andaman and Nicobar Command — fell short of expectations due to weak statutory backing and limited operational impact. Similarly, the DPP did not succeed in significantly accelerating defence acquisitions.

 

The 2019 creation of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) marked the second-generation reforms in civil-military relationship. The CDS, as DMA secretary and principal military advisor to the defence minister, oversees tri-service agencies and promotes jointness in operations, logistics, training, and support. The formation of the DMA marked a smooth transfer of functions from the Department of Defence. In 2023, jointness gained statutory backing through the Inter-Services Organisations Act, which empowered theatre commanders with authority comparable to that of Army General Officers Commanding in matters of command, control, and discipline across the services.

 

The 2019 reforms significantly advanced jointness, especially in training and logistics. Theatre commands are under active discussion, signalling further transformation. The creation of DMA also improved civil-military coordination, resolving long-pending issues with significant dual-use implications.

 

In 2021, policies related to geospatial data and drones eased long-standing defence restrictions. The exclusive economic zone was opened up for oil exploration. Border infrastructure development was accelerated, defence-controlled airspace was made accessible, and dual-use of defence airfields was enabled — without compromising military needs. Land transfers are now resolved more swiftly. Cultural alignment, digitisation (such as the SPARSH system), and the expanded export role of defence attachés reflect broader institutional change. Capital expenditure has risen, signalling a renewed focus on modernisation. Recruitment and training reform through the Agniveer scheme has also been implemented. Though still unfolding, these second-generation reforms are already making a lasting impact.

 

Modern warfare’s blurred civil-military lines demand third-generation reforms aimed at deeper integration. Hybrid threats — such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and proxy wars — necessitate joint civilian-military responses. Rapid advances in dual-use technologies like artificial intelligence, drones, and space systems require co-development with civilian innovators, especially in an era of global tech sanctions and supply chain vulnerabilities.

 

Lawfare—using legal tools as strategic weapons—is increasingly employed by states exploiting loopholes in international agreements (particularly in the maritime domain) or legal vacuums in emerging areas like AI and drones, allowing them to gain advantages without direct conflict. Grey-zone warfare now spans nearly all domains, including the weaponisation of soft power, energy, health, and education.

 

A quick review of today’s  most serious security threats—Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, the growing Russia-China axis, erosion of globalisation, critical mineral concentration, cyberattacks, or the weakening of nuclear deterrence — all underscore the inadequacy of siloed responses. These complex 21st-century threats demand a whole-of-society approach and unprecedented synergy between civil and military institutions, making a strong case for third-generation reforms in civil-military relationship.

The author is a former defence secretary and currently a distinguished visiting professor at IIT Kanpur